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This dissertation is in the first place an interpretation of  the thought of  Michel 
Foucault. Beyond interpretation, it also makes provides a qualified defense of  his views 
on the significance of  ethical theory, particularly in its “critical” forms, the shape of  the 
space of  reasons, and the role of  subjectivity within it. 
I take as my starting point an orthodox view of  Foucault’s work, namely, that it 
can divided in terms of  its content into three distinct periods. First, an “archaeological” 
phase spanning most of  the 1960s. Second, a “genealogical” devoted to unearthing 
power-relations beneath purportedly progressive institutions. Finally, an “ethical” period, 
focused on rehabilitating practices of  moral self-formation in Antiquity. This so-called 
“ethical turn” has been a source of  persistent criticism of  Foucault’s thought for several 
decades. 
I claim that this periodization is mistaken. There is no substantively “ethical” 
period in Foucault’s work that would stand in contrast to his genealogical inquiries.  In 
the first chapter, I present overwhelming textual evidence against this interpretation, and 
then diagnose the motivation for it: the charge of  “ethical nihilism” and the demand for 
a normative framework from critics of  Foucault’s genealogical works. In brief  the charge 
is that in revealing the power-relations that partially constitute Enlightenment institutions 
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and the ideals that sustain them, Foucault deprives himself  of  the resources required to 
construct the kind of  ethical theory needed to ground his critical project. 
In the second chapter and third chapters, I bring Foucault into conversation with 
several figures in analytic philosophy, most prominently Wilfrid Sellars and the 
“Pittsburgh School,” and P.F. Strawson. I argue that Foucault’s archaeological and 
genealogical works are best construed as an historical inquiry into the construction of  
“spaces of  reasons,” in which we find ourselves subject to normative evaluation and 
direction. I then argue that the charge of  nihilism against Foucault is the result of  a 
process of  neutralizing and depoliticizing the essentially plural, agonistic character of  the 
space of  reasons. I conclude by using my interpretation to explain and defend Foucault’s 
controversial engagement with the Iranian Revolution. 
Patrick Gamez 
As always, for my mother, without whom I doubt I’d have amounted to much at all
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1DID FOUCAULT DO ETHICS?
§1.1 What, If  Anything, Comes After Genealogy?
 It has become something of a commonplace, if not outright orthodoxy, in 
Foucault scholarship to divide his work into several periods. Foucault’s earliest works are 
sometimes the subject of discussion: Mental Illness and Psychiatry, or his introduction to 
Kant’s Anthropology. And his very early History of Madness has rightfully been at the centre 
of a great deal of scholarly dispute. But, more or less, the established periodization of 
Foucault’s work has three parts. First, there is the “archaeological phase,” exemplified in 
The Birth of the Clinic, The Order of Things, and The Archaeology of Knowledge. This “first” 
phase is set off from the second phase by an extended silence in publishing by Foucault, 
which is explained with reference to Foucault’s realization of the “methodological 
failure” of archaeology.1 This is followed by a second, “genealogical” phase, in which 
Foucault’s concerns are taken to shift from the autonomy of discourse and the 
production of knowledge to the effects and mechanisms of power. The works attributed 
to this genealogical period are, more or less obviously, Discipline and Punish and The Will to 
Knowledge, the first volume of The History of Sexuality. This genealogical period, similarly, 
is followed by a relative silence; Foucault publishes no major monographs between 1976 
and 1984. A third period, in which Foucault’s concerns are taken to centre on “ethics” or 
1
 1  See both Dreyfus and Rabinow. Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (2nd ed. 
Chicago IL. University of Chicago: 1983) and Béatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between  the 
Transcendental and the Historical (Trans. Edward Pile. Stanford CA. Stanford University Press: 2002).
the “history of the subject,” includes the last two volumes of The History of Sexuality: The 
Use of  Pleasure and The Care of  the Self.  
 And a good deal of scholarship on, and dispute about, Foucault hinges on this 
periodization. To a great extent, its scholarly acceptance is tacit or passive. Jeffrey 
Nealon, for instance, despite the “caveat that ‘this periodization is only indicative and is 
discussed and criticized’” in her text, adopts it from Beatrice Han wholesale.2  And in 
Timothy Rayner’s fascinating text, Foucault’s Heidegger, the “turn” or break between the 
genealogical and “ethical” works is simply taken as a datum to be explained (in this case, 
by appealing to Foucault’s latent Heideggereanism).3  Indeed, explaining the apparent 
“rupture” between his “middle” and “late” period seems to be an urgent task in Foucault 
studies. Whereas there seems to be a more or less accepted explanation of the shift from 
archaeology to genealogy – the “methodological failure” of the former – there does not 
seem to be any established account of just what “moved” Foucault from his middle to 
late period.4 And the stakes are high. Not only Foucault’s “archaeological” work, such as 
The Order of Things with its manifest hope that “man would be erased, like a face drawn in 
sand at the edge of the sea,”5 but his work of the mid-70s on power, seem to be radically 
anti-humanist; the “subject,” it appears, is for Foucault nothing more than a precipitate 
of strategies and mechanisms of power, and hence we subjects don’t seem to be capable 
of any sort of robust resistance to power. If Foucault is correct about this, then how 
2
 2  Nealon, Foucault Beyond Foucault: Power and Its Intensifications since 1984 (Stanford CA. Stanford 
University Press: 2007), p. 2. Cf. Foucault’s Critical Project, p. xiii. 
 3  Foucault’s Heidegger: Philosophy and Transformative Experience (New  York NY. Continuum: 2007). In 
particular, see the first paragraph on p. 86, referring to Foucault’s “ethical turn” in the early 80s as 
something to be explained. 
 4 Note that I am not endorsing this explanation, just registering it.  
 5 The Order of  Things: An Archaeology of  the Human Sciences (New York NY. Routledge: 2002), p. 387. 
could Foucault turn to a history of the subject? Wouldn’t admitting something like a 
“subject,” that could have a history, fly in the face of  the work of  all his previous work? 
 What I hope to do, however, is to undermine that very periodiziation: in 
particular, the positing of a “turn” in Foucault’s thought from genealogy to ethics. My 
strategy in doing so will be to present an overwhelming amount of evidence against the 
idea that Foucault is providing us with an ethics, before trying to make sense of how he 
came to be seen as doing so in the first place. 
 In the first part of this chapter, I will first look at how this periodization has 
emerged, specifically, its basis in Foucault’s own reflections on his work. I will then show 
that characterizing Foucault’s late works as a “turn to ethics” is premature and 
unwarranted in light of the vast array of text stating otherwise. I then diagnose what I 
think is an anxiety that underlies the tendency of many of Foucault’s commentators and 
critics to posit such a turn. Finally, I shall show that the conceptual or problem space in 
which such anxieties take form is by no means the only one available, and that we are 
better off relocating ourselves in order to fully grasp Foucault’s insights. All of this will 
inevitably embroil me in presenting and explicating in at least some detail Foucault’s 
reception-history, and I ask the reader’s patience wading through these waters. It will be 
necessary to sweep away a great deal of interpretation before I can present a positive 
account of what Foucault is doing, one with a firmer basis both in Foucault’s texts, and 
one which will not only avoid but give us reason to reject the sorts of criticisms levelled 
against him by, for example, Habermas and Nancy Fraser, among others. 
 In 1984, at the very end of his life, Foucault in several venues gives us a brief 
overview of his work as comprising a singular project. In both the 2nd volume of the 
History of Sexuality and the essay “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault describes this 
singular project as comprising 3 “axes” or dimensions. In the former, he places his 
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detailed historical examination of sexual medicine, discourse, and morality in this 
context:
To speak of “sexuality” as a historically singular experience 
also presupposed the availability of tools capable of analyzing 
the peculiar characteristics and interrelations of the three axes 
that constitute it: (1) the formation of sciences (savoirs) that 
refer to it, (2) the systems of power that regulate its practice, 
(3) the forms within which individuals are able, are obliged,to 
recognize themselves as subjects of  this sexuality.6 
He goes on to say that the first two axes, or the tools required for their investigation, 
were dealt with in his earlier work, and that the third axis, or the tools required for 
dealing with it, is the focus of the volume in question (and, likely, of the projected future 
volumes of the unfinished History of Sexuality). In this context, though, it’s not clear 
whether or not this is an overview of the entirety of Foucault’s oeuvre, or at least of its 
development from the mid-60s onwards, or whether or not these are simply the axes 
along which it is necessary to analyze sexuality as “a historically singular experience.” 
 In “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault seems to imply that sexuality is one 
domain in which these three axes intertwine, but that his project, as a whole and in 
general, has been to develop these three axes as axes of investigation. In the essay, he 
describes the questions – in their most general forms – that have guided him: 
How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? 
How are we constituted as subjects who exercise or submit to 
power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of 
our own actions?7
So, we have an account from Foucault in which he explains his project as, all along, a 
unified one taking place along 3 “axes” of investigation, axes that clearly seem to 
respectively correspond to Foucault’s archaeologies of the 1960s, his genealogical works 
of  the early and mid-70s, and whatever it is that he’s doing from roughly 1979 onward. 
4
6  The Use of  Pleasure: Volume 2 of  the History of  Sexuality. New York, NY. Vintage Books: 1990. p. 4. 
7 “What is Enlightenment?” in The Politics of  Truth. p. 117. 
Famously, one of the name given to this project is “historical ontology,” or the 
“historical ontology of ourselves.” As the name suggests, the historical ontology of 
ourselves is, ultimately, about figuring out who we are now. This is ontological, insofar as 
Foucault thinks that we are constituted in our very being as subjects, of knowledge, power, 
and our own action. Characterized thusly, and without a detailed exegesis of how such 
“constitution” actually occurs, Foucault’s project seems anodyne, and even traditional. It 
echoes the Delphic imperative to know oneself, only with the proviso that to know 
oneself requires us to know who we have become, and how. While Foucault might share 
this aim with Socrates, and consequently the trait of annoying those who would rather 
not leave such things radically open to question, he also more explicitly links his works to 
some of Kant’s “occasional” writings. The new line of inquiry Kant opens up in his 
answer to the question “What is Enlightenment?” and by which Foucault orients his 
approach is, in essence, “What just happened?” 
 For Foucault, when Kant asks “What is Enlightenment?” he is asking “What is 
this thing that has just happened to us?” But in asking this, Kant is not merely reporting 
on current events, not narrating a story in which we simply happen to be embroiled as 
characters. The Kantian innovation, for Foucault, is in taking some historical event to be of 
ontological import, that as new ways of subjecting ourselves to knowledge, power, and 
action become available (and perhaps, eventually, hegemonic), we are altered as subjects. It 
is in making the question of what just has happened to us an essential dimension of the 
question of who one is that Foucault historicizes  his ontology (or, for that matter, 
ontologizes his history): that is, that makes his project one of  “historical ontology.” 
 As it happens, the unity of “historical ontology” has often been overlooked, 
though the division of Foucault’s work along three axes has been a very influential way of 
describing his project, tacitly shaping his reception. Paul Rabinow has used it to organize 
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the three volumes of Foucault’s “essential works” in English. It has been adopted by 
Arnold Davidson, the general editor of the English translations of Foucault’s lectures at 
the Collège de France, in his influential essay “Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics.” This 
might be enough reason for dwelling on the alleged three projects of archaeology, 
genealogy, and ethics; it has shaped our reception of Foucault, and thus must be 
assessed. But I am dwelling on it for the further reason that it serves to introduce some 
interpretive issues, the settling (and even the articulation) of which will in turn bring up 
some basic conceptual issues that need to be addressed. 
 If “historical ontology” is the guiding thread in Foucault’s inquiries, it involves, in 
general, figuring out who we are by investigating how we have become – that is, been 
constituted as – the subjects we are. And we are constituted thus in three ways: namely, how 
we constitute ourselves as subjects (and objects) of our own knowledge, as subjects who 
exercise or submit to power relations, and as (moral or ethical) subjects of our own 
action. This is the picture that Foucault gives us in “What is Enlightenment?” And many 
of Foucault’s commentators have taken Foucault’s investigation of the first axis to 
comprise his “archaeological” work, or perhaps even an “archaeological method.” 
Similarly, the second axis is supposed to be somehow related to “genealogy,” to Discipline 
and Punish and the first volume of the History of Sexuality. Conveniently, these distinctions 
seem to correspond fairly neatly to a chronological periodization of Foucault’s work; an 
“archaeological phase” in the 1960s, a “genealogical” phase in the 1970s, which then 
might be followed by some third phase in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, these 
periods being identifiable at the least by gaps between major monographs.  
 But it’s not exactly clear how these different characterizations fit together, or 
what the objects of Foucault’s descriptions are. One might be tempted to ask, if there are 
these three distinctions to be made in Foucault’s work, and the first might be subsumed 
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under the terms “archaeology” and “genealogy,” respectively, then how would we 
characterize the third axis? 
 Perhaps the most prominent way of doing so has been as a “turn” to “ethics.” In 
other words, Foucault’s analytic distinction between the three axes of investigation is 
superimposed on a developmental reading of his work, such that the shift in apparent 
subject-matter from investigating technologies of power to those of subject formation is 
also read as a chronological division. This is already a loaded interpretive choice. 
 As mentioned briefly above, the primary evidence for this alleged turn is 
generally taken to be the prima facie dramatic shift in historical focus; instead of focusing 
on the period between the renaissance and the twentieth century – the whole period of 
which was the focus of The Order of Things, the main data for both The History of Madness 
and Discipline and Punish being taken from this period, and the 19th century being the 
historical focus of The Will to Knowledge – Foucault looks back to Antiquity and, perhaps 
even more strikingly, the more or less explicitly “ethical” dimensions of subject-
formation expressed in prominent Greek and Latin philosophy.
 Thus many have arrived at archaeology, genealogy, and ethics as the axes of 
historical ontology. And it is quite simple, then, to think that Foucault has given us an 
archaeology, a genealogy, and an ethics; these three terms correspond, in each case, to 
what Foucault is doing. And a good number of Foucault’s more perceptive and 
sympathetic commentators think that this is precisely what he’s doing. Some – perhaps 
most emphatically Eric Paras but also Timothy O’Leary, in his Foucault and the Art of 
Ethics – are fully on board with Foucault’s project, and not only think that Foucault is 
providing us with an ethics, but also with an ethics that is best characterized as an 
“aesthetics of existence” or “care of the self,” and that such a project is a fruitful and 
appropriate endeavour. 
7
 But there are some who are less satisfied with the ethics of the care of the self. 
Arnold Davidson, for example, thinks that Foucault is not merely doing ethics, but 
radically transforming how we ought to do ethics, and the history of ethics (and perhaps 
even the history of philosophy), and he thinks this transformation a salutary one. 
Indeed, Davidson thinks that Foucault shows us that we should think about ethics as 
ascetics. What concerns him is Foucault’s conceptualization of ethics, of ancient ethics 
explicitly but one making possible a contemporary form ethics “as ascetics,” to which he 
gives his qualified endorsement.8 Nevertheless, Davidson admits that Foucault’s version 
of “ethics as ascetics,” that is, the investigations of modes and practices of ethical self-
formation in Antiquity, is perhaps too “aestheticized,” too akin to Baudelaire’s dandysme. 
Davidson is being sensitive to Pierre Hadot’s criticism of Foucault, namely the charge 
that Foucault ignores the ways in which ancient schools of philosophy thought of ethical 
self-formation as a way of making oneself answerable to the structure of the world, its 
rational structure, and not as a freewheeling process of self-creation guided by amoral 
and individualistic aesthetic criteria like “beauty.” The world has a rational moral 
structure, for the ancients, that makes a claim on all rational agents, so that, for example, 
Stoic asceticism is a matter of bringing oneself into a truly universal community, with 
objective or at least intersubjectively valid criteria for (moral) action. But Davidson’s 
response is to agree with Hadot that Foucault’s emphases, or “interpretation,” is untoward, 
but that his way of conceptualizing ethics as, primarily or perhaps even exclusively, ascetics 
or self-fashioning is the correct way to proceed. 
 Let us consider Hadot’s objection in more detail. It is on the one hand, an 
historiographical complaint; Foucault is not getting the ancients right. In presenting a 
8
 8 Davidson,  Arnold. “Ethics as ascetics: Foucault, the history of ethics, and ancient thought” in 
Gutting (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. 2nd ed. New York NY. Cambridge University Press: 
2005.  pp. 115-140.
picture of – in particular – Stoic “technologies of the self ” as focused on attaining 
pleasure or joy in oneself through various ascetic disciplines without an 
acknowledgement of the dimension of “universality,” of the “universal” nature of 
capital-R Reason to which the Stoics aspire, he is doing them a disservice. On the other 
hand, however, Hadot fully acknowledges that his historiographical complaint is in the 
service of an ethical complaint. That is to say, he is expressing a worry about the moral 
consequences of an excessive attention to the “aesthetic” dimension of ancient practices 
of ethical self-formation. Hadot claims that he is himself looking to the ancients for 
“alternatives” to our contemporary way of  being in the world. As he puts it:
All these observations which I have just made are not to be 
situated only in the framework of an historical analysis of 
ancient philosophy; they are aimed also at the definition of 
the ethical model which modern man might discover in 
Antiquity.9 
And, he thinks, Foucault is doing the same thing. The trouble for Hadot and Davidson is 
that Foucault’s turn to the Greeks for a model of ethical subjectivity that might be 
relevant today doesn’t end up being ethical enough. For Hadot, the project is too self-
involved, too self-interested – the “care of the self ” that rejects the Whole of which that 
Self  is but a part can only be an egoism. 
 Though I focus on a relatively minor quibble between Davidson and Hadot, the 
basic positions here are representative. There are many who think that Foucault’s turn to 
an “aesthetics of existence” is deeply unsatisfactory as an ethics, who nevertheless are by 
and large sympathetic to  the conceptualization of an “art of living” or technologies of 
self-formation as the primary matter of a philosophical ethics. If not egoism, the 
emphasis on Greek “aesthetic” self-fashioning may seem off-putting to many for other 
9
 9 Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault. Ed. Arnold Davidson. Trans. 
Michael Chase. Malden MA. Blackwell: 1999 p. 230. 
reasons: it is the privileged mode of existence of (a) slave-owning (b) white European 
males, focused on (c) male pleasure at the expense of female agency; or, perhaps, it is 
simply off-topic, as the 18th century concept of “aesthetics” that we have inherited has 
its own sort of autonomy from ethics or morality, and hence an “aesthetics of existence” 
could only be amoral; or, as some have noted, and especially in light of Foucault’s 1979 
lectures on neoliberalism, it seems that the mode of individualistic self-formation 
Foucault appears to endorse in the Greeks is too close to the sort of libertarian 
individualism demanded and produced by our (neo-)liberal present, and inimical to the 
sorts of moral solidarity required for concerted collective/social action. What’s lacking, 
for these commentators, is a satisfactory set of principles or rules or virtues by which 
our “art of living” - for thematizing which Foucault rightly deserves credit - might be 
adequate to the contemporary moral landscape; one’s life ought to be thought of as a 
work of art, but not one that only seeks to embody aesthetic values. One’s life ought to 
be a work of  moral art. 
 A similar worry arises for those for whom the very conceptualization of ethics as 
ascetics is problematic, who think that any turn to “ascetics” or “self-fashioning” will 
inevitably fail to be properly moral or ethical. Perhaps most hysterically in this vein is 
Richard Wolin, but even sympathetic critics might think that Foucault proffers only an 
anemic, inadequate ethics. The worry, I take it, is that if Foucault is putting forward an 
ethics of the “care of the self,” or “aesthetics of existence,” it will be inevitably be 
inadequate because recommending such an ethos, such a self-directed project, is just 
orthogonal to what first-order ethics normative ethics is. What ethics, in this sense, is 
supposed to do is to help us figure out what’s right and what’s wrong, which in turn 
enables us to figure out what to do. Foucault’s ethics doesn’t suffice for providing this sort 
of normative guidance when confronted with pressing contemporary problems. For 
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example, Dianna Taylor has recently discussed her experiences of being confronted by 
many among the community of feminist scholars for whom Foucault is a 
disappointment because in some sense his work “is not normative” in this respect.10 It 
doesn’t help us see what we ought to do when, for example, we  confront contemporary 
issues of social justice, to be told that we ought to live our lives as works of art. If 
Foucault is giving us an ethics, one of the most important means of evaluating it  would 
be to see what guidance would be offered to us in salient, morally-charged situations, and 
it’s not clear that they would fare well. 
 The same sort of problem troubles those critics and commentators who think 
that Foucault’s ethics are somehow inadequate or problematic for his own project. The idea 
is that Foucault’s ethics just don’t answer to the problems that  Dreyfus and Rabinow, for 
example, gently point out, such that, after pointing out to us the possibility that we are 
living in a “carceral” society, and one in which we subject to something called “bio-
politics” (this being linked to both the Nazi camps and the Soviet purges), Foucault 
calling us to “live our lives as works of art” is at best not really a solution to those 
problems but just the exchange of one “dangerous” way of living for another. Rainer 
Rochlitz is less reserved when he states, not without some justification, that “[t]here is 
something laughable about Foucault’s proposing a new  way of living if we continue to 
bear in mind the threats of genocide he had brandished some years earlier. If some 
social minority decided to set about making its life a work of art, this would hardly be a 
matter of concern for a power apparatus of this nature.”11  In short, Foucault’s “ethics” 
are simply not up to the task of freeing us from the snares of power within which he 
11
 10 “Normativity and Normalization,” Foucault Studies 7 2009:45-46.
 11 “The Aesthetics of  Existence: Post-conventional morality and the theory of  power in Michel 
Foucault” in Michel Foucault Philosopher [Ewald, François (ed.), Trans. Timothy J. Armstrong. Hertfordshire 
UK. Harvester Wheatsheaf: 1992].
himself had so effectively convinced us that we are trapped. At best, he simply changes 
the subject.  
 Finally, there are those who simply think that Foucault contradicts himself. The 
exact nature of the contradiction varies from critic to critic. As an example, James Porter 
might fall in this category. Like Hadot, he is a classicist and aims to raise an 
historiographical complaint. Again like Hadot, however, the historical criticism is motivated 
by moral concerns: “Foucault’s genealogy of the modern self has more than a historical 
dimension: it also has a moral dimension.”12 
 The problem, as Porter sees it, is that Foucault tries to do too much with the 
concept of asceticism, or self-formation, simultaneously wanting to explain 
contemporary political dilemmas and deadlocks as arising out of attitudes, stances, and 
rationalities that emerge from Christian asceticism (perhaps in the same spirit as Weber), 
while at the same time tracing these forms of asceticism to laudable pre-Christian and 
Greek and Roman practices of “self-fashioning.” Porter worries that there might be 
some sort of inconsistency or incoherence here, in that ancient practices of asceticism 
are supposed to lie both at the root of our contemporary, oppressive social situation and 
to bespeak the possibility of  greater freedom than we currently enjoy. 
 Porter’s complaint mirrors those by Critical Theorists regarding Foucault’s 
genealogical works.13  In broad terms, the complaint is that the targets of Foucault’s 
critiques are precisely the sorts of things - norms, practices, and institutions - in which 
one would hope to find resources for resisting the indignities and injustices of 
contemporary society, somehow implicating them in our own oppression, such that 
12
 12 “Foucault’s Ascetic Ancients” Phoenix 59(12) (2005): 123. 
 13 Hereafter, “Critical Theory,” capitalized, will refer exclusively to the tradition of the Frankfurt 
School, while “critical theory” uncapitalized will refer to the broader, looser conglomeration of theoretical 
endeavours with purportedly critical intent, including those post-structuralist and anti-foundationalist 
ventures with which Critical Theory so frequently finds itself  at odds.
appeal to them could only be self-defeating. The Critical Theorists here are particularly 
concerned that among Foucault’s targets are rationality itself, or humanism, or the most 
valuable elements of  the liberal tradition. Nancy Fraser perhaps puts it most forcefully: 
[Consider] the disciplinary or carceral society described in 
Discipline and Punish. If one asks what exactly is wrong with 
that society, Kantian notions leap immediately to mind. One 
cannot help but appeal to such concepts as the violation of 
dignity and autonomy involved in the treating of persons 
solely as means to be causally manipulated. But again, these 
Kantian notions are clearly related to the liberal norms of 
legitimacy and illegitimacy defined in terms of limits and 
rights…Given that there is no other normative framework 
apparent in Foucault’s writings, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that the liberal framework has not been fully 
suspended. But if this is so, Foucault is caught in an outright 
contradiction, for he, even more than Marx, tends to treat that 
framework as simply an instrument of  domination.14
Porter and Fraser both draw out attention to the fact that the very things at which 
Foucault seems to gesture as a possible source of normative guidance - ancient 
asceticism or liberal framework - are swallowed up as part of the problem with respect 
we need to be guided.
 Whether or not they think that Foucault’s “turn” to ethics are insufficient in 
general, or for his own project, or just inconsistent with his prior work, almost all of 
these commentators agree that there is a shift of some sort, not just between the periods 
on which Foucault focused his investigations, but also in the object and aim of his 
investigations.  
 Not only do all of these commentators and critics agree the aims and objects of 
Foucault’s investigations change radically sometime between 1977 and 1982 but, further, 
that he moves from a clinical, genealogical investigation of insidious “power-relations” 
permeating society to providing for us at least the rudimentary outlines of an ethics 
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 14  “Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions”. PRAXIS 
International 3 (1981):284, my emphasis. 
inspired by Greek and Roman practices of self-mastery. This outline has been embraced 
(e.g. O’Leary), subjected to sympathetic revision (Hadot, Davidson), denounced (Wolin, 
Rochlitz and others), and accused of some sort of incoherence (Porter, Fraser). This 
might seem a trivial point; obviously, everyone who has a stance on Foucault’s ethics 
thinks that Foucault is providing an ethics. But it does not follow from the fact that there 
is a change in emphasis in Foucault’s writing that he has simply started to do “ethics.”. 
As I shall now try to show, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that whatever Foucault 
was doing from the late 1970s onward, he is not doing ethics. What we shall then find is 
that all the commentators seem compelled to present Foucault as responding to a 
particular set of concerns, concerns which – I shall argue – were not really his at all, and 
that we should not feel obliged to foist upon him. 
§1.2 The Illusion of  an “Ethical Turn”
 As stated, it seems that, for many commentators, Foucault’s characterization of 
his project as an “historical ontology,” with three different “axes,” suggests a more-or-
less chronological division between Foucault’s explicit projects of “archaeology” and 
“genealogy” and a third axis.15  He was, in the 1960s, by his own admission doing 
something called “archaeology,” which seemed to be followed, in the 1970s, by 
something called “genealogy.” Between these two there is a lengthy gap between books, 
and an apparent change in focus from the structures of discourse to concrete practices 
of domination, to “power/knowledge.” And his late work in the 1980s is both fairly 
14
 15 “What is Enlightenment?” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth  (The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 
1954-1984 Volume One) (Ed. Paul Rabinow. Trans. Robert Hurley et al. New York NY. New Press. 2000) p. 
316. 
forthrightly concerned with ethics, even if ancient ethics, and separated from his explicit 
work on power/knowledge by a break between monographs very similar to that between 
his “archaeological” and “genealogical” periods. So, the line of reasoning might go, he 
must be doing ethics, as it follows after genealogy just as genealogy followed after 
archaeology. 
 Unfortunately, this is unsatisfactory for a panoply of reasons, and I apologize for 
what will no doubt seem like an avalanche of textual evidence against the “ethical turn.” 
Indeed, in this section I present only the evidence available in Foucault’s published 
works. Granted, not all of these writings would have been available to Foucault’s critics 
in the 1970s and 1980s. But the theme of Foucault’s ethics has persisted long since then, 
and seems so sturdily constructed as to require making this point with a hammer. 
 First of all, if the reasoning above is in fact that of his commentators, it  suffers 
from some formal deficiencies. It would be inappropriate, on this view, to label his late 
work an “ethics”, for the same reason we do not take his early work to be offering a 
“knowledge” or his middle work to be a “power.” It is not even obvious, for that matter, 
that Foucault is giving a theory of knowledge or a theory of power.16 Though Foucault in 
some sense takes knowledge and power as the objects of his investigations, he is not just 
“theorizing” them, and is certainly not putting forward theories of what knowledge and 
power should be. At best, we would want to say that Foucault is putting forward a meta-
ethics, that is, he is talking about ethics, and telling us something significant about what it is 
to be an ethical agent, and indeed he is.17   But this is something distinct from putting 
forward a first-order, normative ethics proper. And, further, there does not seem to be 
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 16 Depending on what you think is required by a genuine “theory.” 
 17 A similar point is made by Gutting regarding Levinas. Cf. Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy 
since 1960 (New  York NY. Oxford University Press: 2011), especially Chapters 6 and 7. Confusions seem to 
arise sometimes when meta-ethics is not properly distinguished from first-order normative ethics. This will 
be dealt with in more detail in the following sections.
any a priori requirement of meta-ethical philosophy that first-order normative principles 
or virtue “drop out” of its analyses, whether of the content of moral utterances or the 
source of  normativity or the shape of  moral agency or the space of  moral reasons.18 
 Beyond this perhaps niggling objection, we might object further that, indeed, 
Foucault never characterizes his work as comprising the axes of archaeology, genealogy, 
and ethics. And, in fact, in one of the earliest versions of what would eventually become 
the essay “What is Enlightenment?” – from which the three-axis characterization of his 
work is often drawn – Foucault explicitly does otherwise. In the interview that has been 
published as “What is Critique?” given in 1978, Foucault gives us one of his first 
attempts at linking his thought to the sorts of historical and philosophical concerns that 
Kant raises in his famous essay. And, in this text, he also discusses the three axes of his 
investigations: these comprise archaeology, genealogy, and something called “strategics,” 
which involve – precisely – the manners in which relations of power can be intensified, 
solidified or reversed and transformed.19 
 Of course, one might respond as follows. “It’s all well and good that Foucault 
prospectively – in 1978 – takes the emerging third axis of his investigation to be focused on 
strategies and tactics, deployments and reversals of power-relations; it nevertheless 
turned out that what he was interested in, that what came to be the third axis of his 
investigations, was precisely an ethics, that is, an new way of answering the question 
“How ought one (or I) live?” And he came to this by returning to the Greeks, who at least 
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 18  There are perhaps Kantians and even Aristotelians who might think that such normative 
guidance does in fact fall out of their meta-ethics, there seems to be no reason to think that it must be the 
case. At any rate, the burden of  proof  is on those who think so.
 19 “What is Critique?” in The Politics of Truth. (Ed. Sylvére Lotringer and Lysa Hochroth. New 
York NY. Semiotext(e):1997) p. 65. The malleability and reversibility of power-relations seem to be all but 
ignored by many of Foucault’s most dogmatic commentators (whether sympathetic or critical) for whom 
the burning insight of his mid-70s work seems to be a claim that subjects are not just produced but 
determined by power in some substantive (if  nebulous) sense. We will return to this later. 
give us some way of understanding how to live that contrasts with the clearly insufficient 
ways that now command currency. How else are we to explain his focus precisely on 
Greek and Roman ethics, and precisely on the priority of (aesthetic) dimension of self-
shaping in them?”20
 There are two things to be said here. First, it’s not at all clear that Foucault’s 
attitude changed. In “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault’s last published essay on Kant, 
much of the material from “What is Critique?” remains. But even more strikingly it 
reproduces exactly much of the material comprising the first two lectures of the series at 
the Collège de France under the title The Government of Self and Others, delivered in 1983. 
What we find there is yet another description of his work along three axes. Predictably, 
the first two axes deal with knowledge and power. And, it is true, we do not find 
Foucault claiming that “strategics” constitutes the third axis of his investigations. But it 
is also true that we do not find Foucault claiming anything about ethics; rather, his stated 
“third axis” is concerned with “pragmatics,” the “pragmatics of self.” Foucault is 
interested in “the different forms by which the individual is led to constitute him or 
herself as subject.”21  Now, even if our ethical practices - or those of the Greeks and 
Romans - are one set of those practices, of which one can study the pragmatics, nothing 
about the “pragmatics of the subject” immediately implies that Foucault is doing ethics. It 
seems that if there were ever a time for Foucault to own up to doing ethics, or even to 
suggest obliquely that he was doing so, it was this. And yet he demurred. 
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 20 Even those who acknowledge the presence of “strategics” as an important dimension of what 
Foucault thinks that he is doing in the late 1970s interpret it the light of what they take to be Foucault’s 
“ethics”: as a form of ethical “resistance” to inescapable power relations that is then superseded by 
Foucault’s alleged turn to the “aesthetics of existence.” See Thompson, “Forms of Resistance: Foucault on 
Tactical Reversal and Self-Formation” Continental Philosophy Review 36 (2003):113-138
 21 The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at  the Collège de France 1982-198 (Ed. Frédéric Gros. 
Trans. Graham Burchell. New York NY. Palgrave Macmillan: 2010), p. 5. 
 This is perhaps because it’s even less clear that Foucault’s turn to the ancients is 
primarily focused around “ethics” or an aesthetic mode of self-cultivation, fashioning or 
formation. Foucault certainly did have positive things to say about fashioning one’s life as 
a work of art, but – at least with respect to his published writings – they are in the form 
of occasional remarks, occasionally linked to a Kantian philosophical ethos that he had 
been exploring on and off for over half a decade, or linked to the more concrete and 
pressing issues of gay liberation, or simply as a theoretical response to the “fact that the 
self is not given.”22  But this hardly amounts to anything like a focus on such issues, let 
alone an ethics built on them.  
 Furthermore, it is hardly the case that the aesthetics of the self were the only 
things to which Foucault gave a positive assessment, even qua practices or discourses of 
resistance against power. He was not averse to providing, at any given juncture in his 
career, elliptical remarks concerning “overcoming” or “resistance.” As early as The History 
of Madness, Foucault seemed to think that there was something positive and meaningful 
in, for example, the Renaissance experience of madness, even if many therefore took 
him to task for appearing to attempt to liberate an “essence” of madness that would 
exist beneath any oppressive discursive formation. Again, in The Order of Things, Foucault 
makes positive remarks about the powers of a modern “literature” that was gathering 
strength in the twilight of the modern episteme, and would sweep the figure of “Man” 
from the centre of discourse. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault seems to put a positive 
spin on prison revolts and 19th century anarcho-socialist rejections of the prison system. 
In “Society Must Be Defended” Foucault explicitly praises the discourse of race war, of all 
things, for its critical, resistive potential, its function as a “counter-history” and – perhaps 
most striking – its evocation of a Biblical, prophetic  voice and style of enunciation in 
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 22 “On the Genealogy of  Ethics” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, p. 262
contrast to the juridical or “politico-legendary” style of history linked to the Roman 
Empire. There is the notorious suggestion, in La Volonté de Savoir, that we elaborate a 
new economy of “bodies and pleasures” in opposition to the apparatus of sexuality and 
its “logic of desire.” In the later 1970s, Foucault’s apparent commendations multiplied 
and diversified: for example, his consistent appeal to human rights (on behalf of 
Vietnamese asylum-seekers, Polish Solidarnosc, and even a laywer for the Baader-Meinhof 
Gang seeking asylum in France), and enthusiastic support of Islamic revolt and Islamic 
government during the Iranian revolution. All of this before ancient practices of self-
shaping had even made an appearance in his work. And, as they began to appear, 
Foucault was equally sanguine about anonymous BDSM practices. Further, though he 
couches his positive recommendations for the direction of gay liberation in the language 
of a “style of life” that seems almost synonymous with an individualistic “aesthetics of 
existence,” his actual aim is to create new relations, and – especially – love-relations between 
men, to establish a network of affective and normative reciprocal connections within a 
community.23 
 If one were still committed to excavating something like a Foucauldian ethics, it  
strikes me that one could not very well posit a “turn” in Foucault’s thinking, at least not 
simply on the basis of Foucault’s scattered affirmations of the importance or desirability 
of developing one’s life “as a work of art.” If one were still so inclined, it seems that the 
task of the (radical) reconstruction of an ethics would involve assessing the consistency 
and coherence of all these affirmations, developing their thematic unity, and extracting 
some sort of guidance from them. Or, if that task appears too daunting, at the very least 
one would have to find some way of separating the “genuine” – or perhaps “mature” – 
19
 23 Cf. “Friendship as a Way of  Life” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, pp. 135-140
affirmations, those which actually represent a “coherent first-order normative outlook,” 
to use Nancy Fraser’s locution, from his “immature” ones.24 
 But we can already hear – from both Foucault’s critics and some of his partisans 
– the reply: “Precisely! The mature Foucault is the one who spent his last years discussing 
antiquity and endorsing the notion of giving a style to one’s life as an ethical ideal. This is 
simply the last word, and so we who would assess this ideal are obligated to flesh out 
what such an ethics, with all its potential and deficiencies, would really amount to.” 
 The problem with this response is that it raises an historical accident to the level 
of Foucauldian dogma. It is certainly true that in his final years Foucault was working on 
the late antiquity, and it is also true that during this period Foucault was explicitly 
fascinated by the idea of extending the realm of the “aesthetic” into the very stuff of 
one’s life or existence. He even linked it explicitly to the sort of ethos that he found in 
Kant, and with which he identified. And for a long time after his death, the extant 
writings gave the impression that these remarks were indeed Foucault’s “last word,” the 
mature hints of the ethics that had been lurking in his thought, perhaps only recently or 
perhaps all along. 
 But this impression ought no longer impress us. The fact of the matter is that 
Foucault’s late works on the ancients give us no unambiguous answer to the question of 
what Foucault was focusing on. We now have at our disposal the series of lecture 
courses that Foucault gave at the Collège de France, and in particular those from the late 
1970s through to his death, which paint a different picture of the trajectory of his 
thought over those years. We see that Foucault’s explicit and continued inquiries into 
biopolitics led him to reformulate the his genealogies in terms of “governmentality,” and 
that government – of men, and things, and in particular government by the truth – forms a 
20
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constant concern; indeed, we see from 1977 onward a concern with the development of 
a pastoral form of political power, incorporating religious modes of governance 
developed in the middle ages. We know that his first steps toward looking at the 
conditions of the possibility of this form of religious governance in Late Antiquity are 
taken in the 1979/1980 lecture courses The Government of  the Living. As he puts is:
This year's course drew  support from the analyses done the 
preceding years [i.e. precisely in Security, Territory, Population 
and The Birth of Biopolitics] on the subject of "government," 
this notion being understood in the broad sense of 
techniques and procedures for directing human behavior. 
Government of children, government of souls and 
consciences, government of a household, of a state, or of 
oneself. Inside this very general framework, we studied the 
problem of self-examination and confession... The question 
raised is this one, then: How is it that in Western Christian 
culture the government of men demands, on the part of 
those who are led, not only acts of obedience and submission 
but also "acts of truth," which have the peculiar requirement 
not just that the subject tell the truth but that he tell the truth 
about himself, his faults, his desires, the state of his soul, and 
so on? How was a type of government of men formed in which one is 
required not simply to obey but to reveal what one is by stating it?25
No mention of ethics, but rather an explicit continuation of Foucault’s genealogy of 
governmentality. As his investigations reach further into the ancient Greek world, he 
explains further:
[It was] a question of beginning an inquiry concerning the 
instituted models of self-knowledge and their history: How 
was the subject established, at different moments and in 
different institutional contexts, as a possible, desirable, or 
even indispensable object of knowledge? How were the 
experience that one may have of oneself and the knowledge 
that one forms of oneself organized according to certain 
schemes? How were these schemes defined, valorized, 
recommended, imposed? It is clear that neither the recourse 
to an original experience nor the study of the philosophical 
theories of the soul, the passions, or the body can serve as 
the main axis in such an investigation. 
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One could be forgiven for thinking that one was reading a preface to Discipline & Punish. 
But this is Foucault’s reflection on the course immediately following The Government of the 
Living, entitled Subjectivity and Truth. He continues:
The guiding thread that seems the most useful for this inquiry 
is constituted by what one might call the "techniques  of the 
self," which is to say, the procedures, which no doubt  exist in 
every civilization, suggested or prescribed to individuals in 
order to determine their identity, maintain it, or transform it 
in terms of a certain number of ends, through relations of 
self-mastery or self-knowledge. In short, it is a matter of 
placing the imperative to "know oneself" - which to us 
appears so characteristic of our civilization - back in the 
much broader interrogation that serves as its explicit or 
implicit context: What should one do with oneself ? What 
work should be carried out on the self ? How should one "govern 
oneself" by performing actions in which one is oneself the objective of 
those actions, the domain in which they are brought to bear, the 
instrument they employ, and the subject that acts?26
The point here is that the “techniques of the self ” are not some sort of ethical response 
to the problems of contemporary society, but a domain to be investigated precisely in 
order to determine how people were led to or prescribed certain ways of relating themselves 
that made them objects of  knowledge. Foucault repeats himself  at Dartmouth College:
I conceived of a rather odd project: not the study of the 
evolution of sexual behavior but of the historical study of 
the link between the obligation to tell the truth and the 
prohibitions weighing on sexuality. I asked: How had the 
subject been compelled to decipher himself in regard to what 
was forbidden? It is a question that interrogates the relation 
between asceticism and truth.
 Max Weber posed the question: If one wants to 
behave rationally and regulate one's action according to true 
principles, what part of one's self should one renounce? 
What is the ascetic price of reason? To what kind of 
asceticism should one submit? I posed the opposite question: 
How have certain kinds of interdictions required the price of 
certain kinds of knowledge about oneself ? What must one 
know about oneself in order to be willing to renounce 
anything? 
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 Thus, I arrived at the hermeneutics of 
technologies of the self in pagan and early Christian 
practice.27 
Note that, if Foucault really were looking for something like an “ethics” or a “normative 
foundation” for his work, or for resistance in the present, or something of that ilk, it 
would make the most sense to pose a variant of Weber’s question: if I want to act in 
accordance with true (ethical) principles, what part of myself ought I renounce? How do 
we overcome or transform those parts of ourselves that are shaped or formed or 
constituted by “power”? But this is not Foucault’s question. Rather, the question is 
something more like into which technologies and practices of truth-telling must one be initiated in 
order to be governed? 
 Arnold Davidson may be correct in noting that understanding “sexuality” is not 
in fact the main aim of Foucault’s late work, but seems clearly mistaken in thinking that 
the point of his interest in “the history of ancient sex... was part of his interest in 
ancient ethics.”28 Rather, ancient ethics  articulate one set of techniques, among others, 
by which he have subjected ourselves, one mode of governing our relation to the truth 
in a long history of  them. Consider the following, from The Hermeneutics of  the Subject:
I have tried to show you that the role and function of ascesis 
- in the sense that Greek and Roman philosophers gave to to 
the word askēsis - was to establish the strongest possible link 
between the subject and truth... The ascesis constitutes, 
therefore, and its role is to constitute, the subject as subject of
veridiction [i.e. truth-telling].29
Earlier in the same course, Foucault makes the same point, while establishing the 
continuity of  this interrogation of  Plutarch and Aurelius with his earlier work:
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 29  The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at  the Collège de France 1981-1982. (Ed. Frédéric Gros. 
Trans. Graham Burchell. New York NY. Palgrave Macmillan:  2005), p. 371.
... at the heart of the problem I want to pose this year - and 
what’s  more have wanted to pose for some time - ...  is: How is the 
relationship between truth-telling (veridiction) and the practice 
of the subject established, fixed, and defined? Or, more 
generally, how are truth-telling and governing (governing oneself and 
others) linked and connected to each other? I have tried to 
look at this problem under a whole range of aspects and 
forms - whether with regard to madness, mental illness, 
prison, delinquency, etcetera - ... I  would now like to pose 
this question of the relationship between truth-telling and the 
government of the subject in ancient thought before 
Christianity... in the form and within the framework of a 
constitution of  a relationship of  self  to self...30
At each turn, the question of the relation to the self, the techniques of the self, the 
“aesthetics of existence” are referred to a larger investigation of how the subject is 
governed by its relations to the truth, and how in turn “the formation of a certain type 
of experience of the self became possible which is, it seems to me, typical of Western 
experience... but also of the experience the Western subject may have of create of 
others.”31 
 One might here think that Foucault is engaged in revisionist history, that his 
concerns with veridiction and subjectivity must be late additions to his work. But this 
would be to ignore, for example, the detailed analysis of techniques for securing and 
extracting truth in early modern judicial proceedings in his 1971 lectures in Brazil on 
“Truth and Juridical Form” (material discussed again at length in Discipline & Punish32), 
and how these constitute both a certain way of relating to truth, of “reading” or 
experiencing the body, and a certain modality of power. It would be to ignore the 
continuity of these themes with Foucault’s 1981 lectures at Louvain published as Mal 
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 32 Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. (Trans. Alan Sheridan. 2nd edition. New  York NY. 
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faire, Dire vrai. It would be to ignore the fact that, even in his explicit engagements with 
bio-politics and governmentality in the 20th century, veridiction was at the center of his 
concerns:
It is not so much the history of the true or the history of the 
false as the history of veridiction which has a political 
significance. That is what I wanted to say regarding the 
question of the market or, let’s say, of the connecting up of a 
regime of  truth to governmental practice.33
 In fact, what is hardly ever noticed is that “truth” or “truth-regimes” or “regimes 
of veridiction” are in fact the original stated objects of Foucault’s work from at least his 
inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, at the beginning of what could be called his 
“genealogical” period: 
I want to try to discover how this choice of truth, inside 
which we are caught but which we ceaselessly renew, was 
made - but also how it was repeated, renewed, and displaced. 
I will consider first the epoch of the Sophists at its beginning, 
with Socrates or, at least with Platonic philosophy, to see how 
efficacious discourse, ritual discourse, discourse loaded with 
powers and perils, gradually came to conform to a distinction 
between true and false discourse.34 
We see here that not only did Foucault begin his genealogies in 1970 with an inquiry into 
the different ways in which we might bind ourselves to truth, compel ourselves to speak 
it, but that he did so precisely by turning to the Greeks, to a great extent the subject of 
his first course, bearing the same title as the first volume of the History of Sexuality: La 
Volonté de Savoir. The same themes that appear in 1970 - such as that of the sumbolon, or 
the “half-truth” as a way of relating to truth, in Greek tragedy, and especially in Oedipus, 
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where truth is linked explicitly to power - Foucault returns to in 1983.35 The ancients, for 
Foucault, do not appear first as the exemplars of a free art of living safe from the 
vicissitudes of disciplinary power, but as an early and decisive episode in the history by 
which we have subjected ourselves, in this case by making ourselves accountable to the 
truth. 
 Indeed, the late turn to the ancient world as a whole, despite the significance 
placed on it by commentators as Foucault’s “final” work, does not even appear to be 
intended as more than a quick one; in The Courage of Truth: The Government of Self and 
Others II (note that both of his final lecture courses contain a reference not to ethics but 
to government), Foucault says:
The lectures I would like to give will no doubt be somewhat 
disjointed because they deal with things that I would like to 
have done with, as it were, in order to return, after this several 
years long Greco-Roman “trip,” to some contemporary 
problems which I will deal with either in the second part of 
the course, or possibly in the form of  a working seminar.36
This remark seems designed to ward of misunderstandings, as he repeats a sentiment he 
had expressed days earlier in an interview, when asked about the contemporary ethical 
significance of  his work:  
I must admit that I have not gone very far in that direction 
and I would rather come back to some contemporary 
problems, in order to try and see what we can do with all that 
in the actual political problematic… I don’t like answering 
questions which I have not examined. I would, however, like 
to take up once again [in the contemporary world] those 
questions I have raised through the culture of  Antiquity.37
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 36  The Courage of the Truth  (The Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the Collège de France 
1983-1984 (Ed. Frédéric Gros. Trans. Graham Burchell. New York NY. Palgrave Macmillan: 2011), p. 2. 
 37 “The Ethics of  the Care of  the Self  as a Practice of  Freedom,” pp. 124-125. 
Foucault never had the chance to move beyond the ancient world, but we have good 
reason to think that he would have. The final course was incredibly truncated on account 
of his rapidly deteriorating health, and he would be dead within months. Nevertheless, 
it’s clear that it is truth-telling in all of its historicity, the different “games of truth” and 
“regimes of veridiction” and the manners in which these games and regimes are 
governed, that is, government of and by truth, that have played a role in making us who we 
are here and now, is the focus of Foucault’s research. It remains to explicate in detail the 
structure of veridiction and governmentality, and their theoretical and practical 
significance, but their centrality is beyond dispute.  
 Now, one could try to make a case that, at the very end of his life, Foucault took 
the practice of ancient parrhesia or truth-telling as an ethically exemplary technology of 
self, an aesthetic of existence or manner of caring for the self in which we can find at 
the least the germ  of a normative ethic of resistance for contemporary life. But without 
an independent conviction that giving us an ethics is what Foucault is primarily up to this 
would seem strangely unmotivated. It would mean rejecting out of hand Foucault’s claim 
he is not looking for solutions to our problems in other solutions to other problems, that 
in fact he was not even looking for such solutions.38 It would require explaining why Foucault’s 
alleged foray into “ethics” seem rather to consist in extended discussions of truth-telling 
and governmentality, and why he had hoped to be done with his little “trip” and to 
return to investigations of the “contemporary problematic.”  One would have to explain 
why Foucault describes his work in 1982 not as ethics but as a “series of studies of ‘the 
arts of oneself,’ that is, the aesthetics of existence and the government of oneself and others,” 
in effect assimilating discussion of the practices of the self to a series of studies on 
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governmentality, begun (at the latest) in 1977. One would have to explain why parrhesia is 
not rather just one mode of truth-telling, in all of its relations to power and government, 
among all the others that Foucault explored. As he puts it in 1983:
one of the questions I would like to put to the history of 
parresia concerns the long and slow evolution over several 
centuries which led from a conception of political parresia as 
the right, the privilege of speaking to others in order to 
guide them (Periclean parresia) to, I was going to say post-
antique parresia, the parresia we find after ancient philosophy, 
in Christianity, where it becomes an obligation to speak of 
oneself, to tell the truth about oneself, to tell everything 
about oneself, and to do so in order to be cured. This kind of 
great mutation from parresia as “the privilege of free speech 
in order to guide others” to parresia as “the obligation of 
someone who has done wrong to tell everything about 
himself in order to be saved,” is certainly one of the most 
important aspects of the history of parrhesiastic practice... 
This long history is obviously very important if we want to 
analyze the relations between subjectivity and truth and the 
relations between government of self and government of 
others.39
In other words, it would be up to the partisan of Foucauldian ethics to explain how 
parrhesia, the ethics of truth-telling, the care of the self, or “aesthetics of existence,” the 
emergence of all these techniques by which an individual may establish a relation with 
herself, are not, on the contrary, nuances in the history of  our government by truth. 
 We have already seen the genuine continuity of the problematic of truth, and of 
government by the truth, through his lectures. And he confirms this in his published 
monographs, for example, in the Introduction to the History of Sexuality Vol. 2., where 
Foucault tries to explain to his readers the glaring shift in historical material from the 
Victorians to the Greeks, he states that “[a]fter first studying the games of truth in their 
interplay with one another... and then their interaction with power relations, as 
exemplified by punitive practices - I felt obliged to study the games of truth in the 
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relationship of self with self and the forming of oneself as a subject, taking as my 
domain of reference and field of investigation what might be called ‘the history of 
desiring man.’”40 Again, we see the importance of the “games of truth,” of the rules and 
strategies that govern our relations to the truth, but no mention of ethics. When in 1984, 
interviewers try to insinuate that there had indeed been a “break” between this work and 
prior investigations, all Foucault will admit is that he had been brought to take account 
of the ways in which subject act on themselves in the process of subject-formation in a 
more explicit way than he had before. It is striking, I think, that Foucault – even at this 
very late stage – resists characterizing his work in ethical terms. This is not what one 
would expect of an author allegedly “turning” to “ethics.” It is, however, rather 
unsurprising if one recalls Foucault’s actually stated interests in investigating, variously, 
strategies of government and pragmatics of subject-formation, all of these reversible, 
alternately threatening and oppressive and empowering and free.
 Taking Foucault at his word, then, would mean actually taking him seriously 
when he says of Greek sexual ethics that they were “disgusting,” and that “All of 
antiquity seems to [him] to have been a ‘profound error.’”41  It would mean taking 
seriously the claim that the interrogation of the ethical practices of antiquity is not a 
matter of doing ethics but of writing a “history of desiring man... situated at the point 
where an archaeology of problematizations and a genealogy of practices of the self 
intersect.”42  It would mean recognizing that when Foucault says that he is giving, in fact, 
a genealogy of ethics, he is no more giving us an ethics than Nietzsche is giving us a 
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morality with his genealogy of morality.43  One would have to recognize that after 
archaeology and genealogy comes simply more archaeology and genealogy. 
 Nor should we be surprised, then, to find that a “Foucauldian” ethics has been 
subject to a battery of objections. It would be surprising, rather, if Foucault - despite his 
serious misgivings regarding Greek ethics, his professed lack of attention to any 
connection between ancient practices and contemporary problems, and his decided 
interest in investigating different historical modes of governmentality (of both self and 
others) - had somehow managed, as if by miraculous accident, to produce a compelling 
normative ethical theory. I hope that the evidence presented has been sufficient to 
convince one that, rather than thinking that Foucault is giving us an ethics and therefore 
leaving us with a host of problems, inconsistency not least among them, we ought to 
employ modus tollens rather than modus ponens. The real question is why the latter seemed a 
compelling move in the first place. 
§1.3 The Demand for a Normative Framework
 The reason that so many commentators continue to think that Foucault must 
have been giving us an ethics is that, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, they are held captive by 
a picture of what philosophy in general, and ethical theory in particular, must be. The 
best way of teasing out this picture is to return to the reception - and subsequent 
criticism - of  Foucault’s genealogical work. 
 In brief, Foucault’s genealogical work was read as making three central claims. 
First, that subjects are not given, and subsequently repressed by relations of power, but are 
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rather produced by such power-relations:
The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is 
already in himself the effect of a subjection much more 
profound than himself. A 'soul' inhabits him and brings him 
to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power 
exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument 
of  a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of  the body.44
Discipline & Punish is, among other things, an historical attempt to make good on this 
claim. And, in doing so, Foucault is thought to make the following claim: the moral, 
ethical, and political valuing of emancipation or liberation, of humanity or individual 
subjectivity, or of rationality or the Enlightenment, liberal government - all these ideals 
that, we might want to say, animated the best in progressive thought over the last 
centuries - do not so much serve to orient our ethical and political projects and limit the 
excesses of power as they are the expressions of the “more profound subjection” that 
produces subjects to begin with. As he says: 
On this reality reference [i.e. the human subject produced 
through power-relations], various concepts have been 
constructed and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, 
subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.; on it have been 
built scientific techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of 
humanism.45
  
The real, corporal disciplines constituted the foundation of 
the formal, juridical liberties... The “Enlightenment,” which 
discovered the liberties, also invented the disciplines.46
Third, there is supposed to be a deeply negative evaluation of the sorts of power-relations 
he describes. It is difficult to avoid attributing a deep contempt to his voice when 
Foucault writes the following:
We are often reminded of the countless procedures which 
Christianity once employed to make us detest the body; but 
31
 44 Discipline and Punish, p. 30. 
 45 Discipline and Punish., pp. 29-30. Emphasis mine.  
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let us ponder all the ruses that were employed for centuries to 
make us love sex, to make the knowledge of it desirable and 
everything said about it precious. Let us consider the 
stratagems by which we were induced to apply all our skills to 
discovering its secrets, by which we were attached to the 
obligation to draw out its truth, and made guilty for having 
failed to recognize it for so long. These devices are what 
ought to make us wonder today. Moreover, we need to 
consider the possibility that one day, perhaps, in a different 
economy of bodies and pleasures, people will no longer quite 
understand how the ruses of sexuality, and the power that 
sustains its organization, were able to subject us to that 
austere monarchy of sex, so that we became dedicated  to the 
endless task of forcing its secret, of exacting the truest of 
confessions from a shadow.
 The irony of this deployment is in having us 
believe that our "liberation" is in the balance.
 
These, the closing words of the first volume of the History of Sexuality, leave us with a 
fairly unambiguous denunciation not just of the power-relations that produce “sexuality” 
as a politically and morally important object, lodged deep within and perhaps even 
constitutive of each individual, and the hierarchical political and ethical relations that 
such an object sustains, but also of the purportedly emancipatory project of liberating 
that sexuality. Given his other main claims, it should not be shocking that Foucault 
criticizes the project of emancipating the sexual subject, insofar as he takes such subjects 
as the product or effect of pernicious power-relations and promulgating the ideal of 
liberation as one more technique for sustaining those relations. The same can be said of 
the prison and the modern soul, with respect to Discipline and Punish. Further, Foucault’s 
rejection of the prison-system, of the obsession with sexuality and the movement to 
liberate it, do not end with either self-satisfied contempt or merely academic criticism. 
Foucault was himself an activist, from the late 1960s with the Groupe d’information sur les 
prisons (GIP) and, as mentioned earlier, for several other causes. Foucault’s moral 
impulses ran deep, and he by no means gave in to resignation in the face of encroaching 
power. 
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 The question that arises for the critics of Foucault is how he can possibly 
maintain this position. If Foucault thinks that progressive moral values and ideals, values 
like “humanity,” certainly, and perhaps justice or freedom as well, ideals like 
“emancipation” and “equality,” are employed as techniques for sustaining power-
relations, how can he possibly make the evaluative judgments that he does? In what 
terms could he possibly justify them? The creeping expanse of the penal system, and the 
internalization of disciplinary structures at the very heart of our everyday life, the 
dangers of bio-power, and our constant search for sexual identity? Are these not 
objectionable precisely because they are affronts to our human dignity, or autonomy, or 
they are alienating, or in some sense irrational? Mustn’t any explanation of their 
wrongness or badness appeal to just the sorts of values and ideals that Foucault has 
indicted? And if so, Foucault’s work appears doomed to be nihilistic with respect to 
morality and fatalistic with respect to political action; the norms that might guide our 
actions, that might enable our autonomy, can only thereby serve to reproduce the sorts 
of  power-relations that constitute us as the subjected subjects we are now. 
 Nancy Fraser has been the most effective and incisive in leveling this sort of 
criticism:
... it has been or may be supposed that Foucault has given us 
a value-neutral account of modern power. Or alternatively, 
since this does not square with the obvious politically 
engaged character of his writing, that he has some alternative 
normative framework to the suspended one. Or since none is 
readily apparent, that he has found a way to do politically 
engaged critique without the use of any normative 
framework. Or, more generally, that Foucault has disposed 
altogether of the need for any normative framework to guide 
politics.
 Clearly a number of these suppositions are 
mutually incompatible. Yet Foucault’s work seems 
simultaneously to invite all of them. He tends to assume that 
his account of modern power is both politically engaged and 
normatively neutral. At the same time, he is unclear as to 
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whether he suspends all normative notions or only the liberal 
norms of legitimacy and illegitimacy. To make matters worse, 
Foucault sometimes appears not to have suspended the liberal 
norms after all, but rather to be presupposing them. These, 
then, are what I take to be the most serious difficulties 
pertaining to Foucault’s work. 
 They appear to stand in a rather curious 
relationship to the strengths I have mentioned; it seems that 
the very methodological strategies which make possible the 
empirically and politically valuable description of power are 
intimately tied up with the normative ambiguities.47
Foucault is not shy about making evaluative claims but Foucault’s critics want something 
more, namely the “normative framework” with which Foucault operates. While vague, 
and in need of a great deal of clarification, the term, and the worry, is persistent; more 
than 25 years after Fraser’s article, even sympathetic readers of Foucault such as Todd 
May feel it:
It has long been noted that there is a certain normative 
tension in the work of Michel Foucault. On the one hand, he 
was always reticent to offer a normative framework for his 
writings. Aside from the cryptic comment about “bodies and 
pleasures” in the first volume of his history of sexuality, one 
would seek in vain for positive political or ethical suggestions 
or claims. On the other hand, his work is undoubtedly 
normatively driven. The genealogical works have a strong 
undercurrent of critique... There can be no doubt that he 
means these works to intervene upon our current situation in 
a normative way.48 
The idea is that “normative intervention” requires a “normative framework.” Now, these 
terms are vague, but the basic idea, I take it, is that in this context a “normative 
intervention in our current situation” is just an evaluative judgment of our situation, 
linked to action in some important sense, if not as a concrete prescriptive regarding 
specific circumstances than at least as a general indication of overlooked problems that 
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we should discover how to address. And we all agree that Foucault makes - or at least 
insinuates - many of  these interventions. 
 But there seems to be some confusion in the idea of a “normative framework” 
or “outlook.” Nancy Fraser “raises the question whether the values implicit in 
[Foucault’s] unabashedly value-laden descriptions of social reality would, if rendered 
explicit, constitute a coherent and consistent first-order normative outlook. That 
question is especially pressing since Foucault has, despite repeated insinuations, never 
successfully argued that a coherent first-order normative outlook is dispensable in social 
criticism.”49 It is strange, I think, to put things in this way insofar as Foucault does seem 
to have a “first-order normative outlook.” Fraser seems to admit as much when she 
refers to his “unabashedly value-laden descriptions of social reality,” and May is certainly 
mistaken in claiming that one would “search in vain for positive political or ethical 
suggestions of claims” in Foucault’s work. Foucault commended many different political 
actions in fairly unambiguous normative terms. And, moreover, they don’t seem to be 
wildly inconsistent or incoherent. Indeed, it seems that Foucault would have no problem 
even with relatively generally applicable commendations. Appeal to human rights to curb 
the overreach of government power; radically alter our current penal system; discipline 
and bio-power are dangerous; resist normalization; these judgments and imperatives all 
seem to hang together well. 
 But, as we have seen, these judgments aren’t what Foucault’s critics want. Fraser 
wants to know what “values” undergird Foucault’s judgments, and Habermas finds fault 
in Foucault for his lack of normative “yardsticks.” These are the sorts of things that 
constitute a normative framework, which, I take it, is whatever it serves to order and render 
intelligible the first-order judgments that Foucault makes. In the case of moral judgments, 
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or ethical life more broadly, such a normative framework could have several components. 
The most fleshed-out such framework would provide one with, e.g.: more or less general 
normative principles that justify first-order evaluations; a set of more or less general 
deliberative principles (which may or may not be the same as the normative principles), 
that allow one to come to a first-order evaluation; a set of values that these principles 
express or serve; and set of “facts” (whether ontological/metaphysical, transcendental, 
or loosely empirical) that ground the normative principles somehow. Kantian and 
traditionally Utilitarian theories of morality exemplify these sorts of frameworks. In the 
Kantian case, we have a normative principle that justifies moral action in the categorical 
imperative and the famous claim that the only thing that can be called unqualifiedly good 
is a good will.50 We have a set of deliberative principles that can help us figure out what 
the right thing to do is in the various formulations of the categorical imperative.51 We 
have a “grounding” of these in the Kantian account of the freedom and rationality of 
human beings. And in Kantian morality we find expressed the values of autonomy and 
human dignity. In the Utilitarian case, the normative principle - something along the lines 
of “One ought to act to bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number” - 
and the deliberative principles come apart, as one does in every relevant situation have at 
one’s disposal a happiness calculator powerful enough to do the requisite calculations, 
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relying instead on practical rules of thumb.52  These Utilitarian imperatives express or 
serve the values of happiness/pleasure/non-suffering, and they are in some loose sense 
“grounded” in the loose empirical observation that human beings generally act so as to 
increase pleasure and avoid pain. 
 Frameworks such as these are supposed order and make intelligible our first-
order moral judgments. When we are told as children, for example, not to lie to our 
siblings, or are punished or otherwise corrected, we can (and often do) meaningfully ask 
“but why?” and are often supplied a normative framework in response. We are given a 
normative principle in response such as “because you ought not lie to the people you 
care about.” Of course, as is often the case with children, we might be reasonably 
unsatisfied with the bare normative principle: but why ought we not lie to the people we 
care about? And in response to this we might appropriately be referred to a value - say, 
respect - that is expressed in the principle: because doing so would be disrespectful to 
your brother or sister. And yet we might still be reasonably unsatisfied with this response: 
“and so?” we might say. And so we might be told an important, fact: “Because your 
brothers and sisters deserve respect, simply in virtue of being your siblings.” And at this 
point, it seems we reach bedrock. Of course, any given person might continue to be 
unsatisfied, but it’s not clear that they could be given, in response, anything but some 
sequence of principles, values, and grounding fact. Often, with children, the questioning 
doesn’t stop until the parent or adult involved simply invokes her authority: “because I said 
so.” Perhaps, if they are lucky, they might not have to invoke personal authority, but only 
act as the mouthpiece of a more impersonal authority: “that’s just the way it is.” It is not 
personal fiat but the objective normative order of  things. 
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utility. Mark Lance and Margaret Little make this point in “Particularism and Anti-Theory” in The Oxford 
Handbook of  Ethical Theory [Ed. David Copp.New York NY. Oxford University Press: 2006], p. 897. 
 It is not difficult to look at first-order normative theories, such as Kantianism and 
Utilitarianism above, as much more refined versions of this dialectic between parent and 
child, making sense of the moral demands placed upon us. They make our moral life 
intelligible to us, in providing explanations of and reasons to execute what is demanded 
of us, principles, values, and grounds, all of which also serve as explanations for and 
justifications of  the sanctions placed upon us when we fail to do what we ought.53 
 It is no coincidence that Foucault’s most trenchant critics are at least in some way 
affiliated or aligned with or highly sympathetic to the Frankfurt School, a tradition that 
has been somewhat preoccupied with developing such an framework, with the aim of 
rendering intelligible the foundations of its own clearly normative, evaluative 
judgments.54 It is unsurprising that they would thus demand of Foucault the same. And 
this reading has set the terms for the critical reception of Foucault’s work, so much so it 
is often framed in terms of a “Foucault/Habermas debate” (where Habermas ultimately 
metonymically stands in for the whole tradition of Critical Theory).55 I take it that most 
of Foucault’s critics think that rendering our ethical life intelligible is a non-optional task 
for any sort of genuinely critical theory and that insofar as Foucault’s evaluative claims 
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seem, on the whole, to be fairly critical he is in the business of critical theory and, 
therefore, of ethics. So, I take it that the best or, at least, most sympathetic way of 
interpreting Foucault’s critics is to see them taking his genealogical work to task insofar 
as it leaves our ethical commitments unintelligible. No one is denying that Foucault 
makes evaluative claims. But his genealogies do not satisfactorily answer the subsequent 
“but why?” questions we take it to be at least part of the task of moral theory to answer. 
He has precluded any explanatory appeal to the values of autonomy or dignity, in part 
because his rejection of “humanism” has precluded any explanatory appeal to a 
grounding fact about human beings. 
 This, I think, explains the temptation to read his later works as a response to this 
demand for ethical intelligibility. It is especially tempting due to the long gap between his 
last explicitly avowedly genealogical monograph in 1976 and the publication of the 
second two volumes of the History of Sexuality. The ethical practices of the elites of 
Classical Athens seem sufficiently independent of the modern, Enlightenment values, 
theories, and institutions that Foucault is alleged to oppose, and the “self as a work of 
art” could perhaps be taken to ground these suitably different practices. This work would 
fill in the blanks, so to speak, of the “normative framework” that is supposed to render 
his evaluative judgments intelligible. And that is exactly what prominent Critical 
Theorists like Habermas and Peter Dews took Foucault to be doing.56 
 It should be clear, by now, however, that Foucault is not providing “an alternative 
normative framework”. Nor should we be so quick to rush to judgment that not doing 
so is a failing on Foucault’s part. When Fraser, for example, suggests that Foucault must 
have “an alternative normative framework” - meaning the same kind of framework, but 
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different in content from traditional “Enlightenment” moral theories - she is, along with 
many others, I want to claim, in the grip of a dogma. In order to see how this might be 
so, we need to look at how Foucault engages with moral philosophy explicitly. 
§1.4 Moral Problematization and the Technologies of  the Self
 I am not the first to note, at least in passing, the demand for a normative 
framework placed upon Foucault by his critics. Ian Hacking describes the dialectic: 
What we more commonly call ethics has, in its nobler forms, 
tended to address the questions, what shall we do? What is of 
value? Foucault was in the terrible predicament of being rich 
in values and able in action, yet at the same time asking what 
makes the ethical question possible at all. It  is common for 
intellectuals, be they self-styled pragmatists or Critical 
Theorists or academic social democrats, to harass Foucault 
about this supposed predicament, and imagine debates like 
this:
 "And what, then, shall we do?"
 "Well, if you want to do something, why don't 
you start trying to make San Quentin less horrendous?"
 "No, that doesn't answer the question. If you're 
in the tradition of unmasking the origins of moral codes and 
our ethical practices, then where do you stand? How can you 
have any values at all? How can you have any grounds for 
action, even for joining a league for prison reform?"
 Even his generous interviewers, Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, have a sense that Foucault "owes us a criterion of 
what makes one kind of danger more dangerous than 
another."57
He is right to state that the debate is purely imagined, insofar as Foucault, frustratingly 
for his critics, never felt compelled to engage. Foucault, I think, was not simply being 
intractable. He did not, and perhaps could not, engage in this sort of debate not because 
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he was simply devoid of values and thus stuck in some sort of pragmatic self-
contradiction, but rather because he found the very terms of  the debate problematic. 
 H.A. Pritchard also famously worried whether or not moral philosophy rested on 
a mistake. It will be fruitful, I think, to explore Pritchard’s position, in order to then 
illuminate Foucault’s engagement with moral philosophy. 
 The problem, Pritchard thought, could be brought out by considering why we 
are brought to ask moral questions in the first place. The idea is that, in our everyday 
lives, we generally unproblematically observe all sorts of norms, or “oughts,” though 
some times we find that these demands upon us are at odds with other things we find 
ourselves highly motivated to do, or other ends we find ourselves highly motivated to 
realize. We find ourselves asking “well, why ought I do this?” And, in general, we give two 
sorts of answers to this question. The first type claims that the act in question is, in fact, 
something we are, or would be, motivated to do, if we can get clear on what our interests 
actually are; it is an answer to the effect that it is to your benefit to do this thing. The second 
type makes no appeal to one’s benefit, or at least not directly, but rather to “goodness,” 
either of the action or its consequences. Giving these sorts of answers is the business of 
moral philosophy. This is not the place to discuss Pritchard’s full arguments but, given 
the title of his essay, suffice it to say that he thinks both of these sorts of responses are 
doomed to fail at actually giving us answer that captures the normative force of why we 
ought to do something. In what follows I don’t want to presume that moral philosophy is 
in some way damned by this, but I do want to register the force of  his conclusions. 
 According to Pritchard, the first sort of answer fails insofar as it doesn’t preserve 
any of the normative force of the ought involved; it does not answer why you ought to 
perform the action in question, but rather just brings you to want to do it, “resolving 
obligation into inclination,” as he puts it. However, in a sense, this sort of response is 
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successful, if not as a “legitimate answer,” insofar as it dissolves the question by dissolving 
the conflict that caused it to be raised. The one who raised it can continue on with her 
life, acting in accordance with, if  not out of, duty.  
 On the other hand, the second sort of answer fails insofar as it attempts to 
explain why we ought perform some action in terms of goodness, either of the 
consequences of the action or of the action itself. In the first case, Pritchard thinks that, 
in general, however, our sense of the rightness of the action is actually prior to our sense 
of the goodness of its consequences; for us, the recognition of the obligation to obey 
the norm is the reason we recognize the good produced or value expressed through 
action, and thus the latter cannot be the answer to the question why ought I do this. In the 
second case, he notes that we generally only think of an action as “good” when it is 
performed out of one of certain set of motives, generally including duty or some sort of 
benevolence. Pritchard takes it that the effect of such a response is to cause one to 
“want to want to perform the action,” which he also takes to be impossible. I think this 
is wrong; rather, I think it is in fact a response to the sort of problem that raised the 
question, in a manner similar to the appeal to the agent’s benefit. Whereas that sort of 
response, if successful, brings the agents behavior in line by showing that the norm, i.e., 
the “ought,” in question is hospitable to her existing motives, the appeal to the goodness 
of the action-plus-motivation ensemble, if successful, brings the agent to adopt a certain 
attitude, or take a certain stance: one of  commitment. 
 In some cases, bringing the agent to take up this attitude may take place simply 
by reminding an agent of her existing commitments; if I’m asked “Why ought I keep the 
promise I made,” I might respond, “Because you ought to be honest and reliable, 
generally,” and this could be a perfectly good answer. It could give the agent a reason why 
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she ought to perform the action in question.58 I might even respond “Because to do so 
would be to lack integrity,” and this could be a fine answer. Each case would, of course, 
rest on a great deal of tacit knowledge and background assumptions on the part of my 
interlocutor, but that is no problem. What is crucial is simply that the answer given, if it 
is to count, hooks into one or another of the normative commitments of my 
interlocutor, whether as the application of a broader principle she accepts, or as 
condition for being the sort of  person she is committed to being, or what have you. 
 In other, more interesting cases, the response given may be performative; if 
successful, it may bring the agent to take up new commitments, or to adopt new stances. It 
might be that I engage with someone whose existing normative commitments simply 
don’t give her (moral) reason to keep her promises. If she asks me why she ought to do 
so, I might simply say “Because, in this case at least, to do otherwise would be wrong.” 
Now, it’s not clear that this response does anything but repeat the claim that one ought 
to do keep one’s promises, which, if one could not see to begin with, would not be an 
answer to the question as to why we ought do so. However, such a response can 
constitute such an answer when someone without the relevant normative commitments 
comes to acknowledge the force of the response, and in doing so takes up those 
commitments, however diverse the causes of  that acknowledgment may be. 
 Pritchard thought he had shown that traditional moral philosophy rests on a 
mistake, in that the sorts of answers it seeks in response to the questions of the sort 
“Why ought I perform such and such an action” are misguided, as they either dissolve 
the distinctively normative force of the ought in question, appeal to properties of 
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 58 This is different than in the case where one appeals to the agent’s benefit, insofar as though 
there is a sense in which that appeal might also be thought to give a reason why the agent “ought” to 
perform the action if she is prudential or instrumentally rational, this is not the same distinctively moral 
ought that has been in question. 
goodness or rightness that are in fact derivative of the original, intuited obligation, or 
attempt to enlarge or alter the motivational set or structure of the agent in question. I 
don’t want to commit myself or Foucault to this diagnosis, exactly, but I want to note 
some aspects of Pritchard’s manner of thinking on this matter that is strikingly evocative 
of  Foucault’s.
 First of all, it should be noted that, as presented, the question that moral 
philosophy attempts to answer - “Why ought I do X” - arises from a problem. Some 
aspect of the agent’s usual way of navigating the normative landscape in which she finds 
herself has broken down. This might be as innocuous as simply being confronted with 
an episode of particularly strong inclinations to act otherwise than she ought to, 
prompting the question. But such problems can go even deeper. Our agent might be 
confronted with a situation sufficiently foreign that her everyday, unreflective way of 
being in the world cannot immediately and unproblematically cope with it, requiring 
explicit guidance. One might raise the important similar question “What is to be done 
(here)?” In such a case, our agent might find her form of life expanded, extended or 
amplified in being made capable of dealing with relevantly similar scenarios. I take it that 
this question is of the same type that gives rise to, among other things, moral 
philosophy; our agent can be provided an account of the rules or principles or the 
virtues that, in fact, specify the appropriate thing to do. 
 It is indeed not impossible that our agent could confront a situation, whether of 
simply extreme unfamiliarity or of such disorder that she finds herself unable to apply 
her moral concepts, to find purchase on or orientation in her situation, in which case the 
rules or virtues she has at her disposal will do her no good. In such a case, it’s not clear 
that a moral philosophy that consists in the elucidation and justification of rules or 
virtues alone will suffice; what is required is the development of a new skill, a new 
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technique for navigating one’s life, the sort of non-codifiable (on pain of infinite regress) 
tacit knowledge that all agents possess.59 
 Sometimes the development of these skills or techniques or styles of living is 
part and parcel of transforming one’s way of life, whether because one has found some 
sort of incoherence in it, or because it is no longer viable, for whatever reason. This self-
formation and transformation might take place in the relative suddenness of a 
conversion experience that demands such new ways of comporting oneself, or through 
the long and difficult work of accommodating oneself to the demands of the world and 
others in it, but, in general, will be in response to the finding of something in the 
situation problematic. 
 And this is exactly what Foucault took himself to be investigating. He was not 
doing moral philosophy, but rather investigating what he called problematization, or modes 
or fields of problematization.60 This is, as he puts it, the explicit theme of The Use of 
Pleasure, the second volume of his history of sexuality and the first to turn to specifically 
“ethical” practice:
It was a matter of analyzing … the problemizations through 
which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought – and 
thepractices on the basis of which these problemizations are 
formed.61
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 59 See the following two chapters for a discussion of the non-codifiability of at least some of our 
normative skills. 
 60  Recently, Colin Koopman has presented a very strong case that “problematization” is 
something of a “master key” for understanding Foucault’s work. See Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the 
Problems of Modernity (Bloomington IN. Indiana University Press: 2013).His argument is too complex too 
address as a whole. For the moment, I will just note that I am in full agreement with Koopman regarding 
the centrality of the concept of “problematization” in Foucault’s work, though I disagree that it is best 
thought of, to use the former’s parlance, as an “analytic” or “method” (as opposed to a “concept,” which 
might emerge in the application of a method). It might simply pick out a particular type of privileged 
object of  investigation. 
 61 The Use of  Pleasure, p. 11. 
Bracketing the Heideggerean language, Foucault’s point here is that what is of interest to 
him are the ways in which our practices and, more broadly, our forms of life, our 
everyday ways of navigating the world break down. When these practices break down, we 
don’t know what to do, and have to develop new techniques and styles of living.62 
Foucault is quite clear about this in The Use of Pleasure. He wants to investigate what he 
explicitly calls “the moral problematization of pleasure,” of what the Greeks called ta 
aphrodisia. Foucault asks why, for the Athenians, there was “an intense problematization 
of  sexual practice”:
Why was it... that the practice of pleasures became a matter 
for debate? Why did... sexual activity... occasion anxiety, 
discussion, and reflection? Why did... everyday experience 
give rise to a way of thinking that sought to rarefy sexual 
behaviour, to moderate and condition it, and to define an 
austere style in the practice of pleasure? How did sexual 
behaviour... come to be conceived as a domain of  moral experience?63
And Foucault knows perfectly well that these sorts of problems, these problematizations, 
call for responses, for new techniques or styles of living. In the case of the Athenian 
problematization of sexual behaviour, Foucault identifies “four types of stylization of 
sexual conduct that were developed in a dietetics concerned with the body, an economics 
concerned with marriage, an erotics concerned with the subject of boys, and a philosophy 
concerned with truth...”64As we have seen, (moral) philosophy is a response to situations 
in which our practices break down, or cease to suffice for unreflective guidance, but not 
the only one.65 
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 62 I don’t distinguish here between inventing a new  technique and finding a new use for an old 
one. I don’t think it makes much of  a difference in this case. 
 63 The Use of  Pleasure., p. 23. Emphasis mine. 
 64 The Use of  Pleasure., p. 36. 
 65 We should also note, of course, that we have Foucault making oblique reference, once again, to 
the way in which we come to govern our conduct, through the help of philosophy, with reference to the 
“truth.” Government by or through the truth remains a constant preoccupation of  Foucault’s. 
 We should also note, here, that - again - Foucault is not himself providing us 
with an account of what the Greeks should have done, how they ought to have responded 
to the problems that they faced when their ways of navigating the practice of sexual 
pleasure broke down. He is certainly not looking to them for a model of how we ought 
to respond to our own contemporary problems. When Dreyfus and Rabinow ask him if he 
sees any sort of valuable solution in the Greeks that might be adapted to our own 
circumstances, Foucault is unequivocal:
No! I am not looking for an alternative; you can’t find the solution 
of a problem [e.g., a contemporary political or ethical 
problem] in the solution of another problem raised at 
another time by other people. You see, what I want to do is 
not the history of solutions [nor, a fortiori, “ethics”] - and that’s the 
reason I don’t accept the word “alternative.” I would like to do 
the history of  problems, of  problématiques.66
So, Foucault, like Pritchard, takes it that philosophy, and moral philosophy in particular, 
is among other things but one way of responding to problems, and is interested in how 
these problems arise. 
 At this point, it is important to avoid misunderstanding. Some commentators 
take Foucault to characterize the way the Greeks problematized sexual pleasure, and 
responded to these problematic pleasures, as “ethical,” in a manner distinguished in 
some important way from “morality,” and especially from Christian morality, where 
morality is understood merely as a code or set of rules or prohibitions. Timothy O’Leary 
goes so far as to attribute to Foucault the “suggestion that traditional, code-based 
morality can only be replaced by an ‘aesthetics of existence.’”67  Lois McNay puts it as 
follows: 
The distinction that Foucault perceives between the Classical 
and Christian moral systems gives rise to a distinction 
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between morality as a set of imposed rules and prohibitions 
and ethics as the ‘real behaviour’ of individuals in relation to 
the rules or values that are advocated to them... Techniques 
or practices of the self are situated at the level of ethical 
practice. It is through a series of different practices or ‘arts of 
existence,’ ranging from the concrete techniques used to 
order daily existence to the spiritual significance attached to 
these activities, that individuals seek to interpret those 
experiences.68 
The distinction being made here is more or less Hegelian in its roots, which is supposed 
to underwrite Hegel’s critique of Kant’s moral theory; Kantian ethics, for Hegel, is too 
abstract, too concerned with separating the dictates of morality from anything empirical, 
historical, or concrete, to actually suffice to guide human action in the way morality 
should. In brief, Kant’s moral theory focuses on the formal properties of rational norms, 
deriving our moral obligations from the bare fact of our rationality. Hegel offers an 
account of Sittlichkeit, or ethical life, as a corrective to what he takes to be Kant’s 
emaciated conception of philosophy not merely as rules but as purely rational rules, rules 
somehow derived from the nature of reason itself. Ethical life, on the other hand, is 
supposed to incorporate the historical and social ways of determining conduct, 
traditions, customs and mores, into a richer, though still thoroughly rational, form of 
life. A similar distinction is also made by Bernard Williams, who - very loosely - takes 
“ethics” as a term for all the various ways in which we are able to evaluate and guide our 
lives, a term, in broad strokes, for what we are doing when we are trying to answer the 
question “How should we live?” in a way that takes seriously all the assorted (and 
perhaps unassociated) ways in which we find courses of action, and human life more 
broadly, significant; “morality” is distinguished as a peculiarly hegemonic way of guiding 
one’s life, characterized by a reliance on highly general principles of conduct to be 
applied to any and every situation, which override all other considerations and are often 
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indifferent to many of the most deeply held convictions of those subject to it. Williams, 
I take it, thinks morality tends to be pernicious, while Hegel takes it to be lacking in 
content. I am unsure of what Foucault’s take on the matter would be, insofar as it is not 
a distinction that he cares to make. 
 After all, if Foucault really were to be worried about the effect of Christianity - 
or “morality” more generally - upon us, it would undoubtedly be because they have had 
pernicious power-effects on us. Let us agree that, were Foucault to be “critiquing” 
“morality” in some way, the technologies, techniques, strategies, tactics, and effects of 
power imbricated in our moral lives are the most plausible targets. But then it would be 
strange for him to take to task Christianity, or Christian morality, or morality, for 
imposing some set of rules upon us, and especially for imposing some sort of 
“repressive” set of rules, given that it is arguably arguably the paradigmatic achievement 
of Foucault’s genealogical works to demonstrate to us that power does not work on us 
first and foremost in the form of law or rules at all, but through subtle techniques that 
produce us as the sorts of subjects we are. Further, it is the explicit thesis of the first 
volume of The History of the Sexuality that we are not the subjects of a “repressed” 
sexuality - whether by Christian values or Victorian mores - that would be something 
positive and free if we could only lift these restraints. To think that Foucault is worried 
about the replacement of Greek “ethics” by a moral code - and especially a “repressive” 
one - is to have misunderstood his diagnosis. 
  In his lecture course on The Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault explains himself 
on this point:
It seemed to me that one of the most interesting dimensions 
of [Greek ethics] was that the basic framework of modern 
European sexual morality was to be found in this regimen of 
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aphrodisia, rather than in so-called Christian morality, or worse, 
in so-called Judeo-Christian morality.69
That is to say, it is not in Christian morality, and a fortiori not in the supersession of Greek 
“ethics” by Christian “morality,” that we find the earliest traces of what will become our 
sexual morality. In 1984, Foucault references “that ‘fiction’ called Judeo-Christian 
morality,” claiming precisely that it would be a mistake to locate the roots of ‘our sexual 
morality’ in “prohibitions” or the “form of law,” and as early as 1978, Foucault was 
claiming that, in fact, “there is no Judeo-Christian morality.”70  What he means, in this 
case, is that there is nothing particularly novel in terms of the content of moral codes 
given to us by the Judeo-Christian tradition.71  Rather - and somewhat surprisingly - a 
certain sort of “austerity” with regard to sexual conduct was already present in the lives 
of the Athenian elite, in the form of rules for self-mastery that echo in the rules for 
sexual conduct we have today. 
 For Foucault, the content of the moral code - the sorts of acts that have been 
proscribed in widely accepted rules of conduct - is relatively continuous, from classical 
Athens to our time. One conclusion that he draws from this is that “morality” isn’t that 
interesting at all, and certainly is not the target of his critique. And yet, because there 
obviously have been incredible transformations in our experience of sexual activity, 
perhaps culminating most recently in the emergence of something called “sexuality,” 
another obvious conclusion is that something else must have altered in the transition from 
antiquity to the Christian era, and beyond: 
I am not supposing that the codes [i.e. what we might call 
“morality,] are unimportant. But one notices that they 
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(Ed. Michel Senellart. Trans. Graham Burchell. New York NY. Palgrave Macmillan: 2007), p. 191. 
 71 At least with regard to sex. 
ultimately revolve around a small number of principles: 
perhaps men are not much more inventive when it comes to 
interdictions than when it comes to pleasures. Their stability 
is also rather remarkable; the notable proliferation of 
prohibitions (concerning permitted or forbidden places, 
partners, and acts) occurred rather late in Christianity. On the 
other hand, it appears - and this is the hypothesis I would like to 
explore here  - that there is a whole rich and complex field of 
historicity in the way the individual is summoned to recognize 
himself as an ethical subject of sexual conduct. This will be a 
matter of seeing how that subjectivation was defined and transformed, 
from classical Greek thought up to the formulation of the Christian 
doctrine and pastoral ministry concerning the flesh.72
 
If moral codes remain strikingly stable and constant between the ancient pagan and 
Christian eras, what changes is what Foucault calls “subjectivation,” that is, the way in 
which we become (ethical) subjects at all, and the sorts of ethical subjects that are available 
for us to become. And the means by which subjectivation takes place include what 
Foucault variously calls the “technologies” or “practices” or “pragmatics” of the self, 
and of which the “aesthetics of existence” that so concern commentators like McNay 
and O’Leary are but an episode:
Taking the example of sexual behavior and the history of 
sexual morality, I tried to see how and through what concrete 
forms of the relation to self the individual was called upon to 
constitute him or herself as the moral subject of his or her 
sexual conduct. In other words, once again this involved... the 
analysis of forms of subjectivation,... through the 
techniques/technologies of the relation to self, or, if you like, 
through what could be called the pragmatics of  self.73
Foucault, unlike Hegel or Williams does not separate out “morality,” as some sort of 
distinctive set of obligations, construed as rules, or motivations, whether overly rational 
or not, from “ethics.” He does not do so because he is not interested in opposing some 
one set of directives for living to another. As mentioned, it’s important to note that 
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Foucault does not come to the Greeks looking for “solutions” to contemporary 
problems. What he wants to do, rather, is to investigate - in The History of Sexuality, at 
least - is how the practice of pleasure was “morally problematized.” He is looking at how 
certain acts or behaviours or situations came to be problematized, and he comes to the 
investigation of the technologies of the self not as some sort of alternative ethics, much 
less a normative framework underwriting the critical attitude displayed in his works of 
the mid-70s, but rather precisely to explain the problematization of the pleasures in 
ancient Athens, insofar as these technologies play a role in constituting ethical subjects, or 
the sorts of ethical subjects, for whom the pleasures are problematic. It is, I think, utterly 
remarkable how rarely this is noted, when Foucault is so clear about it; again I can only 
think to attribute the apparently overriding urge to treat the technologies of the self as 
an ethical recommendation by Foucault, in the face of so much evidence to the contrary, 
to, the effect of his reception by critics held in thrall by a certain way of construing our 
ethical relations to the world, and each other. 
 If Foucault is going to investigate how we come to be the sorts of subjects for 
whom some course of action or set of passions - e.g., for Foucault, in the ancient world, 
the love of boys, or, in the Christian world, those stirrings of the flesh that constitute 
our concupiscence - become problematic, and in turn how we may, in wrestling with 
those problems, come to be transformed, he is going to have to deal with the rules or 
principles by which conduct has been assessed. And he refers to this as a “moral code,” 
the set of rules and interdictions to which a moral agent may (or may not) be held 
accountable and may (or may not) conform.74  This is as near as Foucault gets to the 
manner in which “morality” is characterized by Williams or Hegel, and it is not 
particularly close; he is absolutely indifferent as to what might ground these prohibitions 
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and interdictions, whether it be overly abstract rationality or custom or teleological 
necessity or what have you, and he certainly does not take the demands of “morality” in 
this sense to be overriding or hegemonic. Rather, he takes the moral code to be an 
absolutely integral, if  less interesting for his purposes, part of  unified moral conduct: 
There is no specific moral action that does not refer to a 
unified moral conduct; no moral conduct that does not call 
for the forming of oneself as an ethical subject; and no 
forming of the ethical subject without “modes of 
subjectivation” and an “ascetics” or “practices of the self ” 
that support them. Moral action is dissociable from these 
forms of self-activity, and they do not differ any less from 
one morality to another that do the systems of values, rules, 
and interdictions.75 
To see how they hang together, let us look at each a little bit closer.
 As discussed, there is the morality, or code, in relation to which one evaluates 
one’s actions, intentions, etc. determines one’s standing, and makes adjustments as need 
be. For example, the proscription “Do not lie” would be an element of  a moral code.
 There is, second, the determination of the ethical substance, that is, of the 
ultimate subject of moral evaluation, that which one works to control, improve, manage, 
etc. Just which part of the subject is ultimately evaluable? A paradigmatic example of the 
determination of ethical substance, vis-à-vis Kant’s moral theory, would be the will. 
Ultimately, what matters for Kant is one’s will, one’s moral intentions. The moral 
evaluation of actions, consequences, states of affairs, etc. are all subordinate to the 
evaluation of the will. What matters is that one wills the right thing for the right reasons. 
In relation to the proscription mentioned above, what matters is that one never wills to 
lie, and does not do so not for prudential reasons but out of  duty.
 Third, the form of ethical work required by must be determined. Must, for 
example, the subject constantly survey her will in order to make sure that it accords with 
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the moral code, or is all that is required for her proper ethical conduct a sort of 
conversion experience, one that - if conditions are correct - will bring her will into the 
right sort of state? For Foucault, importantly, one works on oneself in this way not only 
to bring one’s actions or intentions in line with the moral code but also to genuinely 
make oneself the ethical subject of one’s conduct. To use our Kantian example, one 
carefully inspects the motive for one’s will not simply in order to police oneself, to make 
sure one’s actions and intentions are in accord with the law, but in fact in order to be the 
ethical subject of one’s action. In distinguishing rational autonomy from sensible 
inclination, the Kantian sets herself a task, a task of surveillance and of striving (a 
pathos that continues through the tradition of German Idealism) that must actually be 
taken up in order that one become the subject of one’s actions, the task of autonomy.76 
Foucault’s preferred examples in the late writings often come from the Stoics, and he 
discusses at length the manner in which, for example, various practices of writing 
worked as “techniques of the self,” working - for example - to bring one’s self-image into 
alignment with the perceptions of others, or to integrate traditional wisdom with the 
diverse and fragmented deliverances of  everyday experience.77
 This brings us to the “mode of subjection” or “subjectivation,” the style or way 
in which one relates oneself to both the code and the substance. As Foucault notes, this 
can be a matter of seeing oneself as the sort of subject whose very being is essentially 
determined through its subjection to the moral code (as, perhaps, is true to some degree 
of religious ethics). But, Foucault says, there can be other ways of doing so: “One can 
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“reason” could only ever happen in an instant moment of conversion, we finite beings must continue to 
discipline ourselves as if it were a gradual process, due to the fact that we can never be exactly sure about 
the praise- or blameworthiness of  our motivations. 
 77 Cf., for example, “Self-Writing,” in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, pp. 207-222. See especially pp. 
220-221. 
practice [determining and conducting one’s ethical substance in relation to a moral code], 
too, [for example] because one regards oneself as an heir to a spiritual tradition that one 
has the responsibility of maintaining or reviving; one can also practice fidelity in 
response to an appeal, offering oneself as an example, or by seeking to give one’s 
personal life a form that answers to criteria of brilliance, beauty, nobility or perfection.”78 
To continue with our Kantian example, one determines one’s will as the ethical 
substance and oneself as responsible for it, obliged to subject it to the moral law 
because, ultimately, one has the possibility of being a rational, autonomous, self-
legislating being; one styles oneself as an ethical subject out of respect for the self-given 
Law, out of respect for one’s potential for autonomy. One has to do one’s duty not out 
of mere momentary inclination, nor as part of a long-term project of aesthetic self-
shaping, but for the sake of  duty.
 Finally, there is the moral telos or goal towards which one aims; for the Utilitarian, 
for example, it  is a state of affairs, the state of affairs in which the maximal goodfor the 
maximal number of people is obtained. For the Aristotelian, it is something like 
achieving excellence in one’s human functioning. For the Kantian, the absolute ideal 
would be a world in which virtue and happiness were always to be found in perfect 
proportion.79
 It is clear that the discussion of “ethical subjectivity,” and of the various 
elements that constitute such subjectivity, has nothing at all to do with opposing “ethics” 
to “morality,” and it has nothing to do with the recommendation of “ethical subjectivity” 
in contrast to some alternative way of being a subject. Rather, Foucault’s discussion of 
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My presentation of them here reproduces in part my discussion in “Ricoeur and Foucault: Between 
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the modes of subjectivation and technologies of the self (which are always related to a 
moral code) serves as an “analytical grid” or a “principle of intelligibility,” a way of 
analyzing - as can be seen even in the brief examples given above - multiple different 
ways of taking oneself or treating oneself as subject to a moral code, whether Stoic or 
Kantian or utilitarian or what have you.  So, if Foucault is not attempting to replace an 
allegedly destitute or domineering “morality” with ethics, why is he interested in these 
different ways of making moral action intelligible to ourselves, and of rendering 
different ethical subjects intelligible? 
 The answer, I take it, is really quite straightforward. Foucault is interested in what 
he calls “moral problematization,” in the ways that certain activities, actions, or 
inclinations have, historically, come to be problematic for those engaged in them. The 
historical point is, precisely, that such problematizations have occurred; e.g., the love of 
boys became intensely problematized, at a certain moment in Classical Athens; the 
stirrings of the flesh became  intensely problematized at a certain moment in the history of 
the Church. And the novel analytical point that Foucault wants to make is that they did not 
become problematic  due to violating a code; it is not simply as if these practices or inclinations 
had been ignored, and upon their discovery were found to be in violation of a moral or 
religious or legal code. Rather, these phenomena present problems for the “relation of 
the self to itself,” as Foucault calls it, that is enacted or established through the 
technologies of the self. And these problems are not, in general, addressed through the 
development of a more refined system of law or prohibition, but through the emergence 
of new technologies, or the expansion and transformation of the old. Moral 
problematization and the technologies of the self go hand in hand for Foucault because 
they are integral parts of his analysis: to explain moral problematization requires appeal 
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to the technologies of the self, and the analysis of the technologies of the self 
illuminates how moral problematization occurs. 
 For example, with respect to the problematization of the love of boys, that 
Foucault finds so crucial for the genealogy of sexuality, it is not that all of a sudden the 
Athenian elites realized that it was wrong or bad or vicious to love boys. It was not 
discovered to be “against the rules,” nor was it legislated to be so when it raised 
problems. Rather, out of a complex collection of ways of becoming an (exclusively 
male) ethical subject, which included developing one’s active capacities and avoiding 
passivity at all costs, and thus involved developing enkrateia or a proper mastery of one’s 
appetites and pleasures, the love of boys is problematic insofar as it may reveal a 
weakness on the part of the lover. And, according to Foucault, we see, as an example of 
a response to this sort of problematization, the establishment of a new set of 
technologies of the self: “... they elaborated a courtship practice, a moral reflection, and - as 
we shall see - a philosophical asceticism, around [the love of  boys].”80
 But the love of boys was not simply problematized because of the threat it  
posed to the self-mastery of the ideal Athenian citizen. Perhaps more threatening is the 
risk of inhibiting or retarding the initiation or induction of the beloved young boy into 
the way of life of the adult Athenian male, of his transition into a certain status, in short, 
the passivity of the beloved with respect to his lover might taint the boy’s honour, or 
shame him, in a manner hard to reconcile with his eventual entry into the ranks of 
Athen’s citizenry:
The preoccupation of the Greeks... did not concern the 
desire that might incline an individual this kind of [homo-
erotic, pederastic] relationship, nor did it concern the subject 
of this desire [primarily]; their anxiety was focused on the 
object of pleasure, or more precisely, on that object insofar as he 
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 80 The Use of  Pleasure, p. 214, emphasis mine. 
would have to become in turn the master in the pleasure that was 
enjoyed with others and in the power that was exercised over oneself. 
It was here, at this point of problematization (how to make the 
object of pleasure into a subject who was in control of his 
pleasures), that philosophical erotics, or in any case Socratic-
Platonic reflection on love, was to take its point of 
departure.81 
In order to make sense of the development of new (and in this case, philosophical) 
ascetics, Foucault refers to the problematization of the love of boys, and in explaining 
problematization of the love of boys it had been necessary to refer to the various 
technologies and practices of the self that had constituted the Athenian citizen as an 
exemplar of self-mastery, ruler of himself, his household and, jointly, his polis. Together, 
the concepts of moral problematization and the technologies of the self serve to render 
these Greek practices intelligible, altering our understanding of the complexities of 
historical transformation. Their function is more historiographical than moral.82 
 As we have seen, Foucault, like Pritchard, sees our moral reflection as beginning 
in the face of problems, situations or courses of conduct that arise and - without 
necessarily constituting a violation of a moral or legal code - nevertheless render 
problematic our customary or everyday way of life, throwing a wrench, as it were, into 
the technologies by which are formed and form ourselves as ethical subjects and 
inhabitants of  a particular way of  life: the question is raised as to how ought I (or we) go on? 
 Pritchard was skeptical of the ability of moral philosophy to give a sort of 
foundational justification for any particular question of the form “Well, why ought I do 
X?” The problem, he felt, was that the obvious, and peculiarly moral, force of the 
“ought” in question was primitive; it was only in virtue of the recognition of that force, 
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 82 My account here is consonant with Koopman’s insofar as the point for Foucault is, I think, not 
just to show that certain practices or forms of knowledge have emerged historically, with their particular 
sets of rules, modes of action, etc., but how they have done so. Problematization is a key notion in 
explaining this how. 
and its manifest tension with other urges, inclinations, or demands placed on an agent 
that the moral question arises in the first place. His own response was to embrace 
intuitionism, the view that we somehow immediately intuit our duties and obligations. 
Foucault himself made remarks that seem close to a form of intuitionism, such as when 
he famously stated that, with regard to the problems of the prison system, “Simplement, je 
perçois l’intolérable.”83  Nevertheless, I think it is clear that Foucault does not endorse 
intuitionism or any particular form of moral epistemology. Rather, he recognizes that the 
immediacy or priority of the norms we confront in the course of our everyday lives is 
just part of what it is to inhabit a particular way of life. We have always already been 
formed as, or called to be, ethical subjects, with all the complex forms of ethical work, 
subjectivation, and so on, that this entails, but to be formed so is not to be an 
automaton; the regular and unthinking guidance that our ways of life, or ways of being 
ethical subjects, afford us can confront problems, to which, sometimes, only a 
transformation in our techniques for living are capable of  responding. 
 Pritchard also thought that some forms of moral philosophy (probably 
unwittingly) worked to dissolve or transform moral problems, rather than answering the 
moral questions raised in response to them, as, for example, when it is argued that what 
one ought to do is in fact what best serves one’s interests. Desires are brought into 
alignment with the obligation in question, thus dissolving the problem, but the question 
isn’t answered, and the ethical subject in question must be (at least) tacitly committed to 
the assertion that, in this case at least, what one ought to do is indulge one’s desires. To 
take another example, the development of what Foucault calls the “Socratic-Platonic 
erotics” approach to philosophy does not, in fact, simply answer the question of “how 
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François Ewald. Paris. Gallimard: 1994), p. 1073. 
ought I love (or eschew loving) boys?” but rather introduces a new set of technologies, 
new ways of relating to oneself and working upon oneself in service of a new goal. The 
question of “how ought I love (or eschew loving) boys?” - if it remains at all - is 
transformed in the context of a project of transcendence. One can be reconciled to 
one’s way of life, or that way of life can be transformed, without providing what would 
be considered, strictly speaking, a justification for that way of life. Foucault takes a step 
back, so to speak, from engaging in first-order normative ethics to see more clearly the 
forms of life in which such an enterprise arises, and how it manages to gain purchase. 
We have outlined how these forms of life might come to be problematized, and 
transformed through the development of new technologies of self-shaping. Before 
seeing just how Foucault challenges the very ground from which his critics challenge him 
to provide a normative framework, the following two sections will investigate how 




FOUCAULT’S ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXCAVATION OF THE SPACE 
OF REASONS
§2.1 The Trouble with Freedom 
 In this section, I want to ward off misunderstandings of Foucault’s work that 
might arise when confronted with the apparent change of focus in Foucault’s work, from 
anonymous structures of power in the 16th century and after, to highly personal and 
individualized modes of self-formation in Ancient Athens. We have seen that the appeal 
to technologies of the self and moral problematization in Foucault is not intended to 
find new “moral models,” as Hadot puts it, but rather as an attempt to render intelligible 
what Foucault, in describing the reorientation of the entire project of The History of 
Sexuality, calls “the history of desiring man,” to understand ourselves historically without 
relying on tired explanatory tropes of individual ingenuity or autonomous social 
dynamics. It is precisely with the Platonic transformation of the technologies of the self 
that we find “ground broken for a future inquiry into desiring man... [T]he tradition of 
thought that stems from Plato was to play an important role when, much later, the 
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problematization of sexual pleasure was to be reworked in terms of the concupiscent 
soul and the deciphering of  its arcana.”84
 But nevertheless, very insightful readers of Foucault’s work have been struck by 
the way that Foucault writes about these ancient practices. As James Porter puts it, 
Foucault often presents these ancient practices as revealing a different, freer sort of  life: 
The contingency of sexual norms bespeaks vast freedoms, a 
kind of unheard-of malleability and plasticity of subjectivity, 
if  not a complete emancipation from normativity. This line of
approach is known among classicists as a mode of existence 
“before sexuality,” when sexual behaviors were fluid, not 
essence-defining, and not yet divided by desire and its 
repression, and among postmodern exponents [including, 
allegedly, Foucault] as an emancipatory “self-fashioning”...85
He sees Foucault as endorsing the claim that “the modern subject is culturally 
constructed, while the ancient subject is [freely] self-constructed,” where self-construction is 
understood as morally preferable to, presumably because freer than, cultural 
construction.86 Lois McNay argues that the elite Athenian individuals whose modes of 
self-fashioning intrigue Foucault were “allowed much greater freedom [than the 
contemporary subjects of Christianity-inflected sexual morality] in the interpretation and 
application of the demands of austerity to their own lives.”87And, to be fair, Foucault 
does sometimes talk in this way: 
These themes of sexual austerity should be understood not as 
an expression of, or commentary on, deep and essential 
prohibitions, but as the elaboration and stylisation of an 
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from Plato” likely includes the Stoics and Epicureans, and thus one cannot, for example, unproblematically 
valorize, on Foucault’s behalf, the laudable Stoic modes of self-fashioning as against a pernicious Christian 
“hermeneutics of the subject,” as some are wont to do. A “golden age of self-cultivation” is not, in and of 
itself, something Foucault recommends. See, for an example of this, Michael Ure, “Senecan Moods: 
Foucault and Nietzsche on the Arts of  the Self ” Foucault Studies 4 (2007):19-52.
 85 “Foucault’s Ascetic Ancients,” p. 123.
 86 “Foucault’s Ascetic Ancients,” p. 123 
 87 Foucault: A Critical Introduction, p. 135.
activity in the exercise of its power and the practice of its 
liberty.88
McNay cites this same passage, italicizing the phrase “the practice of its liberty” to 
emphasize the possibility that Foucault might actually think the Greeks possessed 
“more” freedom than we do. However, one might very well have emphasized “the 
exercise of its power.” For Foucault, whatever freedom might be manifested in stylized 
Greek responses to the moral problematization of sexual pleasure, they are no less the 
establishment and maintenance of power-relations. As I have been arguing, his 
investigations into the ethical practices of classical Athens remain part of genealogical 
project, and trying to draw this quick contrast between “self-construction” and “cultural 
construction,” or between what “strong and free individuals living their lives as works of 
art”89 and whatever benighted condition we find ourselves in now, is too quick by half.
 Foucault himself, in a different context, explicitly takes issue with the idea that 
one ought to make evaluative comparisons and contrasts of the various historical periods 
he covers in his research. Foucault resists such comparisons “for two reasons. One is 
factual and the other is a reason of  method and principle...
The factual reason first of all. What sense is there in saying, 
or simply wondering, if [for example] an administrative 
monarchy like that of France in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, with all its big, heavy, unwieldy, and 
inflexible machinery, with its statutory privileges which had to 
be recognized, with the arbitrariness of decisions left to 
different people, and with all the shortcomings of its 
instruments, allowed more or less freedom than a regime 
which is liberal, let’s say, but which takes on the task of 
continuously and effectively taking charge of individuals and 
their well-being, health, and work, their way of being, 
behaving, and even dying, etcetera? So, comparing the quantity of 
freedom between one system and another does  not in fact have much 
sense. And we do not see what type of demonstration, what 
type of  gauge or measure we could apply.
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 89 Paras, Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge (New York. Other Press: 2006) p. 127.
 This leads us to the second reason, which seems 
to me to be more fundamental. This is that we should not 
think of freedom as a universal which is gradually realized 
over time, or which undergoes quantitative variations, greater 
or lesser drastic reductions, or more or less important periods 
of eclipse. It is not a universal which is particularized in time 
and geography. Freedom is not a white  surface with more or less 
numerous black spaces here and there and from time to time.90
While it is obvious to all but the most hardened utilitarians that quantifying morally 
salient qualities such as freedom is absurd, Foucault’s point here is that what is of import 
when speaking of freedom (as in this case, but also, I take it, of other normatively 
important or valuable concepts) is not a property or set of conditions, and certainly not 
one we can unproblematically pick out and compare across historical periods from a 
detached perspective. 
 I would like to note well that this is not the same thing as claiming something like 
“There is no such thing as freedom,” and we should be careful not to attribute such a 
position to Foucault. We should be especially careful not to assume that, because 
Foucault thinks that power-relations or techniques of power constitute subjects, he thinks 
that subjects are somehow unfree in virtue of being so constituted. One finds such 
sentiments expressed frequently in discussion of Foucault. But it’s not at all clear that, 
when Foucault speaks of power producing or constituting subjects, that he is invoking a 
causal notion of production or constitution in a way that would conflict with more 
libertarian intuitions about freedom. The thought that any notion of the constitution or 
production of subjects would necessarily be deterministic, or close enough to our everyday 
ideas of causal determination to raise problems requires ignoring deep and complex 
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 90  The Birth  of Biopolitics, pp. 62-63, emphasis mine. In this lecture, Foucault is, admittedly, 
discussing the meaninglessness of trying to compare pre-liberal French government with other forms, but 
the point, it seems, is quite general, and should be heeded by any commentator tempted, for example, to 
hold up the punishment of Damien as evidence that things were “better” or “more free” before the 
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debates about compatibilism and incompatibilism. After all, it is no foregone conclusion 
that some event, action, or agent’s being determined precludes that event, action, or 
agent’s freedom. It may even be the case that such determination is a necessary condition 
for one’s freedom. For the moment we will bracket such concerns, and come at the 
problem of  freedom in Foucault’s work from a different direction.91 
 It should be uncontroversial to claim that there are multiple concepts of freedom 
operative in political life. For example, it is to Isaiah Berlin that we owe the most 
straightforward characterizations of two of these: negative liberty (as the absence of 
external constraint or coercion) and positive liberty (as having the resources to or 
meeting the conditions, often quite substantial, for the mastery of one’s own life or 
actions). It seems clear that these are both really conceptions of freedom, and it seems 
equally clear that either can be embodied to various degrees in our everyday and political 
lives. So, on the face of it, one could read Foucault’s claim regarding the 
incommensurability of freedom across different historical periods as being a claim to the 
effect that, while one could perhaps assess greater or lesser degrees of either negative or 
positive freedom, it does not make sense to say that there is some single privileged sense 
in which one regime is more free, simpliciter, than the other.92
 But Foucault’s aim is more radical than that. He makes no specific reference to 
positive or negative freedom. The reason is not, I think, that he was unfamiliar with the 
exact manner in which we, following Berlin and Benjamin Constant before him, draw the 
distinction, but also likely because these two  options amount to a far too restrictive view 
of what freedom might mean. Even in contemporary Anglophone political philosophy, 
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 91  Johanna Oksala has remarkably thoroughly explored what might be called the more 
“ontological” dimensions of freedom in Foucault’s work. See Foucault on  Freedom (New  York. Cambridge 
University Press:2005). My approach diverges from hers, though I take it my conclusions are compatible. 
 92 Assessing Foucault’s work in these terms is, in fact, central to the criticisms made by Charles 
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we find, for example, Philip Pettit’s influential “republican” conception of “freedom as 
anti-power,” which tries to carve a middle ground, of sorts, between positive and 
negative freedom, in which the central concern is with non-interference, as with Berlin’s 
conception of negative freedom, construed not primarily in terms of actual interference, 
but rather as in freedom from potential arbitrary interference. On Pettit’s account, the 
proper antonym of freedom is not interference but slavery; his notion of freedom is not 
as strong as self-mastery but rather a more minimal notion of “non-domination.” If 
Berlin is useful to set up the initial contrast between different sorts of freedom, the 
allusion to Pettit’s work is useful to demonstrate how conceptions of freedom can 
proliferate. It is especially useful insofar as he notes that this conception belongs to a 
history, and he and Berlin both note that the import of all these conceptions of freedom 
derives from the fact that their advocates are motivated by what they want to avoid, whether 
it simply be external constraint or some form of slavery. To the extent that there are 
these - and, importantly, other, different - rival conceptions of freedom vying for 
primacy in any political community, Foucault is correct to say that there is not much 
meaningful content to comparative assessments of such communities in terms of 
freedom as such and, further, he is right to note that freedom, in the relevant sense, is not 
some “white space,” that is, not in and of itself some unsullied and metaphysically basic 
sense of unconstrained agency.93 Rather, freedom in the relevant sense is something that 
emerges out of relations of power, between governed and governors (even if the 
governed are would-be self-governors), in terms of what is demanded, and what is 
deemed - to use an appropriately Foucauldian phrase - intolerable. 
 We saw in the previous section that Foucault begins in media res; the analysis of 
moral problematization and the technologies of the self arise in a context in which 
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 93 It is not clear to me, at least, that a notion of  unconstrained agency is even intelligible. 
“ethics, or the exchange of ethical reasons and observations, [is] an ‘already going 
concern.’”94  If they weren’t such “going concerns,” they wouldn’t be part of the 
practices, habits, and institutions susceptible to problematization.95 And so it is with the 
demand for freedom. The limits of what will be tolerated, of the unfreedom deemed 
acceptable, by the participants of political life are going to be determined - as much as 
they are determinate - at least in part, by the form of life they inhabit, their everyday 
ethical practices and habits, and these limits are not likely to ever be fully determinate 
insofar as everyday ethical practice is shot through by contestation: over the meanings of 
concepts, hierarchies of  values, and so on.96 
 The claim here is that there is no one metaphysically or morally interesting 
property, such as, e.g., being able to act on the basis of one’s desires, or having the 
capacity to do otherwise than what one does, or being in some sense the “source” of 
one’s actions, that is also in and of itself normatively fundamental, or calls out for 
safeguarding against encroachments. In the context of one’s form of ethical life, one 
might find that certain encroachments upon action do violate some consciously held 
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And this dissensus, unless properly understood, will be where realists attack such pragmatists. The 
beginnings of a radical pragmatist/naturalist response can be found in the work of Huw Price. See, for 
example, “Truth as Convenient Friction” in Naturalism without Mirrors (New York NY. Oxford University 
Press:2011), pp. 163-183
moral value or principle, such that, for example, medical paternalism on the part of 
doctors or hospital boards violates the autonomy of one as a patient, or the action of 
entrepreneurs in establishing a monopoly violates the right of consumers to express 
themselves through choice. Or it might be that some form of freedom is demanded 
negatively, on the basis of a related moral violation; the police force breaking up a strike 
might simply be brutal and cruel, resulting in a call for rights not to safeguard anything 
positive and determinate, but as a bulwark against that. There is no single antonym of 
freedom, but there have been - at various times, in various contexts - many obstacles to 
it: from slavery to imprisonment, from poverty to laziness, from “mass society” to, it is 
sometimes claimed, “society” as such. 
 The important thing is that there is no clear-cut meaning of freedom that has 
any normative force on its own, as far as Foucault is concerned. And, I take it, 
“freedom” is not unique in this regard; the same could be said of any of the complex 
network of normative notions and practices into which the concept and claim to 
freedom are embedded. We do not grasp our normative concepts, like freedom, rights, 
injustice, well-being, or vice, merely in having some articulable sense of how to apply a 
moral rule to some normatively mute state of affairs (though sometimes grasping moral 
concepts will enable such applications). Nor can we grasp any one normative notion 
independently of a rich set of normative notions, in terms of which we can make sense 
of what it is or would be, say, to be vicious, or have broken a promise, or to have 
rendered another’s livelihood precarious. And, certainly, we don’t grasp such concepts in 
being acquainted with some non-normative fact or state of affairs. In brief, it is best to 
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understand Foucault as rejecting what might be called “the myth of the normative 
given.”97 
§2.2  Sellars, The Myth of  the Given, and the Space of  Reasons
 
 Wilfrid Sellars introduced the notion of the “myth of the given” at least in part 
to combat traditional empiricist and foundationalist programmes in epistemology. 
Sellars’ primary target, in invoking the myth, is the notion that there might be some sort 
of experience - the given - that could serve to ground the epistemic status of other 
content-bearing states, itself graspable and in fact knowable independently of any of 
these derivative states. The given is the non-inferential ground of all inferentially gained 
and propositionally articulated knowledge. Sellars rejects this vision of knowledge, 
emphatically.98 Similarly, Foucault rejects the idea that there are foundational normative 
concepts such that we could be in possession of them without grasping a web of related 
moral concepts, and understanding the normative relations between them, and rejects the 
idea that such foundational concepts could (or are needed to) bestow positive moral 
status, or to legislate, or legitimate, other moral judgments. We begin in a complex 
normative web, without clear-cut or consistent conceptual hierarchies. Exploring the 
rejection of that myth, as developed by Sellars and his followers, will help us gain some 
insight into Foucault’s position.
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 97 Benedict Smith uses a similar phrase in his Particularism and the Space of Moral Reason (New  York. 
Palgrave MacMillan:2011). His discussion is insightful, though, given the aims of this essay, my use 
diverges somewhat from his. 
 98  The rejection of the myth of the given stands at the inception of a wide range of post-
positivist philosophy. For a brief but detailed overview  of Sellars’ own argument supporting the rejection 
the myth of given, see Devries, “Wilfrid Sellars,” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
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 Sellars’ rejection of the myth is in part an expression of his rejection of a 
particular vision of knowledge, and a broader conception of the human being’s relation 
to the world, a vision in which human beings stand in isolation from a world, giving rise 
to the urgent metaphysical and epistemological tasks of finding a bridge from 
(representational) thought to world. If the nature of the primary cognitive relation 
between propositional thought and the world is representational, the correctness or 
accuracy of at least some of those representations will be necessary; skeptical worries 
aside, it makes no sense to think of a relation as representational if it cannot be said to 
successfully represent at all. The given serves this role, giving us unmediated contact with 
the world in a way that secures the epistemic standing of  derived states. 
 Sellars gives us an alternative to this picture; for him, the human being does not 
stand apart from the world, but in a “space of reasons” within the world, and our 
practices of knowing are not, or not primarily, a matter of the neutral representation of 
a particular state of  affairs: 
The essential point is that in characterising an episode or state 
as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description 
of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space 
of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one 
says.99
The image of the “space of reasons” is attractive, at least in part because of its 
suggestiveness. It has been developed in various different ways over recent decades, and 
it would be foolish to attempt to do full justice to the thought of Sellars and his heirs 
here.100 Nevertheless, some important features of this image should be noted as, I take 
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it, they figure into the vision of the “subject” and its relation to the “games of truth” or 
“regimes of  veridiction” that interested Foucault so much.101 
 First of all, invoking the image of the “space of reasons” serves to disabuse us 
of foundational questions. Subjects, persons, human beings, do not stand in isolation 
from a world of which they must then come to somehow have accurate representations. 
Rather, an inhabitant of the space of reasons is always in media res, is thrown - to use 
Heideggerean language - into this space. This is consonant with Foucault’s approach to 
everyday practices, forms of life, and their problems. To be placed in the space of 
reasons, as an individual, is to be held accountable and, accordingly, to have or be 
attributed both a stock of concepts at one’s disposal with which one might attempt to 
justify oneself; to be in the space of reasons is to be able to navigate, or be held 
responsibly for not being so able, a rich web of normative relations. The point is that an 
inhabitant of the space of reasons stands in a very different relation to the world than 
the traditional subject of empiricist philosophy. There is no need to establish some 
privileged or foundational relation to the world, as one is, in general, not in an epistemic 
void subject to skeptical anxieties. 
 This is not to say that inhabitants of the space of reasons are immune to error. 
One’s actions are subject to rational evaluation, to censure and criticism, and one is 
subject to demands for explanation and justification. One can act in ways that one is not 
entitled to act, one can make assertions to which one is not entitled, one can violate the 
commitments that issue from previous actions or assertions, and so on. And others can 
hold us accountable for these errors. But the point is that neither the justifications 
demanded of us, nor the criticisms we seek to raise, need to have a foundation in any 
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particular, privileged ahistorical type of experience or body of knowledge. What is 
unacceptable and where explanations come to an end vary according to context. The 
norms governing justification, explanation, and so on are not best thought of as being a 
matter of clearly defined and uniformly applicable rules, all the way down; what rules 
there are are instituted in practices that, though shot through with normative relations, are 
not wholly governed by articulable rules, at the very least.102 
 Beyond the fact that asking for a foundation for these norms in terms of 
articulable rules would lead to an infinite regress, practices rely on a wide variety of 
factors, such as bodily skill and comportment, shared attention, senses of 
meaningfulness, and so on. In other words, a form of life is the only sort of 
“foundation” that our practices, and their norms, have or require. But this is not a 
serious problem for anyone playing the “game of giving and asking for reasons,” or 
anyone engaged in the “game of truth.” In analyzing or discussing the space of reasons, 
there is neither a need for or possibility of stepping outside of it.  When Sellars writes 
that, in calling some episode “knowledge,” one is not merely describing but ascribing a 
certain normative status, opening that episode up to challenge and critique, the implicit 
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Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy. Oxford University Press. New  York NY. 1999, 
p.184. 
point is that to inhabit the space of reasons is to be partisan, at least to some extent; one 
is not standing outside the space of reasons, but taking up a stance of one’s own within 
it. To characterize someone as knowing X is to claim that the relevant party is entitled to 
believe X, does in fact believe X and, finally, just to endorse X oneself.103 No individual 
can survey the world as it is, so to speak, and enter the space of reasons with some sort 
of  trump card that would put an end to the game of  giving and asking for reasons. 
 Thus, acknowledging one’s placement in the space of reasons, one’s partisanship 
or partiality or - to use a term of which I am less fond - the perspectival nature of the 
stance one is afforded involves the firm rejection of what has been called “the view from 
nowhere,” the “God’s eye” perspective on the world and the subject’s relation to that 
world. Beginning in the middle of the game of giving and asking for reasons, sustained 
by a shared form of life, there is no issue of getting the world right, or getting in the 
single right relation to the world. Such an endeavour misunderstands what it is to be an 
inhabitant of the space of reasons, already related to the world in myriad ways, through 
an array of diverse practices. To invoke a God’s eye view, or a sovereign perspective, may 
serve to characterize our inchoate sense of what it would mean to be “finished” with 
inquiry, but it does not serve to name a point of view that can be gained within the space 
of reasons that would be authoritative in and of itself. Any epistemic authority that 
someone might have, even God, depends on its being granted, that is, on us making 
ourselves accountable to that person. And the reasons we have for doing so will always 
73
 103 Cf. Robert Brandom, Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas (Harvard University Press. Cambridge 
MA. 2009), especially “Why Truth is Not Important in Philosophy,” pp. 156-176.
be the partial, partisan reasons available to us in the game of giving and asking for 
reasons.104 
 Though Foucault never knew  Sellars or the the manner in which he and his heirs 
articulated their vision of the rational subject’s place in the world, their views resound 
strikingly with his. And his approach to the “space of reasons” may be equally 
illuminating, insofar as he interested not just in the game of giving and asking for 
reasons, which is but the tip of the iceberg constituted by our everyday bodily, material, 
and discursive practices - our form of life - but rather in “forms of a possible 
knowledge, normative frameworks of behavior for individuals, and potential modes of 
existence for possible subjects.”105  At the very end of his life, this was his manner of 
characterizing the three foci or “axes” of  his project of  “historical ontology.” 
§2.3 Placing the Space of  Reasons in the Arena of  Power
 
 It does not seem too much of a stretch to think of the “forms of a possible 
knowledge” that Foucault wished to investigate as particular regions of the space of 
reasons:
First of all I tried to study the formation of forms of 
knowledge with particular regard to seventeenth and 
eighteenth century empirical sciences like natural history, 
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 105 The Government of  Self  and Others, p. 3. Emphasis mine. 
general grammar, and economics. For me, these were only an 
example for the analysis of the formation of forms of 
knowledge (savoirs). It seemed to me that if one really wanted 
to study... the matrix for the formation of forms of 
knowledge, one should not analyze the development or 
progress of particular bodies of knowledge, but rather one 
should identify the discursive practices which were able to 
constitute the matrices of possible bodies of knowledge, and 
study the rules, the game of true and false, and, more generally, the 
forms of veridiction in these discursive practices. In short, it was a 
matter of shifting the axis of the history of the contents of 
knowledge towards the analysis of forms of knowledge, of 
the discursive practices that organize and constitute the 
matrix element of these forms of knowledge, and studying 
these discursive practices as regulated forms of veridiction. For some 
time I have tried to bring about a shift from the contents of 
knowledge to forms of knowledge, and from forms of knowledge 
to discursive practices and rules of  veridiction.106
Though Foucault’s phrasing may in places suggest that his view of the structures of 
rational space are purely formal, in some neo-positivist or neo-Kantian sense, I have 
stressed that he indeed thinks of discourse as a practice, in which we - embodied, 
historical beings - are permitted to make some moves and sanctioned for others. In his 
archaeological work he delves in painstaking detail into the various canons of 
explanation, underlying models, and evidentiary relations taken to be credible in the 
history of various human or social sciences, and the constitutive role that these play in 
the very emergence of, e.g., political economy, natural history, biology, or general 
grammar. One might very well call these the architecture or infrastructure of the space 
of reasons, or at least some part of that space; Foucault is interested in how it is we have 
rational discourse at all, though he is clear that in moving from an epistemological 
assessment of the “contents of a knowledge” to limning the normative relations or 
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“structures” of our discourses, he is doing something quite other than providing a 
justification or foundation for them.107 
 Foucault’s characterizes the second sort of object of his historical ontology as 
“normative frameworks of behaviour.” Now, it must be stressed that, in Foucault’s 
language, a “normative framework” does not mean the same thing that it does in the 
mouths of his critics, which was discussed in §1.3. It is not an external moral or ethical 
system by which one might seek to evaluate, as if from outside, the forms of life and 
everyday practices that make up our history. Rather, normative frameworks of 
behaviours, as Foucault uses the phrase, are immanent to and embodied within, in fact 
constituting, these forms of life, these practices, and, in turn, the space(s) of reason they 
support. They are not guides by which a theorist might presume to  legislate over a form 
of  life, but are the very object of  Foucault’s investigation: 
Second, it was then a matter of analyzing, let’s say, the 
normative matrices of behavior. Here the shift did not 
consist in analyzing Power with a capital “P”, or even 
institutions of power, or the general or institutional forms of 
domination. Rather, it meant studying the techniques and 
procedures by which one sets about conducting the conduct 
of others. That is to say, I tried to pose the question of 
norms of behavior first of all in terms of power, and of 
power that one exercises, and to analyze this power as a field 
of procedures of government. Here again the shift consisted 
in passing from analysis of the norm to analysis of the 
exercise of power, and passing from analysis of the exercise 
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of power to the procedures of, let’s say, governmentality. In 
th is case my example was cr imina l i ty and the 
disciplines.108  
Foucault was always adamant that he was not providing a theory of power.109 And we can 
grant that his interest was not in analyzing “capital-P” power, in the same way that he is 
not interested in what might be called “capital-F” freedom; there is no interesting thing 
of that sort. If there is no particular feature of agency that is always and everywhere 
defended under the aegis of “freedom,” neither is there some historically constant 
“power” that either augments it or impedes it. Of course, individuals and institutions 
may exert force on others, and may - as Foucault puts it - attempt to “conduct the 
conduct of others,” but Foucault is not even interested in this phenomena in general. 
Rather, he is interested in the specific and concrete techniques and procedures by which 
the conduct of others may be conducted; “conduct” here is a capacious enough concept 
to include obvious senses of the direct control or indirect manipulation of the behaviour 
of others, but also more subtle modes of directing, shaping, managing, administrating, 
and otherwise impacting the behaviour of  individuals. 
 I want to stress that it is not power in and of itself that concerns Foucault, or 
even “disciplinary power” or “bio-power” as such, but rather the techniques  and procedures 
by which behaviour is shaped, sometimes in disciplinary, sometimes in biopolitical ways, 
and likely in various ways that he never managed to investigate himself. This makes 
sense, given Foucault’s focus, discussed in §1.4, on the technologies of the self, which are 
no less techniques and procedures for conducting one’s own conduct; moreover, this 
characterization goes back to his major early statements about power: "'Discipline' may 
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be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a 
modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, 
levels of  application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of  power, a technology”.110 
 The techniques and procedures by which conduct is conducted include, of 
course, the pre-reflective shaping of bodily conduct, at the level of brute behaviour; this 
is part of what Foucault is getting at when he describes the techniques of disciplinary 
power as aiming at the production of “docile bodies.” But behaviour does not take place 
in a void, and a form of life is not built up out of interpretations of otherwise mute 
movements. Behaviour is shaped and directed, certainly, but in our forms of life and 
everyday practices there is no bare behaviour, but rather intelligible action, not merely 
rationally evaluable but in fact responsive to reasons. We can be appropriately chided for 
laughing at an in-law’s racist joke, for the inappropriateness of this behaviour, and we 
hang our heads, appropriately, because we are ashamed. All of this shapes the space of 
reasons we inhabit, and our standing within it. 
 Insofar as action is rationally intelligible, in the sense of responsive to and 
expressing reasons, from the bottom up, Foucault wants to claim that bringing subjects to 
be responsive to reasons in this way, initiating them into a form of life, is a matter of 
power-relations. He rejects any sort of contrast between a “natural” or “free” 
knowledge, and power-relations that could only serve to obscure or distort or mask the 
truth. Foucault never tries to reduce truth or knowledge to power-relations, but 
nevertheless the two are linked. The human being does not come on the scene, so to 
speak, with an originary will to know the world, but has to be formed and shaped into 
the sort of being for whom knowledge, inquiry, and objectivity come to be valuable and 
meaningful at all. As he puts it, by way of explicating some remarks from Nietzsche in a 
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lecture during the alleged transition from Foucault’s “archaeological” to his 
“genealogical” period: 
...knowledge is absolutely not inscribed in  human nature. 
Knowledge doesn't constitute man's oldest instinct; and, 
conversely, in human behavior, the human appetite, the 
human instinct, there is no such thing as the seed of 
knowledge... Knowledge is simply the outcome of the 
interplay, the encounter, the junction, the struggle, and the 
compromise between the instincts. Something is produced 
because the instincts meet, fight one another, and at the end 
of their battles finally reach a compromise. That something is 
knowledge...111
This conviction in the unnaturalness of knowledge, of the subject’s knowing relation to 
the world, remains constant in Foucault:
Perhaps, too, we should abandon a whole tradition that allows 
us to imagine that knowledge can exist only where the power 
relations are suspended and that knowledge can develop only 
outside its injunctions, its demands, and its interests. Perhaps 
we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and 
that, by the same token, that renunciation of power is one of 
the conditions of knowledge. We should admit, rather, that 
power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it 
serves power or by applying it because it is useful).112 
  
Pace critics like Habermas, Foucault is not at all interested in unmasking knowledge-
claims as “ideology,” as falsehood, but rather showing that it is through our formation as 
subjects that we come to play “games of truth and falsity” at all, and that in playing them 
we cement our positions in various power-relations. We see this concern in the very 
structure of Discipline and Punish, which moves from a discussion of the bodily discipline 
that produces docile bodies, to a discussion of the various modes of education to which 
individuals are subjected, initiated into a particular mode of truth-telling - namely, 
hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and examination - with its particular 
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norms, leading finally to a generalized panopticism, that is to say, a technique of power 
whereby subjects internalize the norms of correct action, holding themselves 
accountable in the absence of an external authority as if there were such an authority 
present. And this is precisely what is required by any initiate into a practice; at some 
point, we just have to obey, and not merely obey mechanically, but obey because we have 
come to recognize the authority of  the reasons for which we act.
 In this regard, Foucault’s position is similar to that of Robert Brandom, for 
whom our position in the space of reasons is, precisely, maintained by a sort of 
“scorekeeping” practiced by others, our interlocutors, educators, trainers, and 
supervisors; we respond to reasons insofar as we are trained to be able to obey the rules 
of the game. Some find this conclusion disturbing. John McDowell, for example, 
distinguishes his interpretation of our position in the space of reasons from Brandom’s 
as “a position according to which initiation into a social practice yields individuals of a 
special kind, able to achieve standings in the space of reasons by, for instance, opening 
their eyes; [Brandom’s, by contrast, is] a position according to which we supposedly 
accommodate the very idea of such standings by contemplating subjects individually 
incapable of achieving them, who somehow nevertheless keep one another under 
surveillance?”113. This manner of putting it is misleading, however; any social practice 
require initiation, a period of apprenticeship and blind obedience. It is the 
characterization of  the nature of  that social practice which is at issue. 
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 In fact, the necessity of initiation into social practice has been stressed more by 
McDowell and his followers.114 This is in part because McDowell is concerned with how 
we might find room in a more-or-less naturalistic worldview for an autonomous space of 
reason. His answer is that it is through Bildung, an unproblematic sort of enculturation 
that is “natural” for the sorts of beings we are, that we come to inhabit such a space. 
Indeed, he comes to call our residency our “second nature.” But if one does not frame 
the problem in McDowell’s terms, rejecting any lingering Aristotelianism and accepting a 
more social-pragmatic construal of the nature of the space of reasons, shot through 
with historical contingency and marked all over by the human serpent, it remains the 
case that some sort of initiation is necessary. The shape of our practices do not fulfill 
any human telos, and even if there are (incredibly) broad limits to the sorts of forms of 
life that a human being could really participate in, it is neither the case that such limits 
determine the shape of any form of life on their own nor that there are any such forms 
into which human beings effortlessly enter. The contingency of our ways of being in the 
world are of  a piece with the necessity of  our being properly formed to inhabit it. 
 Returning to Foucault, the very possibility of “veridiction,” of being a subject 
capable of speaking the truth and thus of being a partisan in the space of reasons is a 
matter of being brought to be responsive to norms, insofar as the very notions of “truth” 
and “falsity” are normative notions. The upshot, so clear in Foucault’s work, is that we 
must be acted upon, governed, placed into the normative frameworks of behaviour we 
inhabit, and this is done through a wide variety of techniques and procedures, 
comprising what Foucault calls “power.” Reading Foucault in this way also not only 
allows us to make the best sense of his claims that power is not merely or simply 
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repressive but in fact productive of subjects, of their objects, and of the relations between 
them, but also to understand how the production - or constitution - of subjects by 
power is neither a deterministic nor purely causal affair, and to see the continuity of this 
concern through his first obviously “genealogical” works and his later inquiries into 
Greek antiquity:
It is... the technologies of domination and self, which have 
most kept my attention. I have attempted a history of the 
organization of knowledge with respect to both domination 
and the self. For example, I studied madness not in terms of 
the criteria of formal sciences but to show what type of 
management of individuals inside and outside of asylums was 
made possible by this strange discourse. This encounter 
between the technologies of domination of others and those 
of the self I call “governmentality.” Perhaps I've insisted too 
much on the technology of domination and power. I am more 
and more interested in the interaction between oneself and others, and in 
the technologies  of individual domination, in the mode of action 
that an individual exercises upon himself by means of the 
technologies of  the self.115
Here we find Foucault explicitly stating that the individualizing technologies, the 
“technologies of the self ” that so occupied him in his final years, are technologies of 
domination.116 All the ways in which we form ourselves into ethical subjects, that is to say, 
subjects responsive to norms, to reasons, rules, facts, pleas, and demands, are themselves 
modes and procedures of power, or of governmentality, of the same kind that occupied 
Foucault throughout the 1970s. 
 Of course, this is unsurprising. After all, it was, among other things, Foucault’s 
description of the function of panopticism that so disturbed his readers. He has this to 
say of  the subject who finds himself  in such a field of  generalized surveillance: 
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, 
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them 
play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power 
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relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he 
becomes  the principle of  his own subjection.117 
One clearly finds the language of agency, or “freedom,” here. Subjects assume 
responsibility and act spontaneously, actively. This is the sort of language that one might 
have expected in a conversation about elite Athenian technologies of the self, if one 
were still committed to the existence of some sort of Foucauldian ethics. And it suggests 
that there is no important ethical difference, perhaps in terms of some sort of contrast 
between the “cultural” and “self ” construction of subjects or the degrees of freedom 
manifest in each, between the technologies and procedures of power or government and 
the modes of  self-fashioning that interested Foucault, or at least as such. 
 Rather, it seems perfectly appropriate to claim that, in a disciplinary society such 
as the one described in Discipline & Punish, a generalized panopticism regulating conduct 
according to both patterns of statistical normalcy as well as normatively loaded 
assumptions about the goals of social cooperation, by means of constant self-
surveillance, is part and parcel of the “technology of the self ” by which any given 
individual joins in the everyday practices and ways of life that make up her social milieu. 
Ancient Greek technologies will of course be very different, and their differing will be in 
part due to, for example, differently sanctioned sorts of behaviour, aiming towards 
different ends.118  It is clearly the case that the technologies that interest Foucault in 
Greek ethical life are structured wildly different from our own, in terms of an array of 
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aesthetic criteria for conduct, and agonistic modes of interaction.119  For example, we 
might, alongside Hannah Arendt, stress the important difference in collective 
organization between the “social” and the “political.” “Society” as an entity to which all 
belong, which can be organized in different ways, but nevertheless has certain functions 
and requirements which must be administered, is foreign to Greek thought; political 
organization, that is, collective interaction (albeit only on the part of the privileged) 
aimed toward manifesting individual excellence through active leadership in the affairs of 
the city, would play a much greater role in structuring the everyday life and technologies 
of the self of the Athenian elites.120  Already, such a distinction makes the difference 
between panopticism and the aesthetics of the self more intelligible; of course disciplinary 
techniques and procedures transplanted from functionally-organized contexts such as the 
military and early factories would structure social practice drastically differently than the 
aesthetic/political techniques and procedures available to a free Athenian male. 
 The same phenomenon - again, strikingly unremarked by commentators - 
features prominently in the first volume of The History of Sexuality, in which Foucault is 
much more concerned with the contemporary techniques and procedures of bio-politics. 
Foucault contrasts his sort of explanatory project with a more Marxist hypothesis, 
according to which the emergence of bio-political techniques and procedures of 
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sexuality would have been invented to sedate the working classes. This is emphatically not 
the case: 
On the contrary, the most rigorous techniques were formed 
and, more particularly, applied first, with the greatest intensity, 
in the economically privileged and politically dominant 
classes. The direction of consciences, self-examination, the 
entire long elaboration of the transgressions of the flesh, and 
the scrupulous detection of concupiscence were all subtle 
procedures that could only have been accessible to small 
groups of  people...
 The same can be said of the family as an agency 
of control and a point of sexual saturation: it was in the 
"bourgeois" or "aristocratic" family that... sexuality...was first 
problematized... [It] was the first to be alerted to the potential 
pathology of sex, the urgent need to keep it under close 
watch and to devise a rational technology of correction. It was this 
family that first became a locus for the psychiatrization of 
sex. Surrendering to fears, creating remedies, appealing for 
rescue by learned techniques,  generating countless 
discourses, it was the first to commit itself to sexual erethism. 
The bourgeoisie began by considering that its own sex was something 
important, a fragile treasure, a secret that had to be discovered at all 
costs... [though] the deployment of "sexuality," elaborated in 
its more complex and intense forms, by and for the privileged 
classes, spread through the entire social body.121
We saw that, as Foucault depicts classical Athens, the problematization of the practice of 
loving boys with respect to the active or passive status of both the lover and beloved boy 
was focused in part on the maintenance of the normative status of the male citizen as 
active, and - it seems to be implied - thus as authoritative, capable, competent; a potential 
leader. But it was also aimed at preserving the normative status of the beloved boy as a 
potential future citizen, active and authoritative, and hence was troubled by his perceived 
passivity. The “care of the self ” that developed in response to this problem thus 
concerned both the positions available within a politicized space of reasons, within 
which one can act and speak with purported authority, and the induction of certain 
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candidates into that space. The same is true for the bourgeois European classes with 
whom the complicated technologies of contemporary sexuality emerged; they feared for 
their virility, the continued physical and moral well-being of their offspring, all of the 
complex signs of  fitness to lead:
many of the themes characteristic of the caste manners of 
the nobility reappeared in the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie, 
but in the guise of biological, medical, or eugenic precepts. 
The concern with genealogy became a preoccupation with 
heredity; but included in bourgeois marriages were not only 
economic imperatives and rules of social homogeneity, not 
only the promises of inheritance, but the menaces of 
heredity; families wore and concealed a sort of reversed and 
somber escutcheon whose defamatory quarters were the 
diseases or defects of  the group of  relatives-the grandfather's 
general paralysis, the mother's neurasthenia, the youngest 
child's phthisis, the hysterical or erotomanic aunts, the 
cousins with bad morals.122
 And it seems clear that the development of the complicated techniques and 
procedures that constitute what Foucault calls the “dispositif of sexuality” themselves 
originate in a version of  the care of  the self:
... it seems that the deployment of sexuality was not 
establishedas a principle of limitation of the pleasures of 
others by what have traditionally been called the "ruling 
classes." Rather it appears to me that they first tried it on themselves. 
Was this a new avatar of that bourgeois asceticism described 
so many times in connection with the Reformation, the new 
work ethic, and the rise of capitalism? It seems in fact that 
what was involved was not an asceticism, in any case not a 
renunciation of pleasure or a disqualification of the flesh, but 
on the contrary an intensification of the body, a problematization of 
health and its  operational terms: it was a question of techniques for 
maximizing life. The primary concern was not repression of 
the sex of the classes to be exploited, but rather the body, 
vigor, longevity, progeniture, and descent of the classes that 
"ruled." This was the purpose for which the deployment of 
sexuality was first established, as a new distribution of 
pleasures, discourses, truths, and powers; it has to be seen as the 
self-affirmation of one class rather than the enslavement of another: a 
defense, a protection, a strengthening, and an exaltation that were 
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eventually extended to others - at the cost of different 
transformations - as a means of social control and political 
subjugation. With this investment of its own sex by a technology of 
power and knowledge which it had itself invented, the bourgeoisie 
underscored the high political price of its body, sensations, and pleasures, 
its well-being and survival... 
 What was formed was a political ordering of life... 
through an affirmation of self. And this was far from being a 
matter of the class which in the eighteenth century became 
hegemonic believing itself obliged to amputate from its body 
a sex that was useless, expensive, and dangerous as soon as it 
was no longer given over exclusively to reproduction; we can 
assert on the contrary that it provided itself with a body to be cared for, 
protected, cultivated, and preserved from the many dangers and 
contacts, to be isolated from others so that it would retain its 
differential value; and this, by equipping itself with - among 
other resources - a technology of  sex.123
 The technologies of the self developed by the bourgeois European classes in the 
19th and early 20th centuries are not so narrowly focused on what today goes by the 
name of “ethics,” the sort of practices that were so salient to Foucault in his 
investigations of classical Athens, and could perhaps only be so salient prior to the 
historical emergence of various social or political agencies of direction, administration, 
education, policing, and so on. It takes nothing away from his analysis of either, nor does 
it imply any real change in theoretical interest on Foucault’s part, to admit that the 
institutional and cultural contexts of ancient Greece and modern Europe are wildly 
different. It does, however, make the continuity in analysis all the more clear. In both 
cases we see, in response to problems in everyday life and practice, the invention of 
technologies of the self that serve to modify these practices, maintaining and strengthening 
their positions in a politicized space of reasons, a field of authoritative and often 
hierarchical relations. If Foucault admits that his investigations shifted from 
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“technologies of domination” as such to the “interaction between oneself and others, 
and in the technologies of individual domination,” this is not a turn away from “power” 
but a shift in emphasis from the impersonal power-relations that structure, for example, 
everyday life in a “disciplinary society,” which we might call the carceral space of 
reasons, to the techniques subjects are brought to employ on themselves in order to 
maintain or transform their standing in those spaces, not just through the exclusion of 
others but through a sort of self-affirmation, involving, especially, the preservation and 
initiation of new members of that class, something we see in common between the 
Athenian and European elites. This is no way undermines the crucial and important 
differences between the strategies, techniques, and procedures available in Athens and, 
say, fin-de-siecle  Vienna. They are drastic. But commonalities and differences can coexist, 
and the better the analysis, the better we can see this. 
 It is certainly true that Foucault cared about freedom. In the last piece that he 
prepared for publication, he described his work as “patient labor, giving form to our 
impatience for liberty.”124  But, in his research, was never interested in contrasting the 
histories of practices of freedom with those of our unfreedom. What we have found, in 
this section, is that it is fruitful to understand Foucault’s work on power as an investigation 
into the ways in which we are inducted into the space of reasons, where the latter is a 
distinctive view of how human beings are immersed or engaged in a world through a 
complex normative web. But Foucault is not simply repeating insights already provided 
by Sellars and various members of the Pittsburgh School. In the following section, we 
will see how Foucault crucially improves on our understanding of what it is to occupy a 
space of  reasons.  
88
 124 “What is Enlightenment?” p. 319. 
§2.4 Historical Ontology and the Archaeology of  the Space of  Reasons
 If “space of reasons” talk can help us to understand what Foucault is doing, 
namely, investigating how it is that we come to inhabit such a space, it is also the case 
that Foucault can help us change our ideas about the space of reasons. One important 
thing to note is that, on Foucault’s view, the topography of the space of reasons varies. I 
take the term “topography of the space of reasons” from Rebecca Kukla and Mark 
Lance, who use it in mapping out the different sorts of speech-acts available to agents, 
and to note that different speech-acts, with different conditions on their felicitous 
enactment, position agents differently within the space of reasons, that is, bestow 
different sorts of authority upon agents and entitle them to different sorts of claims. 
Their work is, in part, a valiant effort to combat what they call the “declarative fallacy,” 
the idea that the declarative statement is, if not the only sort of speech-act that makes a 
difference in the space of reasons, the paradigmatic sort; they reject a vision of the space 
of reason in which the only real move is the exchange of propositions, altering the 
entitlements and commitments of members of the space of reason as if shifting them in 
“abstract... Platonic space,” through a sort of disembodied scorekeeping.125 Their project 
is admirable, and I have learned a great deal from it. However, I would suggest that, at 
the level of metaphorical appropriateness, they would have been better served by 
discussing the “geography” of the space of reasons. Kukla and Lance are particularly 
interested in the way that embodied rational agents come into contact with the extra-
linguistic or extra-cognitive world, with how they place demands on each other, and how 
they place each other, and other things, in the space of reasons. They are concerned, in 
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short, with how things stand, and are located with respect to each other in the space of 
reasons. 
 But, for Kukla and Lance, the space of reasons whose geography they map is 
invariably flat, so to speak. Certainly, some speakers have entitlements that others lack, 
but in general the acquisition of a non-indexical true declaration becomes authoritative 
for everyone; to the extent that we do not possess what has become part of our 
community’s common store of knowledge, we are, at best, epistemically defective and, at 
worst, culpably so. And, for Kukla and Lance, the authority of these normative statuses, 
underwriting the binding nature of our commitments, the transmission of entitlements, 
and the force of imperatives, has its source in the way the world is. They want the world 
to have genuine normative significance for our epistemic practices and endeavours, and to 
be the source of the rightness or wrongness of our assertions. And the world exerts the 
same normative claims over everyone. 
 Now, I think, Foucault can certainly assent to the claim that the ways the world is 
makes a difference to our practices of asserting. Whether or not it is the case that, for 
example, the source of national wealth is found in agriculture and the fecundity of the 
land, depends on the ways the world is, and the ways the world works. Nevertheless, to 
admit this does not commit one to there being one unique way the world is; the world 
might admit of multiple sorts of true description that do not cohere into an intelligible 
whole. Further, it does not commit one to the claim that the contributions that the world 
makes to our practices of asserting are the same in all cases of asserting, nor that they 
can be specified and articulated. Further, and most importantly for my purposes, I take it 
that Foucault would claim - and I think he would be right in claiming - that the authority 
that the world has in making this difference is not per se, and not simpliciter. The world 
doesn’t have any bearing on the correctness or incorrectness of anything, independent of 
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In the absence of our epistemic endeavours, the world is normatively inert, though, 
equally, without many and varied ways of being responsive to our environments, our 
epistemic endeavours would be unintelligible. In a sense, this is just a repetition of the 
rejection of the myth of the given; there is no normatively significant role to be played by 
the world or the states of affairs it contains that is independent of our complex 
normative relationships, that is, of the space of reasons and the complicated attitudes 
and practices that support and constitute it. 
 As we have noted, for Foucault there is no basic human drive to knowledge, no 
innate and unique mode of epistemic behaviour that would form fully if we could but 
free ourselves from all of the obstacles that block its realization, whether this be 
ideology or illusion or what have you. I take it that the upshot of this, for him, is that the 
space of reasons is not flat, in the sense that it is not the case that, as inhabitants of the 
space of reasons, we are simply subject to some unique way that the world is, with our 
initiation into this space of reasons being more or less a matter of coming to have 
contentful, epistemically productive discourse about the world through the assistance of 
others - say, parents and teachers - who act merely as functionaries, their authority in 
correcting or encouraging us being vested in them by an impersonal nature, and effective 
only insofar as conducive to an ideal of  knowledge. Rather, as he puts it:
Truth is a thing of  this world: it is produced only by virtue of 
multiple forms of  constraint. And it induces regular effects of 
power. Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general 
politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it 
accepts and makes function as true ; the mechanisms and 
instances which enable one to distinguish true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned ; the 
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techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition 
of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying 
what counts as true.127
 Of course, some sort of “pure knowledge” might serve as a regulative ideal in 
the epistemic game of giving and asking for reasons. But, on the one hand, once we 
discard the myth of the given and the idea of mapping a world from which we stand 
separated, it’s not at all clear what concrete content that ideal has. And, on the other 
hand, it is clear that, even if such a regulative ideal can help explain the functioning of the 
game, it cannot, for Foucault,  serve as an explanation or, at the very least, a complete 
explanation of how the game, the shape of the space of reasons, came to be.128 Such an 
explanation would, of course, be far too Hegelian for Foucault, especially given his 
intellectual context.129  Crucial to the character of the “genealogical” approach to the 
history of thought is a commitment to explanations in terms of contingent interactions, 
and responses to problematizations, with effects that outstrip the intentions of any 
historical actor. Foucault characterizes genealogy thusly: 
Let us say, roughly, that as opposed to a genesis oriented 
towards the unity of some principal cause burdened with 
multiple descendants, what is proposed instead is a genealogy, 
that is, something that attempts to restore the conditions for 
the appearance of a singularity [that is, in this case, a 
particular region of the space of reasons or set of practices 
in which such space is embedded] born out of multiple 
determining elements of which it is not the product, but 
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rather the effect. A process of making it intelligible but with 
the clear understanding that this does not function according 
to any principle of  closure.
 There is no principle of closure for several 
reasons. The first is that this singular effect can be accounted 
for in terms of relationships which are, if not totally, at least 
predominantly, relationships of interactions between 
individuals or groups. In other words, these relationships involve 
subjects, types of behavior, decisions and choices. It is not in the nature 
of things that we are likely to find support. Support for this 
network of intelligible relationships is in the logic inherent to 
the context of interactions [e.g., in the context of the 
problematization of an existing practice] with its always 
variable margins of  non-certainty.130
Our practices, in general, are not “products” in the sense of “realizations of human 
intentions.” As effects of transformations, ruptures, or small series of changes, there is 
no a priori guarantee that the shape they ultimately take on will be foreseeable. And this 
should be unsurprising; if the authority behind the normative structure of our practices, 
of our spaces of and for reason, has its source neither in the way the world is 
independently of us nor in some fact about human nature, it is, in some sense, brute. 
After all, to explain the authority that a figure or rule or institution has over one to be 
initiated, or in the process of initiation, into the space of reasons by appeal to reason is 
viciously circular. Foucault simply draws our attention to the fact that, if this is so, 
authority or power is, if not prior to reason, at the very least inextricably linked to it 
without thereby being grounded in reason. We see this with striking clarity, for example, in 
his lectures on psychiatric power in asylums:
This authority within the asylum is, at the same time, 
endowed with unlimited power, which nothing must or can 
resist. This inaccessible authority without symmetry or 
reciprocity, which thus functions as the source of power, as 
the factor of the order's essential dissymmetry, and which 
determines that this order always derives from a non-reciprocal 
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relationship of power, is obviously medical authority, which... 
functions as power well before it functions as knowledge.131
What is the effect of this sort of medical authority? “The condition, therefore, of the 
relationship to the object and of the objectivity of medical knowledge, and the condition 
of the therapeutic process, are the same: disciplinary order.”132  For the moment, we 
should focus not on the “disciplinary” qualification, but on the fact that the effect of the 
authority at work in the asylum, that is, of medical authority, is order. That order begins 
with the normative structuring of the asylum space, of all the practices that go on within 
it, and make possible the development of pyschiatric knowledge, or the space of 
psychiatric reason. And how does this normative structuring work? Through the 
authority of  the figure of  the doctor: 
[W]hat is the doctor?... [H]ow then does this authority 
without symmetry or limit, which permeates and drives the 
universal order of the asylum, appear? This is how it appears 
in Fodere's text, Traite du delire, from 1817, that is, at that 
great, prolific moment in the protohistory of eighteenth 
century psychiatry—Esquirol’s great text appears in 18187 —
the moment when psychiatric knowledge is both inserted 
within the medical field and assumes its autonomy as a 
specialty. "Generally speaking, perhaps one of the first 
conditions of success in our profession is a fine, that is to say 
noble and manly physique; it is especially indispensable for 
impressing the mad. Dark hair, or hair whitened by age, lively 
eyes, a proud bearing, limbs and chest announcing strength 
and health, prominent features, and a strong and expressive 
voice are the forms that generally  have a great effect on 
individuals who think they are superior to everyone else. The 
mind undoubtedly regulates the body, but this is not apparent
to begin with and external forms are needed to lead the 
multitude. "So, as you can see, the figure himself must 
function at first sight. But, in this first sight, which is the basis 
on which the psychiatric relationship is built, the doctor is 
essentially a body, and more exactly he is a quite particular 
physique, a characterization, a morphology, in which there are 
the full muscles, the broad chest, the color of the hair, and so 
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on. And this physical presence, with these qualities, which 
functions as the clause of absolute dissymmetry in the regular 
order of the asylum, is what determines that the asylum is... a 
field polarized in terms of an essential dissymmetry of 
power, which thus assumes its form, its figure, and its 
physical inscription in the doctor's body itself.133
The doctor serves to establish the normative order that makes possible knowledge, that is, 
to shape the space of reasons. Of course, one cannot establish a normative order 
through brute force, but only through normative authority. The topography of the 
psychiatric space of reasons is not flat; the position of the doctor is elevated. Now, of 
course, the space of the asylum and the figure of the doctor are not instances of an 
absolutely generalizable form of authority, nor do they present us with an invariable 
mechanism for induction into the space of reasons. But, as a case study, it does give us 
some insight both into the character of Foucault’s project and into the shape of the 
space of reasons, and demonstrates clearly how genealogy, rather than replacing 
archaeology as a method or type of investigation, is part and parcel of the larger 
enterprise of  historical ontology. 
§2.5 Rationalities, Persons, and Power
 With respect to the relations between knowledge and power in Foucault’s 
thought, it is useful to remember that he is primarily concerned with the objects of the 
human sciences, namely, ourselves. The idea is that a certain sort of authority must be in 
place to establish the right sort of order to serve as the preconditions of such 
knowledge; ways of observing, examining, modifying, and testing human beings. This 
authority, with respect to those over whom it is exerted, not yet epistemic or rational 
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authority (though it may be authority held simply by virtue of holding the title  of 
“science” or “reason”). As is clear above, this authority at the very least can be found in 
the sheer physical presence of those who give the space of reasons its form. And this is 
a phenomenon that Foucault is deeply interested in; in the first volume of The History of 
Sexuality, he was concerned with how the “political ordering of life” is structured 
through the technology of sexuality, and this too is a matter of establishing authority in a 
thoroughly embodied fashion:
... there was more to this concern with the sexual body than 
the bourgeois transposition of themes of the nobility... A 
different project was also involved: that of the indefinite 
extension of strength, vigor, health, and life. The emphasis 
on the body should undoubtedly be linked to the process of 
growth and establishment of bourgeois hegemony: not, 
however, because of the market value assumed by labor 
capacity, but because of what the "cultivation" of its own 
body could represent politically, economically, and historically 
for the present and the future of the bourgeoisie. Its 
dominance was in part dependent on that cultivation; but it 
was not simply a matter of economy or ideology, it was a 
"physical" matter as well.134
As we saw in the previous section, the authority of elite Athenian males was manifest by 
their active role, their manifest virility, such that the practice of loving boys was rendered 
problematic. A similar dynamic played out among the bourgeoisie in the Victorian era, 
concerned with preserving authority through various techniques of self-care and self-
shaping:
the onanistic child who was of such concern to doctors and 
educators from the end of the eighteenth century to the end 
of the nineteenth, this was not the child of the people, the 
future worker who had to be taught the disciplines of the 
body, but rather the schoolboy, the child surrounded by 
domestic servants, tutors, and governesses, who was in 
danger of compromising not so much his physical strength as 
his intellectual capacity, his moral fiber, and the obligation to 
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preserve a healthy line of descent for his family and his social 
class.135
In each case, some privileged group develops a new technology of self-shaping, in order 
to maintain their authority; these qualities - whether it  be virility, moral-sexual 
uprightness, activity, etc. - inspire obedience. And it is only in a context of obedience that 
the game of giving and asking for reasons can begin. One obeys, or is told to obey, 
before one can ask “why?” or produce reasons not to submit, and this is as true of modus 
ponens as it is of any practical imperative. For Foucault, to be enjoined in the game of 
giving and asking for reasons is to be, at first, commanded. 
 To treat someone as a subject to be commanded, and to treat someone as an 
authoritative source of command, are two different ways of taking someone as 
something, that is, of adopting a certain stance towards them as persons. And Lance and 
Kukla argue in various places, correctly on my view, that to treat something as a person is 
to place it into the “space of reasons.” There is a constitutive connection between the 
treatment of an individual, that is, the stance one takes toward that individual, and her 
placement in the space of reasons.136 This means, in part, treating them as subject to the 
norms of reason, evaluable and accountable to them, and this in turn means being 
subject to the structures and individuals in whom the authority of those norms and the 
force of our accountability resides. What Foucault does is disabuse us of the idea that 
there is a single space of reasons or - to slightly modify the metaphor - that the space of 
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reasons is uniform. There are different spaces, or wildly varying regions, of reason. 
Foucault was always quite clear about this. As he put it, in 1980, to an interviewer who 
wonders whether his critical work might be situated in a Weberian tradition critiquing the 
“rationalization” of  something like Reason-as-Such: 
If one calls "Weberians" those who set out to trade off the 
Marxist analysis of the contradictions of capital for that of 
the irrational rationality of capitalist society, then I don't 
think I am a Weberian, since my basic preoccupation isn't 
rationality considered as an anthropological invariant. I don't 
believe one can speak of an intrinsic notion of "rationalization" 
without, on the one hand, positing an absolute value inherent 
in reason, and, on the other, taking the risk of applying the 
term empirically in a completely arbitrary way. I think one must 
restrict one's use of  this word to an instrumental and relative meaning. 
 The ceremony of public torture isn't in itself 
more irrational than imprisonment in a cell; but it's irrational 
in terms of a type of penal practice that involves new ways of 
envisaging the effects to be produced by the penalty imposed, 
new ways of calculating its utility, justifying it, fixing its 
degrees and so on. One isn't assessing things in terms of an absolute 
against which they could be evaluated as constituting more or less perfect 
forms of rationality but, rather, examining how forms of rationality 
inscribe themselves in practices or systems of practices, and what role they 
play within them—because it's true that "practices" don't exist without 
a certain regime of  rationality. 
 But, rather than measuring this regime against a 
value of reason, I would prefer to analyze it according to two 
axes: on the one hand, that of codification/prescription (how 
it forms an ensemble of rules, procedures, means to an end, 
and so on), and, on the other, that of true or false 
formulation (how it determines a domain of objects about 
which it is possible to articulate true or false propositions).137
And, the year before in his Tanner lecture:
It may be wise not to take as a whole the rationalization of 
society or of culture, but to analyze this process in several 
fields, each of them grounded in a fundamental experience: 
madness, illness, death, crime, sexuality, and so on...
I think that the word "rationalization" is a dangerous one. 
The main problem when people try to rationalize something 
is not to investigate whether or not they conform to 
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principles of rationality but to discover which kind of 
rationality they are using.138
The point is that there is not one space of reason, but a host of them, operative 
throughout history, and prone to transformation. 
 It might be objected, at this point, that this is merely illusory; everyone is bound by 
modus ponens, or whatever axioms one chooses to characterize natural deductive 
reasoning. To treat someone as a person is to place them in the space of reasons in the 
sense of attributing to them this basic, stripped-down sort of formal rationality. Even 
those in the post-Sellarsian tradition who want to maintain a slightly more substantive 
conception of reason tend to err towards quite bare-boned accounts. Mark Lance and W. 
Heath White, for example, argue that for individuals to be persons really just is for it to be 
appropriate to adopt two appropriate evaluative stances towards them, namely, evaluation 
of  their subjunctive and indicative updating inferences: 
Since, as we have argued, subjecthood and agency go together 
for finite natural creatures, taking someone to be a person is 
just treating them in this complex indicative and subjunctive 
fashion. If it is appropriate to treat them this way, they are a 
person indeed.139
Leaving aside the details of these two patterns of inference, it  is noteworthy that, in 
wanting to tie together agency and subjectivity in the concept of a person, Lance and 
White want to claim that taking someone as a person involves placing them in “two 
spaces of reasons,”140  insofar as they are subject to the evaluation of two different 
patterns. And in multiplying spaces of reason, they are on the right track. The problem, 
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from a Foucauldian point of view, is that they engage in a piece of “transcendental” 
reasoning: 
Thus it seems to be transcendentally necessary - 
“transcendentally” in a modest sense that applies to the finite 
natural creatures we have been focusing on - that the 
diachronic space of reason and belief have a dual topography. 
Any believer, that is, who can count as having empirical 
knowledge deployable in practical inference will update in 
both indicative and subjunctive ways. Understanding of the 
world essentially involves stereoscopic vision.141
And, as is well-known, Foucault was resolutely non-transcendental in his thinking: 
In all of my work I strive instead to avoid any reference to 
this transcendental as a condition of possibility for any 
knowledge... I try... to define the historical conditions and 
transformations of our knowledge. I try to historicize to the 
utmost in order to leave as little space as possible to the 
transcendental.142
The problem, that is, involves paring the concept of personhood and, therefore, the 
space of reasons, down to the minimal collection of inference-patterns deemed to be 
necessary to have and deploy empirical knowledge. Foucault would claim that this is 
simply historically false. Our concepts of what it  is to be a person, of what it is to be a 
subject or an agent, are substantive, and have shifted and transformed over time, and one 
does not capture what it is to be a person at any given time simply by pointing out what 
minimal, more or less formal, patterns of inference all those different sorts of persons 
must have been committed to. Indeed, as the history of 20th century philosophy of 
science has shown, it’s not clear that formal logic alone can account for how it is that we 
come to have empirical knowledge (science being the paradigmatic enterprise of 
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100-121, and subsequent exchanges with Kevin Thompson and Colin McQuillan in Foucault Studies 8 and 9. 
empirical knowledge-seeking); the failure of a Carnapian programme in the face of 
criticism from, e.g., Goodman, Quine, or Kuhn, demonstrated the need for a more 
substantive conception of scientific reason. And Foucault knew this fact well, though 
coming from a different tradition. He would often, when discussing the post-Kantian 
tradition of “critique of reason,” emphasize his own position in the tradition of French 
philosophy of science, a tradition that never really characterized reason in the arid terms 
of formal logic.143  And, just as there is no one set of formal rules of inference that 
characterizes human inquiry, so it is not the possession of or capacity for mastering 
some such set of  rules that characterizes a subject or agent.144 
 To their credit, Lance and White don’t want to strip the space of reasons to just 
its formal components. For example, they admit that attributing rationality to individuals 
involves attributing to them a whole set of altered beliefs in the case of the alteration of 
a single practically salient empirical belief. Moreover, they recognize that evidential 
relations - that is, what counts as a good reason for believing or doing something - are 
not primarily or fundamentally understood in formal terms, and are difficult to 
characterize as purely logical. Ultimately, what they want to say is that to attribute 
rationality to an individual, that is, to take that individual as a person, placing him or her in 
the space of reasons, is a matter of attributing them a command of “good” material 
inferences.145 For Lance and White, this is constitutively tied up with establishing (the 
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 145 “Stereoscopic Vision,” p. 5. 
limits of) the “rational community, those who are ‘one of us’, with whom we can interact 
mind-to-mind, and those we cannot... The attitudes we invoke to elucidate personhood 
constitute practices..., practices which constitute a community of [rational] individuals.”146 They seem 
to claim that it is our treatment of individuals as subject to the norms of rationality that 
places them into a space of reasons, creating a “rational community.” But at the same 
time they seem to want to say that it is our recognition of individuals as members of that 
community that secures the propriety of that treatment; we do not subject rocks or trees 
to the norms of reason because we cannot recognize them as members of our rational 
community, that is, as subjects and agents with whom we might engage. 
 I want to suggest that, for Foucault, the relation between our “rational 
community” and the “goodness of material inferences” is complex. First of all, in his 
archaeological works, Foucault seems to recognize that the goodness of material 
inferences, that is, those relations that determine what is evidence for what, and so on, 
are constitutively related to the content of our discourses, or what Foucault calls their 
“objects.” This is a familiar Sellarsian theme, taken up most explicitly by Robert 
Brandom, for whom the content of our discourses is exhausted by their inferential 
proprieties. Foucault does not take such an extreme position, but he does make clear that 
his archaeological work, focused on what he calls “the positivities” of discourse, is an 
inquiry into the constitution of  the content of  discourse. As Foucault puts it: 
The positivity of a discourse – like that of Natural History, 
political economy, or clinical medicine – characterizes its 
unity throughout time, and well beyond individual oeuvres , 
books, and texts. This unity certainly does not enable us to 
say of Linnaeus or Buffon, Quesnay or Turgot, Broussais or 
Bichat, who told the truth, who reasoned with rigour, who 
most conformed to his own postulates; nor does it enable us 
to say which of these oeuvres  was closest to a primary, or 
ultimate, destination, which would formulate most radically 
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the general project of a science. But what it does reveal is the 
extent to which Buffon and Linnaeus (or Turgot and 
Quesnay, Broussais and Bichat) were talking about ‘the same 
thing’, by placing themselves at ‘the same level’ or at ‘the same distance’, 
by deploying ‘the same conceptual field’, by opposing one another on ‘the 
same field of battle’ [in brief, how  their discourse had the 
content it had]; and it reveals, on the other hand, why one 
cannot say that Darwin is talking about the same thing as 
Diderot, that Laennec continues the work of Van Swieten, or 
that Jevons answers the Physiocrats. It defines a limited space 
of  communication.147
That is, when Foucault talks about “positivities” - as he does at length in, for example, 
The Order of Things - he is discussing the “field” or space of reasons in which individuals 
at a given time can talk about the same thing, that is, the space of reasons in which our 
discourses can come to have the objective content they do. And, further, for Foucault, 
the object, or content, of our discourse transforms through time. The following 
statement seems worth citing at length:
What, in fact, are medicine, grammar, or political economy? 
Are they merely a retrospective regrouping by which the 
contemporary sciences deceive themselves as to their own 
past? Are they forms that have become established once and 
for all and have gone on developing through time?
 
... First hypothesis – and the one that, at first sight, struck me 
as being the most likely and the most easily proved: 
statements different in form, and dispersed in time, form a 
group if they refer to one and the same object. Thus, 
statements belonging to psychopathology all seem to refer to 
an object that emerges in various ways in individual or social 
experience and which may be called madness. But I soon 
realized that the unity of the object ‘madness’ does not 
enable one to individualize a group of statements, and to 
establish between them a relation that is both constant and 
describable... This group of statements is far from referring 
to a single object, formed  once and for all, and to preserving 
it indefinitely as its horizon of inexhaustible ideality; the 
object presented as their correlative by medical statements of 
the seventeenth or eighteenth century is not identical with the 
object that emerges in legal sentences or police action; 
similarly, all the objects of psychopathological discourses 
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were modified from Pinel or Esquirol to Bleuler: it is not the 
same illnesses that are at issue in each of these cases; we are 
not dealing with the same madmen...
 
... So that the problem arises of knowing whether the unity of 
a discourse is based not so much on the permanence and 
uniqueness of an object as on the space in which various 
objects emerge and are continuously transformed. Would not 
the typical relation that would enable us to individualize a 
group of statements concerning madness then be: the rule of 
simultaneous or successive emergence of the various objects 
that are named, described, analysed, appreciated, or judged in 
that relation? The unity of discourses on madness would not 
be based upon the existence of the object ‘madness’, or the 
constitution of a single horizon of objectivity; it would be the 
interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance of objects 
during a given period of time: objects that are shaped by measures of 
discrimination and repression, objects that are differentiated in daily 
practice, in law, in religious, casuistry, in medical diagnosis, objects that 
are manifested in pathological descriptions, objects that are circumscribed 
by medical codes, practices, treatment, and care.148
Already at this point, archaeology is shading off into genealogy. Certainly, the 
investigation of positivities is about the rules, that is, the norms that allow us to have 
objective discursive content, and these include, for instance, the proprieties of material 
inference. However, it also involves far more than that. Foucault notes that these rules 
are given shape by the various concrete ethical, therapeutic, political, and legal practices 
in which they are embedded, each of these having their own contingent and historical 
structures of authority. It is these that give our discourse content, that is, give the space 
of reasons its topography. How does this topography change? Sometimes, certainly, our 
discourse is altered because we learn things, that is, we discover new facts about old 
objects, coming to realize that a previous theory or way of framing our knowledge. But 
this is not always the case; sometimes the apparent continuity of a science covers up 
quite radical changes; for Foucault, it  is not because we learned something about the 
source of wealth, for example, that we came to place labour at the theoretical foundations 
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of political economy. Rather, the two discourses - the analysis of wealth and political 
economy - are not about the same thing; they do not in fact concern the same objects at 
all.149 Using the example of  medicine, Foucault had to:
recognize that clinical discourse was just as much a group of 
hypotheses about life and death, of ethical choices, of 
therapeutic decisions, of institutional regulations, of teaching 
models, as a group of descriptions; that the descriptions 
could not, in any case, be abstracted from the hypotheses, and 
that the descriptive statement was only one of the 
formulations present in medical discourse. I also had to 
recognize that this description has constantly been displaced: 
either because, from Bichat to cell pathology, the scales and 
guide-lines have been displaced; or because from visual 
inspection, auscultation and palpation to the use of the 
microscope and biological tests, the information system has 
been modified; or, again, because, from simple 
anatomoclinical correlation to the delicate analysis of 
physiopathological processes, the lexicon of signs and their 
decipherment has been entirely reconstituted; or, finally, 
because the doctor has gradually ceased to be himself the 
locus of the registering and interpretation of information, 
and because, beside him, outside him, there have appeared 
masses of documentation, instruments of correlation, and 
techniques of analysis, which, of course, he makes use of, but 
which modify his position as an observing subject in relation 
to the patient.150
The topography of the space of reasons alters, at least sometimes, not due to human 
intention or human discovery, but through the implementation of new technologies that 
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have their own logics, their own directedness.151 It alters through shifts in the status of 
authoritative figures, and through the development of new methods of measurement 
and data-collecting. And, importantly, the topography of the space of reasons can be 
altered by our treatment of  persons. 
 The constitution of the “rational community” and the norms constitutive of 
personhood are reciprocally related. We never just treat someone as “a person.” Taking 
someone as a person involves taking them as a sane, healthy, reasonable person, or not; we 
place individuals in the space of reasons amidst of whole network of normative 
relations.152 And, as not only concepts of illness, madness, and so on alter, but also our 
forms of treatment, our rules, our practices, and the stances we can take towards 
individuals, so does what it means to be a person. Foucault puts it as follows in 1983, 
using madness as an example of how he attempted tying together archaeology, 
genealogy, and the “pragmatics of  the subject”:
Rather, it involved... grasping madness, first of all, as a point 
from which a series of more or less heterogeneous forms of 
knowledge were formed whose forms of development had to 
be analyzed: madness as the matrix of bodies of knowledge 
which may be of a strictly medical nature, but which may also 
be psychiatric, psychological, sociological, and so on. Second, 
to the extent that madness is a form of knowledge, it was 
also a set of norms, both norms against which madness could 
be picked out as a phenomenon of deviance within society, 
and, at the same time, norms of behavior for normal 
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 152 Indeed, there have been historical moments taking someone to be a fully responsible person 
has involved taking them to be a white, able-bodied person. Foucault’s analyses allow  us to investigate 
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individuals, for doctors, psychiatric personnel, and so on in 
relation to this phenomenon of madness. Finally, third, this 
perspective involved studying madness insofar as this 
experience of madness defined the constitution of a certain 
mode of being of the normal subject, as opposed to and in 
relation to the mad subject. It was these three aspects, these 
three dimensions of the experience of madness (form of 
knowledge, matrix of forms of behavior, constitution of the 
subject’s modes of being) that I more or less successfully and 
effectively tried to link together.153
We see here, just as we would expect from an investigation into a deeply politicized set of 
rational practices, a focus on norms for practical behaviour and for the production of 
knowledge, these being mutually constitutive. A person’s placement in the space of 
reasons depends on a whole host of factors beyond the strictly rational, linked to the 
norms and practices that constitute all the forms of knowledge we have about ourselves, 
and which constitute our “normalcy” and proper functioning within that space. The 
spaces of reason that we might possibly inhabit are various, according to what sorts of 
persons it is possible for us to be. In brief, there have been as many different spaces of 
reasons as there have been ways to treat each other as persons. 
 We can see here quite clearly how Foucault might think that power, then, is 
productive of subjects, and we have an at least slightly more concrete sense of what that 
could mean. Insofar as power-relations are those ways we have of maintaining, shaping, 
and, in particular, initiating individuals into the spaces of reasons, these power-relations, 
or forms of governmentality, they do so by determining the treatment of individuals as 
types of persons and, further, by making those types possible; not only madmen, 
delinquents, homosexuals, or deviants, but also doctors, priests, and aristocrats. So, for 
Foucault, to the extent that one can speak of a or the space of reasons, it really does have 
a genuine (and genuinely political) topography; not only are there different spaces, or 
107
 153 The Government of  Self  and Others, p. 3.
regions, of reason, with different sorts of objects, or objective content, and in fact 
different types of persons, different sorts of subjects and agents. And these different sorts 
of subject and agents have wildly different normative statuses, including epistemic 
positions, such that they are able to wield authority or are subjected to it in wildly 
different ways, sometimes oppressive and sometimes enabling. While we certainly 
encounter constraint in all of our practices, our practices of reasoning are no more two-
dimensional than any of  the rest of  them.
 Let us return to the question of freedom with which we began this chapter in 
§2.1. I have argued against those who think that Foucault’s “late” works attributes to 
human beings some substantial sense of freedom, usually opposed to sort of 
(disciplinary or bio-political) constraints placed us through our subjection. I want to 
suggest that those who think so are confusing the capacity to act with freedom, and 
freedom with the absence of constraint. Those examples of historical moments in which 
privileged elites take it upon themselves to shape themselves, whether according to 
“aesthetic” criteria or in the service of impeccable health and moral hegemony, whether 
Athenian citizens or the European bourgeoisie, are certainly examples of subjects doing 
things, acting upon themselves in particular ways. These elites are able to act, certainly. 
There is absolutely no reason to think that power, as Foucault conceives it, is the sort of 
thing that necessarily restricts action in this way; indeed, insofar as it is what structures, 
maintains, and initiates us into the spaces of reason, there is a sense in which power-
relations are the very condition of genuine action, as opposed to mere behaviour. But 
there is no sense in which this is somehow escaping the networks of power, or the fields 
of governmentality. Indeed, the ethical self-work of the bourgeoisie, while self-
affirmative, is a first moment in the deployment of the dispositif of sexuality, while the 
self-care of the Athenians is a first moment in the development of a whole 
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hermeneutics of the flesh. Many transformations in the practice of self-care were 
necessary for something like the Christian “flesh” to emerge, but that does not mean the 
Greeks were not yet participating in power-relations. 
 Foucault, when prodded, will admit that “freedom is the ontological condition of 
ethics.”154 But, by the same token, he also claims that “freedom may well appear as the 
condition for the exercise of power (at the same time its precondition, since freedom must exist for 
power to be exerted, and also its permanent support, since without the possibility of 
recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical determination).”155  The point, I 
take it, is that between “ethics,” the “practices of freedom” and those practices 
constituted by relations of power, there is no significant difference in kind. Becoming an 
agent and a subject, that is, becoming a person depends in important ways on our 
treatment by others and by ourselves, and the rules governing that and the work of 
becoming an ethical agent is still a matter of entering a space of reasons shot through by 
power. These relations are not the sort of  thing that one escapes. 
 I should stress again that, though in his analyses Foucault often stresses the 
transformation of our spaces of reason, of our practices and attitudes, in terms of the 
“self-affirmation” of a privileged group, as with the “care of the self ” in Athens or the 
deployment of sexuality in the families of the European elites, this does not imply that 
these groups form a shadowy cabal of political masterminds, manipulating power-
relations to their own advantage. Rather, power-relations, qua relations, are prior to their 
relata, in much the same way that the rules of baseball determine who is an umpire and 
who is an outfielder. These two can do different things. And they can train and improve 
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 155 “The Subject and Power” Critical Inquiry 8(4) (1982):790
themselves according to any standard they want, really, aesthetic or athletic or what have 
you, but it hardly means they’ve escaped the rules of baseball. And so it is with being a 
person; one adopts a “person-stance” towards oneself and others, which - concretely - 
actually involves a whole host of attitudes, technologies, etc., and places one in various 
(and often hierarchical) relations with others, but these attitudes and stances are not the 
product solely of will, reflection, or calculation; the positions available are those that 
exist in the games of truth and power that we play, and though we may switch positions, 
or strengthen or weaken those we hold, and even contribute to their transformations, we 
don’t invent them. They are simply the techniques that are available to us. 
 The objects of Foucault’s analyses are the practices, technologies, and discourses 
that constitute the spaces of reasons that we have come to inhabit, and the ways in 
which we’ve been brought to inhabit them, the ways in which we have been formed by 
power-relations, and have come to govern ourselves and others. In doing so, he tracks 
several, but by no means all, of the techniques and strategies by which we have been 
brought to be who we are. We should not then be surprised to find him uninterested in 
traditional metaphysical worries about freedom with respect to determinism, insofar as 
he uninterested in characterizing our actions in terms of the complex causal chains of 
which they form a part. Perhaps these are free in some metaphysical sense. Perhaps not. 
It’s not clear that any theoretical answer to that question would make a difference to the 
political, ethical, and scientific practices that do interest Foucault.156  Neither is he 
interested in freedom construed as some antecedently determined sphere of action or 
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influence that must be either safeguarded or enabled, given that one can only be an agent 
capable of  performing genuine actions by entering into power-relations.157 
 It is fitting, I think, that Sellarsians often think of the space of reasons as the 
realm of autonomy.158 For Foucault, the space of freedom and the space of reasons 
overlap as well. But reason and freedom, while not identical with power (and Foucault is 
always clear about this) are nevertheless enmeshed in networks of power all the way 
down. The logical spaces of reason, that is, are encompassed by the political arena of 
power. In the following section, I will bring together my earlier claims about the nature 
of the demand for normative standards (§1.3) and what it is that we do when we pursue 
traditional moral philosophy (§1.4) in order to show how Foucault’s genealogical and 
archaeological analyses of our spaces of reason - that is, of who we have been and might 
be - not only undermines the grounds for such demands but gives us reason to think that 
they might themselves be problematic. 
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 158 See, e.g., John McDowell, “Autonomy and Its Burdens,” The Harvard Review of Philosophy 17(1) 
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3 
HUMANISM, CRITIQUE, AND HISTORICAL ONTOLOGY
§3.1 The Prosecutor, the Jurist, and the Universal Intellectual
 In 1977, Foucault claimed, in an interview, that in order to carry out his project:
[one] has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid 
of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which 
can account for the constitution of the subject within a 
historical framework. And this is what I would call genealogy, that 
is, a form of history which can account for the constitution 
of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc , without 
having to make reference to a subject which is either 
transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its 
empty sameness throughout the course of  history.159
In 1983, well into what has been alleged to be his “ethical period,” he basically says the 
same thing, in characterizing the “third axis” of  his project:
Finally, the third area involved analyzing the constitution of 
the subject’s mode of being. Here, instead of referring to a theory 
of the subject, it seemed to me that one should try to analyze the 
different forms by which the individual is led to constitute him or herself 
as subject... In other words, once again this involved bringing 
about a shift from the question of the subject to the  analysis 
of forms of subjectivation, and to the analysis of these forms 
of subjectivation through the techniques/technologies of the 
relation to self, or, if you like, through what could be called 
the pragmatics of self... [This involves] replacing the theory of the 
subject or the history of subjectivity with the historical analysis of the 
pragmatics of  self  and the forms it has taken.160
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I cite these two passages in support of the claim that Foucault never really stopped 
doing genealogy and certainly did not stop doing genealogy in favour of ethical theory. 
We saw, further, in the last chapter that Foucault’s archaeology of the space of reasons 
leads directly, and naturally, into these sorts of genealogical questions. He is concerned 
with discovering how subjects were constituted by entering into discursive practices that 
are themselves constituted by power-relations, and this never changed (even if he 
recognized that subjects were also forced, or “led to,” “brought to,” and “called upon,” 
to relate to themselves in certain ways). The historical analysis of our spaces of reason 
requires, as we have seen, an investigation of the manners in which individuals are 
treated, or governed, insofar as these are constitutively related to our ways of producing 
knowledge. 
 Now, at this point, one might understandably feel somewhat deflated, to the 
extent that one might see the position that I am ascribing to Foucault as thoroughly 
nihilistic. Power-relations permeate the production of knowledge, the norms of 
rationality, and the dream of freedom all the way down. Any hope for an escape from 
power is dashed. Fair enough. I want to claim that, indeed, Foucault’s thought is 
thoroughly nihilistic, as long as we understand that term in the right way. In doing so, I 
am echoing, for example, Richard Rorty and C.G. Prado, who have claimed that there is 
an “Americanized” image of Foucault who has been stripped of the disturbing nihilism 
evident to his European readers.161 My contribution, such as it is, is to add: this sort of 
nihilism, properly understood, isn’t so bad. Indeed, at a conference devoted to Foucault’s 
work in 1988, his two good friends, André Glucksmann and Paul Veyne, confirmed 
without reservation (and, notably, without condemnation) Foucault’s nihilism: 
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The term nihilism can be understood in [in at least two] ways. 
(1) Relativism of values: there is no supreme good. Was 
Foucault a nihilist in this sense? Certainly. (2) Refusal to 
create supreme values. God, being dead, cannot be replaced. 
Was Foucault a nihilist in this sense? Certainly.162
Neither Glucksmann nor Veyne felt compelled to defend Foucault in this regard. And, 
strikingly, neither did Foucault. In the manuscript for the same 1983 lecture cited above, 
in which Foucault describes his rejection of the “theory of the subject” in favour of the 
historical analysis of the pragmatics of the self, Foucault includes the following long 
passage:
What meaning is this enterprise [i.e. historical ontology] to be 
given?
There are above all its immediately apparent ‘negative,’ 
negativist aspects. A historicizing negativism, since it involves 
replacing a theory of knowledge, power, or the subject with 
the analysis of historically determinate practices. A nominalist 
negativism, since it involves replacing universals like madness, 
crime, and sexuality with the analysis of experiences which 
constitute singular historical forms. 
  
A negativism with a nihilistic tendency, if by this we understand a form 
of reflection which, instead of indexing practices to systems of values 
which allow them to be assessed, inserts these systems of values in the 
interplay of  arbitrary but intelligible practices.
Faced with these objections, or to tell the truth, ‘reproaches,’ we should 
adopt a very firm attitude. For there are ‘reproaches,’ that is to 
say objections, such that in defending oneself from them one 
inevitably subscribes to what they maintain. Under these 
different objections /reproaches, a sort of implicit contract 
of theoretical decision is assumed or imposed, a contract 
whose terms disqualify historicism, nominalism, and nihilism 
from the start: no one dares to declare themselves such and 
the trap consists in not being able to do anything but accept a 
challenge, that is to say, subscribe . . .
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p. 336. Glucksmann discusses a third way of understanding nihilism as well, regarding an “a-cosmic” 
worldview, which lies beyond the scope our current concerns. With respect the first two ways of 
understanding, and affirming, Foucault’s nihilism, Veyne states that he is “in complete agreement with 
what André Glucksmann has just said, and flattered at this convergence of our views,” (“Foucault and 
going beyond (or the fulfillment of) nihilism”) in the same volume, p. 340. 
To objections that postulate the disqualification of nihilism/
nominalism/historicism, we should try to reply by 
undertaking a historicist, nominalist, nihilist  analysis of this 
current. By this I mean: not construct this form of thought in 
its universal systematic character and justify it in terms of 
truth or moral value, but rather seek to know how the 
constitution and development of this critical game, this form 
of  thought, was possible.163 
We should understand the charge of nihilism, in this case, as the charge that Foucault 
fails to provide a normative framework for his works of criticism; this is what he means 
when he says that “instead of indexing practices to systems of values by which they 
could be assessed,” he analyses values as internal to practices. In this passage, then, 
Foucault doubles down on his alleged nihilism; not only does he not find it necessary to 
respond to the demand for a normative framework, but rather suggests subjecting that 
very demand to genealogical and archaeological analysis, that is, to the work of historical 
ontology, in order to discern how it arose, and what it says about who we’ve become. 
 In §1.3 we saw how the demand for a normative framework can be understood 
as a demand for set of normative and deliberative principles, perhaps expressing 
“values,” along with a set of facts that ground these principles, in brief, a demand for an 
ethical or moral theory, traditionally understood. Now, of course a moral theory includes 
some of the various elements of ethical subjectivity discussed in §1.4. A moral theory 
will include a more or less systematic presentation of a moral code (insofar as the 
prescriptions of such a good can be derived through the application of the normative 
and deliberative principles provided), and likely a specification of the ethical telos to be 
achieved, as well as of what Foucault calls the “ethical substance.” The upshot of the 
discussion of Foucault’s work in relation to Pritchard’s in §1.4 was that the activity of 
doing ethical theory or demanding that ethical theory be done is both a matter of 
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responding to a problem and, in general, a way of re-orienting an agent in the space of 
moral reasons, either by bringing her motivations in line with what she originally thought 
she had moral reason to do, or by bringing her to accept new commitments, or by 
clarifying the commitments she already had, etc. And, as was seen in §1.6, re-orienting 
this agent in the space of reasons may, in some cases, importantly involve new or 
different ways of treating her, of taking her to be a person, involving new relations of 
authority between agents, new relations of evidence or justification, and so on. Thus, the 
ways in which we engage in moral discourse or, better, moral discursive practice - 
whether simply in one’s conduct, or in casuistry, or even in genuine theory - are ripe for 
historical-ontological investigation. The question that would concern Foucault is not 
whether the norms and principles of, say, Enlightenment thought are in some sense 
valid, true, or legitimate, but rather what has this mode of discursive practice done to us; 
through its adoption, who have we become? 
 Of course, in his opening lectures on the government of self and others, 
Foucault never actually read aloud the above passage claiming that, rather than 
responding to the “reproach” of nihilism, one ought to subject the practices in which 
nihilism warrants reproach to genealogical investigation. But it was not the first time that 
he had at least pretended to demur from polemics, that is, from responding to the 
“reproaches” leveled against him, from demands for a normative framework that would 
somehow locate him along some political spectrum. Paul Rabinow begins an interview 
with Foucault by simply asking “why don’t you engage in polemics?” And Foucault 
responds, as he seemed at least tempted to do publicly in his 1983 lectures, by engaging 
in some surreptitious polemics. His strategy is, again, to call into question the role, the 
personage, the sort of subject that one would have to make such theoretical, practical, or 
political demands upon him. In the interview with Rabinow, Foucault describes the 
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activity of engaging in polemics as that of demanding that one’s interlocutor meet 
certain criteria so as not to be disqualified from meaningful discussion: 
The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in 
privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to 
question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to 
wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking;... his 
final objective will be not to come as close as possible to a 
difficult truth but to bring about the triumph of the just 
cause he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning. 
The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by 
definition denied.164
The type of critic who levels the reproach of nihilism at Foucault, then, is sort of critic 
who engages in the activity of polemics. Indeed, the reproach of nihilism might be a 
paradigmatic instance of “polemics” in Foucault’s sense, insofar as he characterizes it as 
a “trap” to which one is (almost) forced into responding in order to qualify oneself as a 
partner to a “theoretical contract.” The idea is that one simply cannot be a nihilist, one 
simply cannot be without a normative framework, if one is going to be a serious partner 
in conversation. And Foucault links this sort of polemical engagement with the adoption 
of  a certain kind of  intellectual stance, and a particularly “juridical” stance:
As in judiciary practice, polemics allows for no possibility of 
an equal discussion: it examines a case; it isn't dealing with an 
interlocutor, it is processing a suspect; it  collects the proofs of 
his guilt, designates the infraction he has committed, and 
pronounces the verdict and sentences him. In any case, what 
we have here is not on the order of a shared investigation; the 
polemicist tells the truth in the form of his judgment and by 
virtue of  the authority he has conferred on himself.165
This is not the only time that Foucault has tried to distinguish himself from a certain 
sort of would-be or failed interlocutor who adopts the same sort of stance. Famously, in 
“Truth and Power,” Foucault tries to distinguish what he does from a certain kind of 
“left” intellectual, that he calls the “universal intellectual”: 
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For a long period, the [universal] intellectual spoke, and was 
acknowledged the right of speaking, in the capacity of master 
of truth and justice. He was heard, or purported to make 
himself heard, as the spokesman of the universal. To be an 
intellectual meant something like being the consciousness/
conscience of  us all...
It is possible to suppose that the "universal" intellectual, as he 
functioned in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
was in fact derived from a quite specific historical figure—the 
man of justice, the man of law, who counterposes to power, 
despotism, and the abuses and arrogance of wealth the 
universality of justice and the equity of an ideal law. The 
great political struggles of the eighteenth century were fought 
over law, right, the constitution, the just in reason and law, 
that which can and must apply universally. What we call today 
"the intellectual" (I mean the intellectual in the political, not 
the sociological sense of the word, in other words, the person 
who uses his knowledge, his competence, and his relation to 
truth in the field of political struggles) was, I think, an offspring 
of the jurist... The "universal" intellectual derives from the jurist or 
notable.166
With his repeated reference to either the polemicist or the “universal” intellectual, 
Foucault is trying to characterize the same figure. He was quite familiar with objections 
demanding a normative framework. In response, he consistently gestured at a sort of 
genealogical or historical-ontological investigation of the stance adopted by those 
making the demand. On the one hand, Foucault casts the “universal” intellectual, the one 
charging him with the sin of nihilism, that is, the sin of ultimately having no normative 
reasons for struggling against “power” that might support his obviously critical intent, 
into the role of the polemicist. On the other hand, Foucault is resisting being cast in that 
same role; the polemical universal intellectual is precisely the one who has a robust 
normative framework, who can speak as the “conscience” of all, that is, who can provide 
reasons that (at least given ideal conditions) any rational moral agent might be able to 
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sign off on in support of a particular criticism or suggestion for political action.167 What 
needs to be subjected to genealogical investigation, then, is not just the role of the 
universal intellectual as conscience, but also the demand for it, the apparently deep-
seated need for such a conscience. 
 Now, what does it mean to say that the universal intellectual - as represented by, 
say, the Critical Theorist critical of Foucault’s work - is a descendant or a derivative of 
the jurist or notable? Foucault never gave a full, detailed answer to this question, but he 
nevertheless did speak on several occasions about the emergence of the court system, the 
system in which the jurist has a place, and made highly critical remarks about the court as 
a juridical institution. These are themes that remain constant concerns throughout the 
latter half of his career. In the remainder of this section, I will trace his account of that 
emergence. 
 In his lectures from 1971 on “Truth and Juridical Form,” Foucault details a series 
of transformations that took place in penal procedures in the Middle Ages.  According 
to Foucault, in certain feudal Germanic cultures lacking the sort of centralizing 
sovereign power we see emerging during the Renaissance, conflict resolution between or 
within groups did not take place through juridical intervention in the form of a court. 
What is crucial in this situation for Foucault is that there is no allegedly neutral third 
party, like a court or magistrate, to adjudicate the situation. And, indeed, there is no such 
institution because it wouldn’t really make sense; the wrong claimed is not a purported 
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infraction against an independent law, such that some sort of neutral observer could 
determine whether or not the infraction took place. Foucault further argues that these 
legal conflicts - cases in which a wrong has been claimed - were handled not through a 
process of (judicial) inquiry, but by means of “tests,” or “ordeals.” The resolution of the 
conflict could take place through various means, such as the swearing of oaths, the 
recitation of certain formulae, the attestation of members of the community to one of 
the parties’ character, physical ordeals, or combats.168  The claim of a wrong initiated a 
process of what Foucault calls “ritualized warfare,” a continuation of a private war by 
procedural means, that did not issue in a judgment regarding innocence or guilt; it ended 
with victory or defeat.169 
 Foucault notes that the emergence of a recognizable judicial system in feudal 
Europe, and the fading of the bellicose model of conflict-resolution, coincides with the 
centralization of wealth and (armed) force in newly established monarchies. With the 
establishment of monarchies with these features comes a set of four developments in 
penal practice that contrast strikingly with the feudal system. First, where the claim/
challenge of a wrong, and its potential redress, involved the claim of one against another 
in a voluntary procedure between two individuals, we see the emergence of a manner of 
dealing with conflict that is, as Foucault says, “imposed from above on individuals, 
adversaries, and parties. Thereafter individuals would no longer have the right to resolve 
their own disputes, whether regularly or irregularly; they would have to submit to a 
power external to them, imposing itself as a judicial political power.”170  What is 
important about this transformation? First of all, we have the first stages of the 
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establishment of the sovereign monopoly on right.171 The most explicit  statement in favour 
of the sovereign monopoly on rights would, obviously, be Hobbes’ Leviathan. In 
Leviathan, subjects contract away their rights to the sovereign, such that, at least 
fundamentally, one cannot, strictly speaking, directly wrong another individual. If one does 
wrong, one does wrong to the sovereign, directly affronts the order embodied in the law 
construed as the king’s will. Only derivatively will one be wronging another subject; they 
may be harmed, but their claim to being wronged, in the sense of having their right(s) 
violated, is a secondary phenomenon. Foucault repeats the claim many times, into the 
1970s, and it forms a central part of his characterization of “sovereign” punishment in 
Discipline & Punish:
Besides its immediate victim, the crime attacks the sovereign: 
it attacks him personally, since the law represents the will of 
the sovereign; it attacks him physically, since the force of the 
law is the force of the prince... The intervention of the 
sovereign is not, therefore, an arbitration between two 
adversaries; it is much more, even, than an action to enforce 
respect for the rights of the individual; it is a direct reply to 
the person who has offended him... [Sovereign] punishment, 
therefore, cannot be identified with or even measured by the 
redress of the injury [of the victim]; in punishment, there 
must always be a portion that belongs to the prince, and, even 
when it is combined with the redress laid down, it constitutes 
the most important element in the penal liquidation of the 
crime.172
So, for example, in such an arrangement, if I confront you with a switchblade and take 
you wallet as you stumble home some drunken evening, I have not primarily wronged 
you, but rather broken the law. After all, in this case, I don’t have any duties primarily 
directed at you. And it doesn’t seem that I can wrong you by doing X if I don’t have a duty 
to you not to X. I might have a duty to obey the law, but this is, so to speak, a monadic 
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does. Cf. “The Nature and Value of  Rights” The Journal of  Value Inquiry 4 (1970):243-257. 
 172 Discipline & Punish, pp. 47-48. 
duty, or, if it is bipolar, or relational, it is a relation between the sovereign and I.173 And 
the opening pages of Discipline & Punish examine in gruesome detail the consequences of 
confronting the sovereign. 
 The main idea here is that cases of conflict are no longer cases of essentially 
first- and second-personal interaction between agents, but a matter of establishing 
something like “social order” from above, replacing the explicitly partisan, medieval 
mode of resolving conflict.174 As it happened, historically, the order to be imposed was 
that determined by a monarch or sovereign, insofar as the law  or legal order was 
considered an extension of the will of the sovereign. But the point stands, I think, even 
if we no longer think of sovereignty in the same terms. Perhaps we now think that the 
institution of law is not the embodiment of the will of the sovereign but, perhaps, the 
representation of the popular or general will, the means for a populace set on self-rule to 
order itself. Or, one might hope, the institution of positive law comes close to ordering 
human existence in terms of a moral law. In either case, what matters is that we think of 
the institution of law  as a means of ordering our social interactions, and a means that 
works insofar as individuals are answerable or accountable to a law  that not only exists 
antecedently and independently not simply of any particular case of being wronged but 
of any moral action at all, grounding the intelligibility of any subsequent moral claim, 
such as the claim of  being wronged. 
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 Foucault calls this latter shift in understanding the intelligibility of a claim of 
wrong-doing the invention of  the “infraction”:
So long as the judicial drama unfolded between two 
individuals, the victim and the accused, it was only a matter of 
the wrong that one individual had done to another. The 
question was whether there had been a wrong committed and 
who was right. From the moment that the sovereign, or his 
representative, the prosecutor, said, "I too was injured by the 
offense," the wrong was not just an offense of one individual 
against another, but also an individual's offense against the 
state, against the sovereign as the state's representative; not an 
attack upon an individual but an attack against the law of the state 
itself. Thus, in the concept of crime the old concept of 
wrong was to be replaced by that of infraction. The 
infraction was not a wrong committed by one individual 
against another, it was an offense or injury done by an individual to 
order, to the state, to the law, to society, to sovereignty, to the sovereign. 
The infraction is one of the great inventions of medieval 
thought. We thus see how state power appropriated the entire 
judicial procedure, the entire mechanism of interindividual 
settlement of  disputes in the early Middle Ages.175
It is difficult, I think, to overstate how important Foucault took the invention of the 
infraction to be, insofar as the idea that a crime is not merely a wrong done to a person 
but a violation of a law  raises the issue of guilt or innocence. One who has broken the 
law, or committed an infraction, is no longer confronted as an opponent within a political 
field that is always in flux, but rather as guilty and thus, in virtue of this new status of 
guilt, in need of being resituated - whether through punishment or rehabilitation - in the 
social, political, and moral order. One who hasn’t, of course, remains innocent. The law 
sorts people into categories of innocent and guilty. And, indeed, Foucault characterizes 
the goal of his political (and, arguably, theoretical) activism of the early 1970s in terms 
of  that distinction: 
Consider the actions of the GIP (Information Group for 
Prisons) during the past year [with which Foucault was 
heavily involved]. The ultimate goal of its intervention was 
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not to extend the visiting rights of prisoners to thirty 
minutes or to procure flush toilets for the cells, but to 
question the social and moral distinction between theinnocent and the 
guilty... Our action... seeks to obliterate the deep division that lies 
between innocence and guilt.176
So, I think it is clear, Foucault - at least in the early 1970s - sees something very 
problematic about the juridical notions of innocence and guilt, at least in part because of 
something troubling about the concept of an “infraction,” which gives these notions 
their sense. In the 1971 lectures, he goes so far as to call the institution of the infraction, 
along with the other novel elements of the externally imposed juridical process, 
“diabolical.”177 
 The invention of the infraction is part and and parcel of the sovereign monopoly 
on right; the infraction is the violation of this sovereign law. I am not just one who has 
wronged my peer, but a law-breaker, one who has violated rule itself, in violating a rule. 
There is no opportunity for me to alter or determine the normative landscape in this 
confrontation, as there might have been in the feudal “test” or “ordeal,” but only to 
await the discovery of the facts of the matter. If I have committed a criminal infraction, 
I am a criminal, which is not relation I bear to an individual, to one of my peers, but a 
property of mine. This property marks me as a source of disorder, such that my punishment 
- the workings of justice - will also be tied to the restoration of order, an order identified 
with those above me; the very invention of the infraction places all citizens in a position 
of submission. And it is the duty of the prosecutor to figure out if I in fact bear this 
property, that is, to marshal the evidence, apply the law, and discover the truth.
 Finally, along with the institution of the law and its infraction, Foucault notes the 
emergence of  the figure of  the jurist:
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There appeared a totally new figure, without precedent in 
Roman law—the prosecutor. That curious personage, who 
appeared in Europe around the twelfth century, would 
present himself as the representative of the sovereign, the 
king, or the master. When there was a crime, an offense, or a 
dispute between individuals, he would appear as a power that 
was injured by the mere fact that an offense or a crime had 
occurred. The prosecutor would make common cause with 
the victim; he would be behind the one instituting an action, 
saying: "If it is true that that man did injury to another, I can 
affirm, as the representative of the sovereign, that his 
sovereignty, his power, the order that he ensures, and the law 
that he established have also been injured by that individual. 
Thus, I too stand against him." In this way, the sovereign and 
political authority stood in for and gradually replaced the 
victim. This utterly new phenomenon would enable political 
power to take control of the judicial procedures. The 
prosecutor, therefore, appeared as the representative of the 
sovereign, who was injured by the offense.178 
This figure, the jurist, the prosecutor, is the ancestor of the “universal intellectual” that 
Foucault is so often criticized for not being, and the demand for whom, and whose 
function, ought to be called into question. 
 The prosecutor adopts what I have called above the “juridical stance,” the stance 
inherited by the “universal intellectual” who accuses Foucault of nihilism.179  The 
prosecutor is the agent of the law, that is, a coherent normative framework or theory, 
which determines, for each, their place in the normative order, that is, their proper 
normative status and their desert. And is this not what Foucault’s critics demand of him? 
An authoritative framework that would explain why (and how) he can assign to discipline 
and bio-politics and “power” the normatives statuses that he does? And now we see that 
in rejecting the framing of normative questions in the way that he does, Foucault is 
rejecting role of the jurist, the prosecutor, of the “universal” intellectual. He does not 
engage in “polemics” at least in part because he has no interest in serving as a 
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prosecutor, in bringing anyone or anything to trial, and no interest in serving the power 
of a sovereign by enforcing a normative order in the form of a law. If Foucault is a 
nihilist, such a charge could only be leveled by the bureaucrats of power: for “Western 
societies since the Middle Ages, the exercise of power has always been formulated in 
terms of  law.”180 
 To adopt the juridical stance in the context of philosophical or theoretical work 
is to approach moral questions in this way, as if one always spoke either as a judge or to a 
judge, rendering a verdict or attempting to mount the case that some law has indeed been 
violated or upheld. From this stance, in moral life, or politics, one is to be ceaselessly 
placing one or another’s existence on trial. And it is something with which Foucault 
wants nothing to do. From at least 1972, he rejects legalistic or juridical intervention; in 
his debate with Maoist students, he rejects courts as potential instruments of 
revolutionary popular justice, and proceeds to enlighten his interlocutors as to the 
sovereign, monarchical origins of the court apparatus that appeared in the Middle Ages 
to consolidate royal power and redistribute and circulate wealth.181 Four years later, in the 
first volume of the History of Sexuality, he reminds us that “Law was not simply a weapon 
skillfully wielded by monarchs; it was the monarchic system’s mode of manifestation and 
the form of  its acceptability.”182 
 Of course, many of Foucault’s liberal critics might contend that even if our 
modern judicial apparatus, and the juridical stance that makes it possible, arose in the 
service of stabilizing centralized, monarchical power, it nevertheless now serves to limit 
excessive and arbitrary exercises of power. But Foucault’s lecture series at the Collège de 
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France undermine our confidence in both this story and what might be called the 
“traditional” reading of Discipline and Punish. In the next two sections, I will explain this, 
in some detail. 
§3.2 War, Sovereignty, and Subjectivity
 We now have at our disposal a good deal of the background of Discipline and 
Punish, and a better sense of the concerns that animate the work. While critics like Fraser 
want to claim that Foucault is committed to broad, universalistic normative claims like 
“discipline is bad” and Habermas thinks that Foucault is committed to something like a 
total rejection of the Enlightenment (whatever that would mean), we can see that this is 
not the case. Both of these figures read D&P as an overtly political continuation of the 
more explicitly anti-humanist theoretical philosophy The Order of Things and the 
Archaeology of Knowledge. But Foucault never claims anything so crude as his critics impute 
to him, though his approach is still radical. Ultimately, Foucault’s worry is that “prisons 
resemble factories, schools,barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons.”183 The idea is 
that, with the rise of the prison as the fundamental modality of (public, state, or social) 
punishment, we see a transformation not only of our juridical institutions and the 
techniques of power that subtend and sustain them, but also of the very ethical subjects, 
the moral selves, that we are. And these are moral selves that live under the constant 
imperative of correction. This might not seem a particularly interesting point, but it is - in 
fact - quite novel. If Foucault is correct, then it seems that we have departed, for the 
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most part, from cultivating moral selves in relation to sovereignty and law, strictly 
speaking. 
 Where the instruments of sovereign law once displaced the ordeals and trials of 
mediaeval justice, “disciplinary power” has - if not displaced - then colonized and 
mutated the understanding of law as will, as the sovereign’s will (once God’s, then the 
king’s, and then the nation’s, and so on). With respect to sovereign power, to play the 
game of justice, with its characteristic technology of law, was to adopt a particular 
version of  what P.F. Strawson calls the “participant attitude.” 
 In his justly famous “Freedom and Resentment,” Strawson is concerned with a 
set of potential consequences of the truth of determinism, namely, whether or not our 
practices of holding responsible, accountable, attributing moral blame, and - perhaps 
most importantly - punishment, if it turns out that determinism is true. He identifies two 
broad positions on this question, that of the positivist and that of the optimist. The 
optimist, according to Strawson, takes it that the truth of determinism will have no 
impact on the attribution of moral properties, whereas the pessimist thinks that the truth 
of determinism will necessitate drastic revisions in our practice. Strawson - wisely - 
professes ignorance with respect to the exact content of the thesis of determinism, and 
instead focuses on whether or not any metaphysical thesis in the area would affect our 
everyday such practices and judgments. Strawson goes on to claim that, in general, our 
practices of holding accountable and moral evaluation are expressions of reactive 
attitudes - such as gratitude or resentment - towards the concern for us manifested in the 
action of others. And these practices have, in general, accepted conditions for 
occasionally forebearing the expression of reactive attitudes, if not inhibiting these 
attitudes completely, such as extreme external pressure, coercion, etc. And having these 
attitudes - responding the valuing manifest in the comportment or conduct of others - 
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takes place within a context of genuine interpersonal engagement, as participants  in a life 
tied closely to the lives of others, dependent on them in many respects, and sensitive to 
their attitudes, values, and behaviour; it relies on maintaining the “participant attitude.” 
 The participant attitude is not the only one available. When one has such an 
attitude, exculpatory reasons from someone who has offended have no tendency to 
make us see the agent as other than a morally responsible agent; they simply make us see 
the injury as one for which he was not morally responsible.”184 One can shift from this 
attitude, however, to what  calls the objective attitude, in which we treat agents as, in some 
sense, other than morally responsible agents, that is, who are appropriately blameworthy 
due to their somehow “abnormal” status. So, for example, one might argue that we take 
up the objective attitude with respect to certain behaviour on the part of mentally ill or 
several incapacitated persons; we don’t usually take these individuals to be accountable 
for their actions - especially those that don’t indicate the demanded degree of concern 
and respect for us - in the same way that we take the sane to be. Such abnormality is an 
example of a special sort of excusing or exculpatory consideration, one which excuses 
not the act in question, but the individual taken to have authored the act. Strawson takes 
it that viewing the issue in this way helps to disabuse us of the notion that the 
metaphysics of free will and determinism have any bearing on our practices of moral 
approbation, disapprobation, and punishment. The idea is that we have a perfectly clear 
understanding of the conditions that cause us to suspend these practices, and they don’t 
hinge on any metaphysical views at all. 
 Now, Foucault obviously doesn’t adopt this terminology and, though he was 
familiar to some extent with ordinary language philosophy, there’s no evidence that he 
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ever read Strawson.185  But it can help us to understand his work and, as with the 
Sellarsian themes discussed in the previous sections, in turn his work can give the 
Strawsonian approach much-required historical and political inflection.186  And this 
approach gives us more resources to discuss just what Foucault is after in investigating 
what I have been referring to as our placement or induction into the space of reasons; 
after all, if how we treat individuals determines not only an individual’s placement in the space of 
reasons but its very shape then better understanding those attitudes will give us a better 
handle on the latter, and this is the aim of Foucault’s project of historical ontology, the 
investigation into who we are. And it helps support the picture that we sketched in the 
previous sections. The evidential and the rational are, just as much as the moral, part of 
the realm of the normative. If, as Strawson suggests, we can make sense of the 
constitution of moral agency as a matter of the treatment of individuals, of our holding 
them accountable or responsible, then the view already put forth, of understanding rational 
agents, or subjects more generally, as constituted in and through the attitudes and reactions 
they adopt and warrant, seems more like just a different case of the distribution of 
normative statuses. And this is a picture of moral subjects as constituted by our attitudes 
towards them. On this view, there is nothing more to being responsible, and therefore a 
moral agent, than being appropriately held accountable or responsible. And what makes 
this holding appropriate is not the sensitivity of our practices to some prior metaphysical 
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fact, but rather precisely the norms of the moral lives to which we are subject. The two 
are inseparable.187  
 What does this have to do with Foucault? To begin, he - like Strawson (and 
Nietzsche) - takes our punitive and retributive practices to be constitutive of our forms of 
subjectivity, to the extent that subjectivity is essentially about accountability, or 
answerability (e.g., answerability to the facts for a certain sort of epistemic subject, to the 
law for a legal subject, to ethical norms or values for a moral subject). Accordingly, we 
can interpret Foucault’s characterization of the ordeals, tests, and trials that made up 
certain medieval practices of conflict resolution as involving a particularly radical and 
agonistic version of the participant stance. To claim a wrong in such a case, then, is not to 
appeal to the violation of some code, or the magical transgression of some invisible 
metaphysical right, but to report the dissatisfaction of a demand placed upon one’s 
peer(s); it is to express a reactive attitude. To the extent that this claim has uptake in one’s 
community, one can engage in a challenge, or trial, the outcome of which will validate or 
invalidate said reactive attitude. This is why Foucault claims that the outcomes of these is 
not a verdict or “judgment” but rather a victory, one which establishes whether or not the 
expressed demands and attitudes are in fact acceptable, and whether some further 
sanction is required to satisfy them, or whether the trial itself sufficed. The outcome, 
thus, is analogous to a speech act, like a baptism that does not report a fact but produces 
or constitutes one. In this sense, there is no prior “fact of the matter” as to whether or 
not someone has actually been wronged. Whether or not this process ends with an 
explicit statement, its conclusion is nevertheless analogous to a performative, rather than 
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declarative, speech act; rather than simply reporting the violation of a right, it  establishes 
that indeed a right was violated, that is, certifies the demand made as the claim of  a right. 
 The emergence of the technology of law as the “monarchic mode of 
manifestation,” including the appearance of the jurist, the infraction, etc., involves a 
modification of the sorts of attitudes that constitute our moral lives and our very moral 
subjectivity. The technology of law is still a matter of will, in the sense that the law 
embodies the will of the sovereign (even if the sovereign is the nation or the people). In 
this sense, law  is a demand placed upon us by the sovereign, and when we fail to satisfy 
the demand, Foucault notes, our offense is an affront to the sovereign. The punishment 
of Damien the regicide is, for all its spectacular cruelty, the expression of the reactive 
attitudes of the King (perhaps with the sanction of the deity who legitimates his rule), 
one that makes of the offender a symbol of transgression and, with any luck, inspires 
obedience.188
 We can in fact see the impact of sovereign power, and its technology of law, by 
looking at the sort of ethical subject - in Foucault’s sense - that one would have to be in 
order to genuinely be governed by a (moral) law. As we have seen, Foucault’s project is a 
historical ontology, inquiring into the sorts of subjects that we have become, and the 
spaces of reason that we inhabit. And these spaces and subjectivities are shaped by the 
ways we have available to us of  treating persons, of  the stances we can take towards them. 
 For Foucault, as he characterizes sovereign power, what genuinely matters in 
determining cases of wrongdoing is whether or not the crime was committed, and if so by whom. 
And these centers of concern, or problematizations of action, reveal how subjects and 
agents have been constituted. Let us assume that everyday moral and legal codes are 
relatively continuous, as Foucault claims elsewhere with respect to the narrower domain 
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of sexual morality. The ethical substance of the legal subject is one’s action or, perhaps, 
the individual qua agent. This is true also of the agent recognized in the agonistic 
medieval conflict resolutions mentioned above. They are both, in this sense, instances of 
moral subjectivity constituted in part by reciprocal adoption of the participant stance. 
What matters, in each case, is whether a wrong was committed, and who committed it; 
there is no tracing some source of the wrong deep into the person in order to correct or 
isolate or stem its influence.
 In contrast with the episodic “battles” that characterize Foucault’s vision of 
medieval justice, the aim of sovereign power is obedience, in the sense of submission to the 
will of the sovereign, as embodied in the law. Those who are “subjected” or “subjectivated,” 
in terms of sovereign power aim - whether consciously or not - at a sort of stability, and 
order, for social life. This is expressed in Hobbes’ desire to escape the bellum omnium contra 
omnes, and 400 years later Bernard Williams explicitly echoes the former:
I identify the “first” political question in Hobbesian terms as 
the securing of order, protection, safety, trust, and the 
conditions of cooperation. It is “first” because solving it is 
the condition of  solving, indeed posing, any others.189
Williams is of course criticizing those who take a “moralistic” or “foundational” 
approach to this question - the heirs of Kant and Rousseau, one might say - but the 
point is that all of them share a sense of the basic problem, even if they differ with 
respect to the constraints they accept on their answers. And the order to be established is 
the order of the sovereign’s will, arranging things as closely as possible to the sovereign’s 
specifications. For Foucault, this is true even when the technology of sovereign law  is 
wielded, in some sense, against the king or sovereign. As he puts it in Society Must Be 
Defended: 
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The juridical edifice was, then, formed around the royal 
personage, at the demand of royal power, and for the benefit 
of royal power. When in later centuries this juridical edifice 
escaped from royal control, when it was turned against royal 
power, the issue at stake was always, and always would be, the 
limits of that power, the question of its prerogatives. In other 
words, I believe that the king was the central character in the 
entire Western juridical edifice. The general system, or at least 
the general organization of the Western juridical system, was 
all about the king: the king, his rights, his power, and the 
possible limits of his power. That, basically, is what the 
general system, or at least the general organization, of the 
Western juridical system is all about. No matter whether the 
jurists were the king's servants or his adversaries, the great 
edifices of juridical thought and juridical knowledge were 
always about royal power.190
The point, for Foucault, is that even when we try to think, in moral and political 
philosophy, about the individual rights we might have against the sovereign - and against 
each other, in the case of popular sovereignty and broadly legalistic ways of construing 
our interpersonal moral relations - we are still trapped by a failure of imagination. In 
particular, we fail to imagine that there might be something other than law construed as 
the will of a sovereign that might serve as a model or template for thinking about power, 
about the normative structure of our practical lives. In the context of the quotation 
immediately above, the 1975/76 lecture series at the Collège de France entitled in “Society 
Must Be Defended,” Foucault is interested in one particular alternative, namely, war:
This year, I would like to begin... a series of investigations 
into whether or not war can possibly provide a principle for 
the analysis of power relations: can we find in bellicose 
relations, in the model of war, in the schema of struggle or 
struggles, a principle that can help us understand and analyze 
political power, to interpret political power in terms of war, 
struggles, and confrontations?
That is, so to speak, the preliminary question I would like to 
look at a bit this year: Can war really provide a valid analysis 
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of power relations, and can it act as a matrix for techniques 
of  domination? 
He had already made limited use of this model of analysis in Discipline & Punish. In that 
work, he is explicitly “presupposing” that we think about power in terms of strategies of 
“battle” rather than in terms of  either “contract” or “conquest”.191
 We all know that Foucault thinks of power as producing rather than repressing 
subjects with given channels of desire, practices of pleasure, and sources of values. But 
viewing power as a battle, allows us to think of the production of bodies, individuals, 
etc., through power-relations as intrinsically contestable, as unfinished. If every site of 
power is a site of resistance as well, it is because every site of power is a site of struggle. 
Foucault echoes Nietzsche’s claim that the “higher natures” among us have become 
“genuine battlegrounds.”192  Long before his alleged “ethical turn,” and in direct 
opposition to his teacher Althusser, Foucault recognizes that it is not the State but we 
who are the stakes and site of  political struggle. 
 Foucault is hopeful about using the war-model to understand power-relations, 
and to think about law apart from sovereignty. Though Foucault is never explicit about 
it, this counterhistory, this model of war as a matrix of intelligibility for understanding 
power, echoes and transforms the forms of medieval law he discussed in “Truth and 
Juridical Form,” which he states clearly is the “ritual form of war.” He explicitly praises the 
discourse of “race war” for its “counterhistorical” function, that is, for its ability to 
contest what he calls the “rituals of sovereignty” that establish the legitimacy of 
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sovereign power.193 Through the “historico-political” discourse of “race war,” developed 
- at least at first - by Levellers during the English civil war, and contrasted with the 
“juridico-philosophical” discourses of  the jurists, one was able to:
demand rights that have not been recognized, or in other 
words, to declare war by declaring rights. Historical discourse of 
the Roman type pacifies society, justifies power, and founds 
the order—or the order of the three orders—that constitutes 
the social body. In contrast, the discourse [of race war] I am 
telling you about, and which is deployed in the late sixteenth 
century, and which can be described as a biblical-style 
historical discourse, tears society apart and speaks of 
legitimate rights solely in order to declare war on laws.194
There is an important contrast to be drawn, then, between these two different forms of 
discourse, the “juridico-philosophical” discourse of sovereignty and the “historico-
political” discourse of war. There is a corresponding contrast to be drawn between the 
subjects of sovereign law and the subjects of medieval law or of this sort of bellicose 
revolt through and against law, that is, about the sorts of subjects that these practices 
make and have made us. To use the terminology that Foucault adopts in the History of 
Sexuality, they involve quite different “modes of  subjectivation.” 
 As mentioned, the agonistic subject of medieval, Germanic justice adopts a sort 
of radically agonistic version of the participant attitude or stance. To be such a subject is 
to recognize others as fellow participants in social life, and to hold them accountable, not 
simply to a single higher authority, but to each of their compatriots, and also to hold 
oneself accountable to them, recognizing that their demands may place on one the burden 
of a trial or ordeal, and being prepared to answer their charges. One is accountable to 
the contingent and potentially arbitrary demands of one’s peers. The subject of “race 
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war,” does not subject oneself to an established order that could serve as criteria of the 
legitimacy of claims before they are made. As Foucault says, the strategy of “claiming 
rights to declare war on law” is, to some extent, a rejection of established order. For 
Foucault, both of these sorts of “war discourse” hew closely to the sort of rejection of 
the normative given that I have argued underpins his own research.195  We should be 
unsurprised that Foucault looks to such discourse as a rough model for how to think 
about the domain of normativity in the absence of a “God’s-eye view” of the landscape, 
and this not just because there doesn’t happen to be a God, but because even if there 
were, there is no determinate landscape to be seen from such a position. 
 To own up to this situation is to adopt what I will call, in contrast to the juridical 
stance, the stance of revolt. While both are clearly expressions of the participant stance, 
the stance of an engaged subject, taking up a first-person stance towards one’s peers, and 
treating them as adopting first-person stances of their own, registering (or not) demands 
for respect or concern, expressing (or not) attitudes of proper regard, etc., nevertheless 
to be subjectivated from, and into, a stance of revolt is very different from being 
subjectivated into a juridical stance. The subject of revolt begins, as all subjects do, in 
media res,  and in this case begins in indeterminate struggle, a sort of standing conflict of which 
- at least in principle - even the conditions for victory are not fixed in advance. On this 
view, there are friends and there are (at least potential) enemies, and there is no fully 
determinate normative whole to which all are, or must be, accountable; under felicitous 
conditions, there are simply the normative negotiations of parties to lives that are 
inevitably shared. 
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 To enter (or, better, to be brought into) the space of the reasons in the juridical 
stance, on the other hand, and to take others to embody that stance is, in a sense, to elide 
our thrownness into a shared, normatively structured existence. The sovereign accrual to 
itself of a monopoly on right is made possible by the fact that subjects accept their 
answerability to the sovereign order (and this might be taken to be the ultimate normative 
order, God’s laws, or what have you), and to one single will or set of rules. No one can 
“wrong” another, directly, as we have seen. Certainly, we can adopt the participant stance 
towards others, but only insofar as we recognize, in their actions and attitudes, a failure 
to abide the order in which he have our set places. The agonistic dimensions of earlier 
modes of subject-formation are absent in the tamer, more docile subjects of sovereignty. 
As Foucault puts it, “Before the justice of the sovereign, all voices must be still.”196 Such 
subjects are bound by laws purporting to be the foundational expression of order, a 
presumptive constitutive framework into which the totality of  normative life must fit. 
 In both of these cases, the space of reasons is different. In an agonistic, warlike 
space of reasons, for example, that you fail to take into account, say, my honour or some 
such when attempting to recruit me into an underhanded business venture may put me 
in a position to raise a claim against you. However, this is only so if your action in fact 
registers with me and activates my reactive attitudes. It is just not the case that, simply in 
virtue of having performed some action X and thereby violating some (perhaps 
unwritten) law prohibiting X, you have in fact wronged me; indeed, whether or not your 
action counts as a wrong at all will depend on the outcome of the ordeal or trial by which 
the claim is resolved. And, even if it does turn out that a wrong has occurred, its 
wrongness will not be explained by the fact that the action, as a particular action, falls 
under a general category or concept or rule. There is no reason to think that two 
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instances of underhandedness, even in relevantly similar circumstances, will both 
necessarily have the same moral weight, or provide the same reasons for action or 
judgment. The valence of  these considerations is variable. 
 The flexibility of the valence of reasons is a central claim contemporary moral 
particularism, which is a fully cognitivist view  of moral reasons that denies the existence 
of any true, non-trivial moral principles at all.197  While we are not obliged to read 
Foucault as adopting quite so strong a claim, nevertheless, in a sense, the agonistic 
subjects of revolt, to whom he is so clearly sympathetic, is subject to particulars, to the 
particulars of one’s own demands and those of others (which is not to say that one is 
only subject to particulars; there may be rules to which one is subject as well, but they will 
not cover everything, and they will not be construed as an original order to which one is 
answerable). This implies a specific set of legal, ethical, and even evidential relations, that 
is, a shape of  the space of  reasons, that is particular to this sort of  agonistic subjectivity.
 Different space of reasons, different kinds of subjects inhabiting it. Thus the 
subject of sovereignty is a different sort of subject, and thus constituted or subjectivated differently. 
One is subject to an order that exists independently of one’s own desires, of the 
demands that one might make on others. There is an I-Thou structure that is essential, 
and central, to the agonistic, medieval form of subjectivity.198  The structure of the 
subject of sovereignty also has an important I-Thou structure, though one that is 
ambiguous and unstable. The subject of sovereignty is subject to a will, in Foucault’s 
characterization, and thus to a Thou. However, the will of the sovereign is independent 
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of any relation to a specific person or subject. At least in principle, it need not be 
responsive to the particularities, demands, or expectations of any subject, and purports 
to prescribe an order for a social whole. Whatever demands sovereign law places on one, 
and thus whatever reasons for acting such law provides one, are entirely agent-neutral, in 
contrast to the manner in which reasons for acting, for an agonistic subject in a 
particularistic space of reasons, are - in general - agent-relative.199 There is no face-to-face 
between the sovereign and its subjects. As Foucault puts it:
Ever since the Middle Ages slowly and painfully built up the 
great procedure of investigation, to judge was to establish the 
truth of a crime, it was to determine its author and to apply a 
legal punishment. Knowledge of the offence [sic] knowledge 
of the offender, knowledge of the law: these three conditions 
made it possible to ground a judgement in truth. [The 
important questions for sovereign power with respect to 
penal practice are]... “Has the act been established and is it 
punishable?”... “Who committed it?” ... [and] “What law 
punishes this  offence?”200
In this passage, Foucault is contrasting sovereign power with the new disciplinary 
techniques that colonized interpersonal life during the 18th century. The point of the 
contrast is that, whereas the techniques of disciplinary power, as they enter into penal 
practice, require detailed knowledge of an individual, sovereign law is indifferent to these 
details. Being able to pick out the offender is sufficient. 
 The period in which the techniques and concepts of sovereign power best 
characterize the political and penal practice corresponds to the reign of what, in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, he calls “representation.” In this era, the rich tapestry of analogy 
and divination that characterized Renaissance “knowledge” is succeeded by the creation 
of “facts,” as “something compact, robust, down to earth, neutral, bite-sized, byte-sized, 
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the very opposite of theory, conjecture, hypothesis, generalization. Facts are ugly 
ducklings, ungainly, unordered, ‘brute facts.’ But then they are supposed to speak, if only 
we get enough of them.”201  The idea, here, is to separate facts from our interpretations of 
them, interpretations that fit them into fascinating inferential webs, e.g., those structured 
by the Renaissance concepts of microcosm/macrocosm, allowing inferences from 
features of small-scale phenomena to global phenomena and vice-versa.202 Foucault here 
uses the language of “knowledges” rather than “rationalities,” though this is more of a 
quirk of his immersion in the tradition of French philosophy of science rather than 
German critical theory, with which he would not really familiarize himself for some years 
yet. But the point is still clear. One is silent before the brute facts, which are yet still 
supposed to speak, to move one to belief or action, in the same way that one is supposed to 
be silent before the voice of the sovereign. Of course, these brute facts are still 
supposed to be held together by natural laws. There is an affinity between the 
epistemological reign of representation and facts, and the establishment of sovereign 
power. The fact of the law, or will of the sovereign, is supposed to be the same sort of 
brute fact, and subjects must not be partisan, must not be partial; the objective order of 
the sovereign’s will is objective, free of interpretation, independent of the vicissitudes of 
our personal histories. 
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 The spaces of sovereign and agonistic reason are genuinely different spaces, and 
thus  are inhabited by different sorts of subjects. I have suggested that Foucault is 
sympathetic to the subjects of revolt, those who recognize the space of reasons as a 
partial, indeterminate and incomplete space. But the juridical stance is still a species of 
the participant attitude. Though the particularities of juridical subjects make no claim in 
themselves on the sovereign, it is still the case that the punishment or sanctions that juridical 
subjects are best seen as manifestations of the reactive attitudes of the sovereign.  In the 
following section, I will discuss how Foucault sees disciplinary power as in turn building 
a different sort of  space of  reasons, and its impact on moral subjectivity. 
§3.3 Discipline, the Human Sciences, and the Subject of  Correction
 As noted in §3.1, with the invention of the “infraction,” breaking the law 
becomes an affront against the sovereign himself, against the very form of his will, 
displaying the sort of lack of concern that, as Strawson notes, tend to provoke the 
reactive attitudes in interpersonal life. Torture, the paradigmatic sovereign punishment, is 
the imprint of  the reactive attitudes on the very body of  the criminal. 
 Foucault stresses that torture is a mode of punishment by which a spectacle is 
made of the criminal, a ritual which not only manifests the reactive attitudes of the 
sovereign, but also his power. It has the function of a sign (which, given that it is an 
expression, should be unsurprising). But he also notes that this torture, as a technology 
of sovereign power, is ambivalent and unstable. The ritual that is supposed to, in all of 
its gruesome splendour, underwrite and strengthen the normative ties between sovereign 
and subjects can have precisely the opposite effect. As he puts it:
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Of all the reasons why punishment that was not in the least 
ashamed of being “atrocious” was replaced by punishment 
that was to claim the honour of being “humane” there is one 
that must be analysed at once, for it is internal to the public 
execution itself: at once an element of its functioning and the 
principle of its perpetual disorder. In the ceremonies of the 
public execution, the main character was the people, whose 
real and immediate presence was required for the 
performance. An execution that was known to be taking 
place, but which did so in secret, would scarcely have had any 
meaning. The aim was to make an example, not only by 
making people aware that the slightest offence was likely to 
be punished, but by arousing feelings of terror by the 
spectacle of power letting its anger fall upon the guilty 
person: “In criminal matters, the most difficult point is the 
imposition of the penalty: it  is the aim and the end of the 
procedure, and its only fruit, by example and terror, when it is 
well applied to the guilty person'... But, in this scene of terror, 
the role of  the people was an ambiguous one.203
Note that Foucault is explicit in describing sovereign punishment as the expression of 
anger; he will go on to describe the participation of the people in the vengeance of the 
sovereign. Sovereign punishment is clearly an expression of the reactive attitudes. And 
the people are not only supposed to feel fear at the prospect of suffering the same 
punishment, but also to  partake of  the sovereign’s resentment:
People were summoned as spectators: they were assembled to 
observe public exhibitions and amendes honorables; pillories, 
gallows and scaffolds were erected in public squares or by the 
roadside; sometimes the corpses of the executed persons 
were displayed for several days near the scenes of their 
crimes. Not only must people know, they must see with their 
own eyes. Because they must be made to be afraid; but also 
because they must be the witnesses, the guarantors, of the 
punishment, and because they must to a certain extent take 
part in it. The right to be witnesses was one that they 
possessed and claimed; a hidden execution was a privileged 
execution, and in such cases it was often suspected that it had 
not taken place with all its customary severity. There were 
protests when at the last moment the victim was taken away 
out of sight...The people claimed the right to observe the 
execution and to see who was being executed.204
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It is a right of the subjects to observe the sovereign punishment, to see judgment done, 
and not only a right but a right exercised, passionately. Insofar as these subjects submit to 
the sovereign’s will and the order that it prescribes they must accept it, such that it would 
in fact be normative for their lives. And they demand to see justice done. But not just to 
see, either. They were to participate in the power to punish, not because the power 
belongs to them, but because it is the power to which they are beholden:
The people also had a right to take part... The condemned 
man, carried in procession, exhibited, humiliated, with the 
horror of his crime recalled in innumerable ways, was offered 
to the insults, sometimes to the attacks of the spectators. The 
vengeance of the people was called upon to become an 
unobtrusive part of the vengeance of the sovereign. Not that 
it was in any way fundamental, or that the king had to express 
in his own way the people's revenge; it was rather that the 
people had to bring its assistance to the king when the king 
undertook 'to be avenged on his enemies', especially when 
those enemies were to be found among the people...205
But these very rights, which though hemmed in by the power of the sovereign are part 
of its functioning in penal practice, work to render that power unstable. Though it was 
the case that they might work to enact or enable to work of sovereign punishment, 
nevertheless it might be “that the people, drawn to the spectacle intended to terrorize it, 
could express its rejection of the punitive power and sometimes revolt.”206 The tortured 
criminal, while a possible target of the wrath of the public, was also a possible object of 
sympathy, a symbol of injustice, of purported justice beyond proportion, and so on. In 
such cases, the criminal would be a sign of justice “gone wrong,” not a sign of a 
rejection of  the sovereign will, embodied in law, but of  its application in this instance:
Now it was on this point that the people, drawn to the 
spectacle intended to terrorize it, could express its rejection 
of the punitive power and sometimes revolt. Preventing an 
execution that was regarded as unjust, snatching a 
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condemned man from the hands of the executioner, 
obtaining his pardon by force, possibly pursuing and 
assaulting the executioners, in any case abusing the judges and 
causing an uproar against the sentence - all this formed part 
of the popular practices that invested, traversed and often 
overturned the ritual of  the public execution.
But things could be more radical. The body of the criminal may become the site of a 
symbolic battle. And, occasionally, the underclasses, plebeians, and peasants would side with 
the criminal against the sovereign, rejecting the sovereign edifice, in the same sort of 
gesture of war Foucault discerned in “Society Must Be Defended” in the discourses of the 
English civil war and in the genealogies of  the pre-revolutionary French nobility.207 
 This sort of instability is a condition of the possibility of the gradual 
colonization of penal practice, and hence subjectivity, by what Foucault will call 
“discipline” or “disciplinary power”:
In this same dangerous and ritual violence, the eighteenth-
century reformers denounced, on the contrary, that which 
exceeded, on both sides, the legitimate exercise of power: in 
this violence, according to them, tyranny confronts rebellion; 
each calls forth the other. It is a double danger. Instead of 
taking revenge, criminal justice should simply punish.208
It has been frequently noted how Foucault takes disciplinary power to succeed sovereign 
power (at least as a dominant structure in penal practice), in part because it was more 
more stable than the occasionally arbitrary and/or excessive practices of sovereign 
power. But it should be stressed that the eventual domination of disciplinary power is in 
no way a result of any sort of intention to overhaul the punitive practices of sovereign 
power. Foucault notes that, while there were plenty of explicit  plans for the 
transformation of penal practice circulating in the 18th century - such as focusing more 
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on less brutal but more effective symbolic forms of deterrence - the implementation of 
prisons as the paradigmatic mode of punishment, and the corresponding alteration in our 
ethical subjectivity is not really one of them. Disciplinary power was not deployed in 
order to stabilize sovereign power; rather, because it stabilized the procedures of 
punishment, discipline was able to survive. 
 It was able to survive, in part, because disciplinary power neutralizes the potential 
agonism of the sovereign spectacle of punishment. How does this work? The answer, in 
part, is given by the manner in which disciplinary power allegedly “humanizes” 
punishment: by making it impersonal. Punishment can no longer be seen as the 
expression of the reactive attitudes of the sovereign. Even the sovereign people cannot 
simply exhaust their collective fury on the body of the criminal. Rather, punishment 
becomes, at its gentlest, rehabilitation or, more tellingly “corrections.”209  And, this 
implies, that the normative order that the criminal has transgressed is no longer a will. 
Indeed, it’s not even clear that what the criminal has done is transgressed. Rather, insofar as 
the aim of punishment is not vengeance but rehabilitation or correction, the criminal, 
then, simply becomes one who is sub-performing, one who fails not to respect the law, but to 
meet certain positive standards of conduct. That is to say, subjects are compelled to actively 
meet a functional norm, rather than to heed a prohibition. This change, I take it, signals a 
new paradigm in ethical life in contrast to earlier “agonistic” and “sovereign” 
technologies of power. Both of these, as I have been arguing, initiate subjects into a 
space of reasons in a “participant stance,” from which they might make claims upon 
each other “face to face,” so to speak. Disciplinary power, with its positive compulsions 
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to action, on the other hand, initiates subjects into the “objective attitude” which 
Strawson opposes to the participant attitude.
 In the context of his essay, Strawson notes that the objective attitude is often 
adopted by those he calls “optimists.” Optimists are those who take it that the truth of 
determinism would pose no serious threat to our ethical practices (including blame and 
punishment). The optimist, that is, thinks that the justification of our punitive practices 
resides in their efficiency and effectiveness:
To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to 
see  him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject 
for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; 
as something certainly to be taken account, perhaps 
precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or cured 
or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided...210
On the optimists’ view, our punitive practices - and thus the sorts of subject that we are - 
aim at “treating” offenders, at reforming their behaviour. There is no room for “all the 
essentially personal antagonisms” that require a participatory attitude in intersubjective 
life; as Strawson puts it:
The objective attitude may be emotionally toned in many 
ways, but not in all ways: it may include repulsion or fear, it 
may include pity or even love, though not all kinds of love. 
But it cannot include the range of reactive feelings and 
attitudes which belong to involvement or participation with 
others in inter-personal human relationships; it cannot 
include resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, anger, or the sort 
of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feel 
reciprocally, for each other. If your attitude towards someone 
is wholly objective, then though you may fight him, you 
cannot quarrel with him, and though you may talk to him, 
even negotiate with him, you cannot reason with him. You 
can at most  pretend to quarrel, or to reason, with him.211
Strawson’s point is that when engaging someone in a wholly objective stance, one does 
not recognize them as responsive to reasons; one adopts the objective stance precisely 
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when the object of one’s attitude is not properly held responsible (for actions or beliefs) 
in the way that rationality requires. And individuals are not properly held responsible 
when they fail to meet the conditions required for proper authorship of their acts, for 
having the right sort of  authority over their actions.212 
 On Foucault’s view, part of what disciplinary power does is subjectivates 
individuals without this authorship. In the practices of sovereign juridical inquiry, the 
accused still maintained an important sort of authority. If sovereign power, in the ritual 
torture, laid ahold of the body of the criminal in a particularly violent way, it was, as 
Foucault says, to manifest the “truth of the crime.”213 The body of the criminal needs to be 
present for this; a mere pronouncement will be insufficient to actually register the 
punishment as the manifestation of the truth that the crime was committed (indeed, 
arguably, simply seeing the crime committed wouldn’t count as establishing the truth of 
the crime). The authority of the criminal, however, does not only reside in the body; 
Foucault describes at length the importance of  confession for sovereign penal procedure:
...the only way that this procedure might use all its 
unequivocal authority, and become a real victory over the 
accused, the only way in which the truth might exert all its 
power, was for the criminal to accept responsibility for his 
own crime and himself sign what had been skilfully [sic] and 
obscurely constructed by the preliminary investigation. “It is 
not enough,” as Ayrault, who did not care for these secret 
procedures, remarked, “that wrong-doers be justly punished. 
They must if possible judge and condemn themselves”... 
[T]he criminal who confessed came to play the role of living 
truth. The confession, an act of the criminal, responsible and 
speaking subject... [and] an element in the calculation of the 
truth, it was also the act by which the accused accepted the 
charge and recognized its truth; it transformed an 
investigation carried out without him into a voluntary 
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affirmation. Through the confession, the accused himself 
took part in the ritual of  producing penal truth.214
The necessity of this sort of first-personal avowal of the crime is characteristic of the 
participant stance; in such a stance, one has to take the agent-object of the reactive 
attitudes as capable of genuinely expressing a problematic lack of good intentions, and 
hence as genuinely warranting an expectation thereof. Confession is crucial because the 
crime is only truly a crime - as opposed to, say, an accident or misfortune - if the criminal 
can responsibly author it; the criminal must say, in effect, “this was my act, it was I who 
committed it” for the juridical procedure to be truly, properly concluded. Of course, the 
mere vocalization or statement of guilt is not enough. The criminal subject must be 
genuinely recognizing and responding to the norm against whatever crime it is, and part of 
doing so is avowing, that is, committing oneself  to the norm that has been broken. 
 With the rise of disciplinary power, this changes, and the change is complicated. 
On the one hand, individuals have to be subjectivated or subjectified to not take others as 
essentially (at least potential) interlocutors, that is, as claims-makers (what John Rawls calls 
“self-authenticating sources of valid claims”).215 Sure, others may make claims, but the 
point is that their claims do not have authority by themselves; normative discourse 
becomes, in almost all of its manifestations, the expression of opinion and preference, 
and it is not clear that such expressions carry any weight in and of themselves. This 
process has already begun with the establishment of a sovereign monopoly on right. For 
all but the sovereign, what possesses authority is an objective set of norms and values 
independent of one’s own (empirical) will.216 What disciplinary power accomplishes is 
149
 214 Discipline & Punish, pp. 38-39. 
 215 Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (2nd edition. Ed. Erin Kelly. New  York. Cambridge University 
Press: 2001), p. 23. 
 216  This is true even of people in situations where, nominally, the “people” are ultimately 
sovereign. 
the uncoupling of the normative order from any will at all; what becomes normative are 
simply norms, in the sense of normalcy, norms of performance. And, for Foucault, the 
emergence of this new, neutralizing, depoliticizing, and normalizing disciplinary power 
hinges on its approach to the human body.217 
 Many, many commentators have stressed the centrality of the “body” to 
Foucault’s work, and Nietzsche - Foucault’s greatest philosophical inspiration - had 
foregrounded its centrality in the formation of ethical subjects, subjects responsive to 
norms. Furthermore, Foucault was well aware that the 18th century “was certainly not 
the first time that the body had become the object of such imperious and pressing 
investments; in every society, the body was in the grip of very strict  powers, which 
imposed on it constraints, prohibitions or obligations.”218  Foucault’s question, rather, is 
“What was so new in these [particular] projects of docility that interested the eighteenth 
century so much?” 
It was certainly not the first time that the body had become 
the object of such imperious and pressing investments; in 
every society, the body was in the grip of very strict  powers, 
which imposed on it constraints, prohibitions or obligations. 
However, there were several new things in these techniques. 
To begin with, there was the scale of the control: it was a 
question not of treating the body, en masse,  'wholesale', as if it 
were an indissociable  unity, but of working it 'retail', 
individually; of exercising upon it a subtle coercion, of 
obtaining hold upon it at the level of the mechanism itself - 
movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal 
power over the active body. Then there was the object of the 
control: it was not or was no longer the signifying elements of 
behaviour or the language of the body, but the economy, the 
efficiency of movements, their internal organization; 
constraint bears upon the forces rather than upon the signs; 
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the only truly important ceremony is that of exercise. Lastly, 
there is the modality: it implies an uninterrupted, constant 
coercion, supervising the processes of the activity rather than 
its result and it is exercised according to a codification that 
partitions as closely as possible time, space, movement. These 
methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the 
operations of the body, which assured the constant 
subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of 
docility-utility, might be called 'disciplines'.219
In this passage, Foucault notes three crucial innovations of disciplinary power. First, 
disciplinary power targets control not only of the position or placement of the body, its 
general movement or somatic integrity. After all, holding a medieval criminal in a cell is 
an act of power upon the body, one that treats it “en masse” by ignoring the details of 
its actions and simply placing material limits on them. This bears on the second point; 
sovereign power, of course, made a target of the body, but as a symbol; as a manifestation 
of truth and the authority of the sovereign. This is no longer the case with disciplinary 
power. The disciplined body is no canvas on which truth might display itself. Discipline, 
rather, targets the components of each action, aiming at making them maximally 
efficient, at optimizing them. This optimization does not signify anything, but simply 
increases capacity. The processes of collecting and presenting truth and evidence are 
altered, radically. 
 The eighteenth century was witness to a number of disciplinary projects: military, 
educational, industrial, and so on. According to Foucault, discipline historically drew on 
the sorts of labour, management, military, and educational techniques that developed 
through the eighteenth century. So, for example, as the production of goods shifted 
from skilled craftspeople to factory division of labour, a new schema of separate actions 
had to be invented. The actions of the single craftsperson are not simply divided into 
operations to be performed by a series of labourers. Rather, new and different schemes 
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of action are required, and bodily motion needs to be retrained to repetitive and/or 
mechanical tasks.220  What disciplinary power does is shape the sort of sub- or pre-
conscious bodily intentionality that makes these new forms of  performance possible. 
 Foucault always stresses that disciplinary power targets the body at a pre-conscious  
level, often parasitically making use of the sorts of affordances that fill other areas of 
our lives.221 Consider an early public schoolroom. Children who have never attended a 
public school might not know what is required of them as they enter, but nevertheless 
they enact the proper script. Whatever prompting they might need would come from 
nervousness or fear, not incapacity. A room full of desks and chairs presents them with a 
wealth of affordances for which they have already have uptake - namely, sitting 
(especially in the absence of much in the way of standing room) - while at the same time 
using the uptake of those affordances to orient children towards a central (usually 
standing) authority in the figure of the teacher. As we saw in §3, some figures occupy 
higher ground in the space of reasons due to non- or arational factors, and the teacher 
(at least initially) occupies such ground, which further shapes the subjectivity of the 
students. The students are arrayed in front of a teacher, all visible at once, but unable to 
survey the room themselves with ease without making themselves more visible, by 
craning one’s neck or turning around, generally movements that will be subject to 
judgment and penalty for “disturbing” a classroom until the student has been trained to 
look forward at all times. Finally, the teacher is authorized to subject the students to 
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examinations, which reveal the latter’s level of performance for evaluation or 
“normalizing judgment.” 
 At the same time, these arrangements (and similar ones in factories, barracks, and 
so on) serve to make power “cellular,” to distribute individual bodies in space such that 
they can be monitored, assessed, and addressed in an individual ways. Disciplinary 
arrangements make possible a structure of constant, individualized intervention. Indeed, 
even architecture in disciplinary settings works to shape these affordances while at the 
same time installing particular individuals in authoritative positions and others in 
subordinate positions.222
 The parent, the teacher, the doctor, the staff sergeant, the floor manager: these 
authoritative figures, among others, interpellate subjects, calling and binding them to 
their identities, and in doing so to various assigned tasks. Individuals are induced into a 
routine or schema of tasks, a routine or schema which normatively structures their 
experience.223  What is important is that each of these local, relatively small-scale 
disciplinary projects is how they served to render “normalcy” normative, and how the 
techniques for doing so colonized social life to such a degree that criminal wrongdoing 
would no longer find its appropriate response in vengeance or - really - even 
punishment, but rather in correction, in rehabilitation, in the return to a normalcy that has 
become obligatory. Indeed, it is a constitutive norm for the subject of  discipline. 
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 This marks a shift and transformation in disciplinary technologies from their 
original contexts, linked essentially for Foucault to the birth of the human sciences. He is 
explicit at the beginning of  Discipline & Punish: 
Instead of treating the history of penal law  and the history of 
the human sciences as two separate series whose overlapping 
appears to have had on one or the other, or perhaps on both, 
a disturbing or useful effect, according to one's point of view, 
see whether there is not some common matrix or whether 
they do not both derive from a single process of 
“epistemologico-juridical” formation; in short, make the 
technology of power the very principle both of the 
humanization of the penal system and of the knowledge of 
man.224
As Foucault notes in describing “the methods of correct training” in specific military, 
industrial, and educational contexts, these disciplinary technologies all involved three 
important factors, namely: (1) hierarchical observation, (2) normalizing judgments, and 
(3) examination. He then links these to the development of the human sciences. After 
all, it was in the “laboratories” of these disciplinary settings that human multiplicities 
became observable, en masse. As has been discussed at various points above, these various 
forms of confinement and the manner in which they establish positions of authority and 
subordinance. At the same time, they do so in a normalizing environment, that is to say, 
environments in which proper functioning is not only of the utmost importance but also 
not taken for granted. It must be trained, and habituated into subjects. At the same time, 
the examination tests subjects on their performance; the thing to be evaluated is no 
longer their judgment, and their avowal is no longer necessary for that evaluation. What 
is captured is functional aptitude, the capacity to perform assigned tasks. 
 And - I think Foucault would agree with me here - if one could abstract the 
factory, the barracks, the school from their eventual place in a larger “carceral 
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archipelago,” there is nothing really objectionable about the way they are run.225  We 
should recognize that in many local contexts our performance, or ability to fulfill various 
functions, calls for supervision, reinforcement, training, and indeed discipline. As 
Foucault says in a late interview, “I say that power is a relation. A relation in which one 
guides the behavior of others. And there’s no reason why this manner of guiding the 
behavior of others should not ultimately have results which are positive, valuable, 
interesting, and so on.”226 We should not think of Foucault’s genealogy of the prison as 
being a call to seek out and subject to critique every instance of discipline simply in 
virtue of  its being discipline. 
 Discipline becomes troubling, rather, when these disciplinary contexts come to 
colonize our social life at large and especially when the sort of functional normativity 
that characterizes particular roles in local contexts comes to characterize human beings, if 
not as such then at least insofar as they are social beings. It is nothing new to stress the 
connection Foucault draws between the nascent human sciences and the rise and spread 
of disciplinary techniques through the 18th and 19th centuries. But it is not always 
incredibly clear what he takes that connection to be. In broad strokes, I take it that, 
although he doesn’t use this language, Foucault thinks that it is through the functionalism 
of the human sciences, both social and psychological, that the human sciences are linked 
to the disciplines. 
 Similarly, anyone who has read Foucault’s genealogical works knows that 
disciplinary power is supposed to place the harsh, heavy, often physical power of the 
sovereign with normalizing power. But it’s not often explained why discipline, with its 
connection to the human sciences, must be normalizing, as opposed to - say - merely 
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oppressive, or alienating, or what have you. It’s important to note that - as opposed to 
the concepts of physics or chemistry - the functional concepts and categories of the 
human sciences are intrinsically normative.227  By this I mean that these concepts are 
essentially related to our evaluations of human beings; where we cannot say that an atom 
or an electromagnetic field is deficient or abnormal in the pejorative sense qua physical 
phenomena, the concepts of the human sciences allow us to classify humans as, for 
example, deviant or invalid. While of course there are longstanding disputes about the 
differences, and possible relationships, between the natural and social sciences, the 
concepts of the human sciences play a role in inscribing such functional, normative 
conceptions of the human individual in our broader visions of nature, or of human 
being-in-the-(natural)-world.
 From Durkheim through Parsons to Habermas and beyond, an influential stream 
of social theory has construed society precisely as a sort of functionally differentiated 
organism or machine, a unified object serving an array of purposes.228 It is this sort of 
functionalism that lies behind, for example, critical accounts of ideology.229 While “Society 
Must Be Defended” details the emergence of a sort of organic, functional conception of 
society out of the agonistic “counterhistory” of race way in early modern England and 
France, in other lectures he hints at the way that this “functional” normative conception 
of human beings emerges in the psychological sciences. Indeed, as early as The Order of 
Things Foucault emphasized the importance of the conceptual pairing of function and 
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norm, attributing to them in that work a sort of quasi-transcendental status, functioning 
as constitutive categories for the development of the sciences of biology, sociology, and 
psychoanalysis.230
 For example, in his 1973/74 course at the Collége de France on psychiatric 
power, coinciding with the publication of Discipline & Punish, and in particular the lecture 
of 12 December 1973, he discusses how, as disciplinary power came to colonize the 
treatment of the mad or mentally ill, the “most important and typical” aspect of this 
treatment was the putting to work of mental patients.231 Foucault’s point here is that the 
“illness” of the patients is tested against their ability to function. Of course, there are 
conceivably many different explanations why this might be, but Foucault wants to 
suggest that the very conceptual structure of the truths of the human sciences are 
founded on this functional, utilitarian employment of  patients:
In the middle of all this, the most important and typical 
element is undoubtedly the way in which psychiatric 
knowledge and treatment are connected to the practice of 
putting those residents to work who are capable of working. 
Actually, very strangely, it is clear that the psychiatric 
categories developed by the psychiatry of the time... are not 
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in fact employed here at all as a classification of the curability 
of different people and the form of treatment that should be 
applied to them. Nosological classification is not linked to any 
therapeutic prescription but serves instead solely to define the 
possible utilization of individuals for the work they are 
offered.232
As I put explained in Chapter Two, the construction of the space of reasons is 
intimately connected to our treatment of persons: in this case, to the treatment of the 
mad and mentally ill, insofar as these sorts of practices form the conceptual bedrock of 
the human sciences. Psychiatric patients were, at the dawn of the disciplinary age, put to 
work, and treated as functionally characterized individuals. 
 This treatment, in the rather brutal and crude context of early psychiatric 
practice, highlights the way in which disciplinary power in general works to produce a 
specific sort of individual. In the same course, during Foucault’s lecture of 21 November 
1973, Foucault discusses explicitly and at length the “genealogy of disciplinary power.” 
As he puts it, “the other side of the disciplinary relationship is punishment, both 
miniscule and continuous punitive pressure.”233  As described above, teachers, military 
officers, factory managers, all of these figures shaping the disciplinary contexts in which 
they operate, exerting this continuous pressure, even if only through the threat of 
disapproval, minor corrections, etc. As Foucault puts it: 
One must be able to spot an action even before it  has been 
performed, and disciplinary power must intervene somehow 
before the actual manifestation of the behavior, before the 
body, the action, or the discourse, at the level of what is 
potential, disposition, will, at the level of the soul. In this way 
something, the soul, is projected behind disciplinary power, 
but it is a very different soul from the one defined by 
Christian practice and theory.234
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The individual, considered as that mass of properties, tendencies, tastes, character, habits, 
dispositions, is the product of disciplinary arrangements. As he puts it in Discipline & 
Punish: 
The history of this 'micro-physics' of the punitive power 
would then be a genealogy or an element in a genealogy of 
the modern 'soul'. Rather than seeing this soul as the 
reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the 
present correlative of a certain technology of power over the 
body. It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or 
an ideological effect. On the contrary, it  exists, it has a reality, 
it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by 
the functioning of a power that is exercised on those 
punished - and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, 
trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the 
colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the 
rest of  their lives.235
And this object - projected, produced, and managed through disciplinary apparatuses, 
becomes the object of the human sciences which, in turn, further solidify it. These 
qualities, which constitute “individuals,” are “projected” behind the bodies that are 
consistently pressured to perform. As we saw in the previous chapter, these therapeutic 
and medical practices play a role in constituting the object of the human sciences, namely, the 
soul or psyche. There is nothing obvious about such an object; indeed, once this object 
was in some sense constituted, the work of Nietzsche and Freud, among others, served 
as a sustained attack on the idea that the various drives, desires, and dispositions of 
human beings amount to any coherent whole at all. 
 In the same lecture course, Foucault gives his most detailed account of the 
relation between the human sciences, disciplinary power, and juridical/penal practice. As 
he puts it:
The function of the discourse of the human sciences is 
precisely to twin, to couple this juridical individual and 
disciplinary individual, to make us believe that the real, 
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natural, and concrete content of the juridical individual is the 
disciplinary individual cut out and constituted by political 
technology. Scratch the juridical individual, say the 
(psychological, sociological, and other) human sciences, and 
you will find a particular kind of man; and what in actual fact 
they give as man is the disciplinary individual.236
With the rise of the juridical apparatus of sovereign power, the sort of agonistic, 
essentially incomplete mode of conflict resolution, with its attendant forms of 
subjectivity and space of reason, faded away. Where once people struggled with each other, 
in an arena where at least in principle the strength and validity of their claims was not 
predetermined in advance, awaiting only discovery, there was now the sovereign order, 
imposed from above, independently of partisan voices. With the twin inventions of the 
infraction and the prosecutor, the legitimate claims that might be raised and the voices that 
might raise them are reduced sharply; the latter ventriloquizes subjects of right with the 
voice of  the sovereign. Disciplinary power silences even that voice. 
 Through the lectures on psychiatric power, Foucault notes the transformation in 
the role of the psychiatric doctor, from - as he puts it - “ambiguous master of truth” to 
an “agent of reality.” Foucault here is summarizing a drastic change in the treatment of 
the mad; prior to the 19th century, the psychiatric doctor treated patients, in some sense, 
by indulging their delusions. So, for example, in a case he draws from the practice of 
Mason Cox, published in 1804, he describes a patient consumed by paranoid fantasies 
about his housekeeper. While clearly this was a fantasy, the treatment of his condition 
involved at the very least pretending the patient’s views were true; a false trial was held, the 
housekeeper convicted and sent away, and the patient appeared to recover.237 Foucault - 
whose approach in these lectures is precisely to analyze these “scenes” of medical 
practice to reveal the workings of the “microphysics” of disciplinary power - wants to 
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stress that, at least through the very beginning of the 19th century, the voice of the 
patient made a difference to his or her treatment; his or her role as a truth-teller was not 
completely discounted, even if it meant creating a more or less elaborate “delusion 
within a delusion.”238
 Foucault contrasts these sorts of psychiatric scenes - scenes, perhaps, which still 
evoke the outlines of sovereign power - with those that indicate, explicitly, the rise of 
disciplinary power. Indeed, he chooses for his exemplary case one in which a genuine 
sovereign - King George - confronts the new forms of psychiatric power. In this scene, 
as the mad king submits to his treatment and, perhaps more importantly, to the 
administrations of  servants acting on doctor’s orders. And, as Foucault describes it:
Now, in the disciplinary relationship that we see appearing 
here, the servant is not at all in the service of the king's will, 
or it is not because it is the king's will that he serves the king's 
needs. He is in the service of the king's needs and condition 
without either the king's will or his status being involved. It is only the 
mechanical requirements of the body, as it were, which fix and determine 
what the servant's service must be. Consequently will and need, 
status and condition are disconnected. What's more, the 
servant will only act as a repressive force, he will leave off 
serving only in order to curb the king's will, when the latter is 
expressed over and above his needs and his condition.239
To be completely clear about the case:
One type of power, that of sovereignty, is replaced by what 
could be called disciplinary power, and the effect of which is 
not at all to consecrate someone's power, to concentrate 
power in a visible and named individual, but only to produce 
effects on its target, on the body and very person of the dethroned 
king, who must be rendered "docile and submissive" by this new 
power.240
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 What is striking about this case is the separation of will - and, consequently, of 
voice, of one’s capacity to hold authority in oneself, to be a genuine author of one’s 
existence - from the normative order; the king himself must be placed in the normative 
order, and not stand at its head. And once that happens, the human sciences step in to 
inscribe the natural, functional normative order that belongs to their neutral, third-
person, objective knowledge. 
 As mentioned, Foucault’s worry is that ““prisons resemble factories, 
schools,barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons.” The point here is that, insofar as 
the normative order to which we are subjected is drawn from the functional contexts in 
which disciplinary techniques and technologies are deployed, we become subjected as 
subjects of training, ready to be corrected. The point is that when we submit to such 
punishment in a penal system that stands as the safeguard and guarantor not only of a 
political order but also of the conduct of our everyday lives, we subjectivate ourselves - using 
Foucault’s language - as subjects of correction, for whom this order is authoritative; we put in 
the ethical work of constant surveillance and intervention with the aim of training and 
correcting our ethical substance, namely, our souls, or psyches, or dispositions and 
tendencies.  
 Let us return to the Strawsonian themes discussed earlier. Where Strawson 
distinguished between the participant and the objective stance, we have drawn a further 
distinction within the participant stance, namely, that between the juridical stance and the 
stance of revolt, based on the structures and sources of normative authority at work in 
each. We have seen how the shifts in the technologies of power between, for example, 
medieval and sovereign practices embodied each of these. Strawson saw the participant 
stance - and we might see the juridical stance and the stance of revolt - as necessary to 
our moral lives, unable to engage others solely in the objective stance. As he puts it: 
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Being human, we cannot, in the normal case, do this [i.e. 
adopt the objective stance] for long, or altogether. If the 
strains of involvement, say, continue to be too great, then we 
have to do something else – like severing a relationship.241
It is this that Foucault would deny; indeed, what discipline does is divest human beings of 
the sense of being any sort of source of normative authority. This is what happens when 
even the voice of the king is silenced in the face of his bare needs. What is to be 
maintained is simply the functional order of a society, which is authoritative with respect 
to all of our actions. The space of disciplinary or carceral reason is one which has been 
flattened and which purports to provide standards and norms in virtue of objective facts 
about human functioning; we are always a mistake away from having that lack of 
authority made forcefully apparent. In brief, disciplinary power moves us to adopt the 
objective stances as the foundation of  our engagement with each other. 
 There are many reasons why one might expect - at the very least - our governing 
bodies to adopt the “objective” stance towards individuals. Where in our individual lives 
we are perhaps able to sever our relationships when the strains of involvement are too 
great, we do not have this same option when considering ourselves as members of, say, a 
national community. Indeed, neutralizing tensions between smaller scale political units 
has been part and parcel of the emergence of the administrative State, an objective aided 
and abetted by the rise of disciplinary power. Foucault - while not appealing to these 
intentions as causes of the rise of disciplinary power - nevertheless suggests that they are 
important effects:
If the economic take-off of the West began with the 
techniques that made possible the accumulation of capital, it 
might perhaps be said that the methods for administering the 
accumulation of men made possible a political take-off in 
relation to the traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of 
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power, which soon fell into disuse and were superseded by a 
subtle, calculated technology of  subjection.242  
Indeed, the role of disciplinary technologies in establishing the normative order - we 
might, presumptively, call it “the social” - that underlies our contemporary political 
existence is crucial for Foucault. 
 To think otherwise would be to miss the massive transformation that has taken 
place in our punitive and penal practices. We have moved - in our assessments of the 
proper attitudes to take towards wrong-doers - to the “objective” stance on the whole, 
precisely because it is “civilized”: 
This need for punishment without torture was first 
formulated as a cry from the heart or from an outraged 
nature. In the worst of murderers, there is one thing, at least, 
to be respected when one punishes: his 'humanity'. The day 
was to come, in the nineteenth century, when this 'man', 
discovered in the criminal, would become the target of penal 
intervention, the object that it claimed to correct and 
transform, the domain of a whole series of 'criminological' 
sciences and strange 'penitentiary' practices... We must, 
therefore, recount the birth and early days of this enigmatic 
'leniency'.243
In the next section we will see how the birth of this leniency, which we have now 
outlined, and its role in setting a limit to the power of the sovereign has come to shape 
the juridical stance that Foucault rejects completely. 
§3.4 Cutting Off  the King’s Head
 For Foucault, the humanism of the Enlightenment began with the placing of 
limits on sovereign power. However, pursued in a juridical fashion, this movement to 
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limit sovereign power never managed to escape the juridical stance and the technologies 
of sovereign power sustaining that stance. And, indeed, framing this attempted escape 
from these technologies in terms of humanity, or of human dignity, have served to place 
the juridical stance in a sustained dialectic with the human sciences that Foucault refuses 
to enter. 
 Let us look more closely at the way Foucault links the birth of “lenient” or 
“humane” punishments with the birth of  the human sciences:
Instead of taking revenge, criminal justice should simply 
punish. This need for punishment without torture was first 
formulated as a cry from the heart or from an outraged 
nature. In the worst of murderers, there is one thing, at least, 
to be respected when one punishes: his 'humanity'. The day 
was to come, in the nineteenth century, when this 'man', 
discovered in the criminal, would become the target of penal 
intervention, the object that it claimed to correct and 
transform, the domain of a whole series of 'criminological' 
sciences and strange 'penitentiary' practices. But, at the time 
of the Enlightenment, it was not as a theme of positive 
knowledge that man was opposed to the barbarity of the 
public executions, but as a legal limit: the legitimate frontier 
of the power to punish. Not that which must be reached in 
order to alter him, but that which must be left intact in order 
to respect him. Noli me tangere. It marks the end of the 
sovereign's vengeance. The 'man' that the reformers set up 
against the despotism of the scaffold has also become a 
'man-measure': not of things, but of power. There is, 
therefore, a problem here: how was this man-measure 
opposed to the traditional practice of punishment? How did 
he become the great moral justification of the reform 
movement. Why this universal horror of torture and such 
lyrical insistence that punishment be 'humane'? Or, which 
amounts to the same thing, how are the two elements, which 
are everywhere present in demands for a more lenient penal 
system, 'measure' and 'humanity' to be articulated upon one 
another, in a single strategy? These elements are so necessary 
and yet so uncertain that it is they, as disturbing as ever and 
still associated in the same dubious relation that one finds 
today whenever the problem of an economy of punishment 
is posed. It is as if the eighteenth century had opened up the 
crisis of this economy and, in order to resolve it, proposed 
the fundamental law that punishment must have 'humanity' as 
its 'measure', without any definitive meaning being given to 
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this principle, which nevertheless is regarded as insuperable. 
We must, therefore, recount the birth and early days of this 
enigmatic 'leniency'.244
The point to be noted, in this longer excerpt, is this: the pushback against sovereign 
power came before the development of the objects of the human sciences, constituted by 
the practices of discipline in our industrial, pedagogical, military, and - later, and most 
importantly - penal institutions. And it occurred in the name of the humanity; the 
arbitrary will of the sovereign reached the end of its grasp as it clutched at the edges of 
its object’s humanity. 
 But what is this humanity? What does it amount to? As Foucault notes in a far 
more commonly cited discussion of the shortcomings of “humanism,” it is not clear 
that humanity as such has much in the way of concrete normative content. In the 
context of  distinguishing humanism from Enlightenment, he writes:
Humanism is something entirely different. It is a theme or, 
rather, a set of themes that have reappeared on several 
occasions, over time, in European societies; these themes, 
always tied to value judgments, have obviously varied greatly 
in their content as well as in the values they have preserved... 
In the seventeenth century, there was a humanism that 
presented itself as a critique of Christianity or of religion in 
general; there was a Christian humanism opposed to an 
ascetic and much more theocentric humanism. In the 
nineteenth century, there was a suspicious humanism, hostile 
and critical toward science, and another that, to the contrary, 
placed its hope in that same science. Marxism has been a 
humanism; so have existentialism and personalism; there was 
a time when people supported the humanistic values 
represented by National Socialism, and when the Stalinists 
themselves said they were humanists.
 From this, we must not conclude that everything 
which has ever been linked with humanism is to be rejected, 
but that the humanistic thematic is in itself too supple, too 
diverse, too inconsistent... And it is a fact that, at least since 
the seventeenth century, what is called "humanism" has 
always been obliged to lean on certain conceptions of man 
borrowed from religion, science, or politics. Humanism 
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serves to color and to justify the conceptions of man to 
which it is, after all, obliged to take recourse.245
 Remember that, as was discussed in §1.3, normative frameworks often make 
appeal to some sort of substantive normative fact, straddling the divide between the 
natural and the moral, in order to ground the normative principles, laws, and rules that 
comprise them. Foucault thinks that the great juridical effort, from the 17th through the 
19th century, to rein in the powers of the sovereign did so by erecting a humanist 
framework, one in which the “human” with its attendant “dignity” plays the role of the 
foundational normative fact. This is part of what Foucault, in The Order of Things calls 
the “anthropological sleep.” What makes this anthropological sleep a slumber is that it 
allows one to think that there is anything at all about being human - in the purely 
descriptive sense of being a homo sapiens - that has any moral import in itself. Another way 
of putting this is that “human being” cannot serve as the sort of normative fact these 
frameworks require, where the relevant sense of “fact” is the sense in which it is 
opposed to (mere) values, insofar as such facts could be at least in principle public and 
objective. The gold standard for such normative facts would be one, for example, that 
would move anyone who could recognize the descriptive or “merely factual” aspects of 
human being to respect the moral claims that human being allegedly makes on us.246 
 I take that in pointing out that humanism of some sort has been used to ground 
wildly different moral and political projects - and, importantly, moral and political 
projects that few if any of his readers would endorse - Foucault wants to suggest that 
these are not simply so many failed attempts at figuring out the “correct” or “true” 
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concept of humanity, that is, of finding an accurate representation of humanity. His 
point here is that, rather, what we find in these cases is what might be called the 
“normative construction of the human,” a kind of humanity that does not coincide with 
empirical human being. This becomes apparent in the ways in which these movements 
have explicitly endorsed the differential treatments of different classes of human beings, 
as inhuman or subhuman. In thinking that the fact of humanity could serve as the ground 
of humanistic normative frameworks would be to miss the ways in which a normative 
conception of the human is constructed out of extant, already (often deeply) held moral 
commitments. 
 The upshot of this is that, in making an appeal to “the human” central to its 
efforts, the juridical resistance to sovereign power placed itself in the position of having 
to provide some sort of content to that conception, to conceive of a human being whose 
sheer existence would have normative consequences. And it is this sort of humanism 
that, I think, fuels Foucault’s suspicion of normative frameworks more generally. For if, 
as Foucault thinks as happened, the West has continually failed to ground its moral and 
political projects in a consistent conception of the human being, what other sort of moral 
fact might take its place? At any rate, he takes it that this juridical move, noble as it might 
have been, laid the groundwork for the colonization of our moral lives by the 
imperatives of “normal functioning.” In replacing the will of the sovereign as the source 
of normative authority in our lives, as something arbitrary and possibly unreasonable, with 
an objective  and purportedly neutral “natural” normative order, the jurists placed 
themselves in the position of having to provide some sort of content to this concept. 
Let us expand another citation from the previous section:
The function of the discourse of the human sciences is 
precisely to twin, to couple this juridical individual and 
disciplinary individual, to make us believe that the real, 
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natural, and concrete content of the juridical individual is the 
disciplinary individual cut out and constituted by political 
technology. Scratch the juridical individual, say the 
(psychological, sociological, and other) human sciences, and 
you will find a particular kind of man; and what in actual fact 
they give as man is the disciplinary individual. Conjointly, 
there is the humanist discourse that is the converse of the 
discourse of the human sciences, taking the opposite 
direction, and which says: the disciplinary individual is an 
alienated, enslaved individual, he is not an authentic 
individual; scratch him, or rather, restore to him the fullness 
of his rights, and you will find, as his original, living, and 
perennial form, the philosophico-jundical individual. This 
game between the juridical individual and the disciplinary 
individual underlies, I believe, both the discourse of the 
human sciences and humanist discourse.
 What I call Man, in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, is nothing other than the kind of after image of 
this oscillation between the juridical individual, which really 
was the instrument by which, in its discourse, the bourgeoisie 
claimed power, and the disciplinary individual, which is the 
result of the technology employed by this same bourgeoisie 
to constitute the individual in the field of productive and 
political forces. From this oscillation between the juridical 
individual—ideological instrument of the demand for power
—and the disciplinary individual—real instrument of the 
physical exercise of power—from this oscillation between the 
power claimed and the power exercised, were born the 
illusion and the reality of  what we call Man.247
What Foucault means by all of this is really quite simple. The normative appeal to 
humanity - embodied in the humanist, “philosophico-juridical” position - serves a critical 
function in attempting to limit direct intervention by the sovereign, but this is turn calls 
for genuine content to the concept of  the “human.” 
 In principle, I suppose that there are many ways to try to provide such content. 
Even putting aside various forms of philosophical anthropology, one could draw, for 
example, on any number of religious traditions for a normative and descriptive account 
of human beings. However, as was mentioned in the closing paragraphs of the previous 
chapter, that it’s not clear that this will suffice for providing a normative framework for 
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living together in common in an age characterized by what John Rawls calls “the fact of 
pluralism.”248  In modern Western liberal democracies, we must coexist with many who 
do not share our most deeply held moral, political, religious, or metaphysical beliefs. And 
- given that part of the reason that disciplinary practices have survived and proliferated is 
that they work to neutralize the sorts of clashes of wills that could be provoked by 
displays of sovereign vengeance - it should not be surprising that these same disciplinary 
practices aid in the propagation of purportedly neutral normative frameworks, that 
might be acceptable to the (vast majority) of a population. And that is what Foucault 
takes them to do, through their relation to the human sciences; in the face of massive 
disagreement about the proper ends of life, the human sciences provide normative, 
functional characterizations of human beings, which provide standards and goals for 
human conduct and reasons for intervention in many cases. As disciplinary power 
colonizes public institutions, the aim of government becomes less the imposition of 
sovereign will and more and more the administration and policing of  normal life. 
 And throughout the 20th century, the administered life and the administrative 
State have been the repeated objects of critique, indeed, often of humanist critique. Too 
often, it is claimed, the State oversteps its bounds in its interventions into the lives of its 
citizens, or that the character of life in the modern world is deadening or alienated; 
human being is at odds with its nature, in some way. This is, in broad strokes, the 
beginnings of a dialectic of critique that Foucault rejects. Some normative but thin 
conception of the human being and its place in nature and society arises out of everyday 
disciplinary practice, and is used to naturalize and legitimate an enforceable social order. 
170
 248 Political Liberalism (Expanded edition. New  York. Columbia University Press:2005), p. 441 et 
passim. Rawls actually refers to “the fact of reasonable pluralism,” but I take it that - outside of the 
enterprise of “ideal theory” - in our modern liberal democracies we are compelled to coexist with those 
whose views and forms of  life we find wildly unreasonable. 
Some aspect of this order or its enforcement is found ethically lacking, and an objection 
is raised to it, usually framed by a humanist normative framework; appealing to some 
sort of moral quality or consequence of human nature or reason or dignity or what-
have-you. And this appeal to a humanist normative framework, in turn, demands a 
positive conception of human being, and a normative order that answers to its rights, 
responsibilities, values, and desires. And, eventually, the attempted institution of this 
positive conception of human being and its accompanying normative order - through 
further disciplinary practices, legislation, and so on - falls short, ethically, again, and the 
dialectic begins all over. It is in this back and forth of ethical critique and political and 
social construction that, Foucault thinks, we arrive at the philosophical conception of 
“Man” that so occupied him in, for example, The Order of  Things. 
 In that work - identified as the locus classicus of Foucault’s alleged anti-
humanism, with its closing “wager that man [might] be erased, like a face drawn in sand 
on the edge of the sea” - Foucault identifies “Man” not as a generic term for human 
being, but as “an invention of a recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end.”249 What 
he means by this is that “Man” is something like an epistemological artefact, the precipitate 
of a massive change in the way in which we conceive knowledge. During what Foucault 
calls the “Classical period” - roughly the 17th and 18th centuries - certain important 
fields of empirical knowledge, namely, those that have to do with human beings, the 
fuzzy and immature sciences of natural history, the study of wealth, and the study of 
grammar - were understood first and foremost as a matter of representation, something 
like a table of facts all systematically arranged. As Foucault describes it, in the closing 
years of the 18th century, the questions of the conditions of the possibility of these 
representations came to be raised: the Kantian problematic of how the manifold 
171
 249 p. 422. 
elements of a field might be unified into objects of knowledge. And the Kantian answer 
to this problem is to posit a transcendental subject, a non-empirical structure or process, 
working to unify and render cognizable the objects of  our empirical knowledge. 
 Foucault’s - and not only his - problem with this solution is that, insofar as human 
beings are taken to be, instantiate, or somehow participate in this sort of transcendental 
subjectivity, the human being is divided, bifurcated; both an empirical human and a non-
empirical subject. Why is this a problem? Well, it seems self-defeating in important ways. 
If the transcendental subject organizes empirical objects for cognition, but is itself not 
an empirical object, it’s not at all immediately clear how we could possibly have any 
knowledge of it, or what knowledge of it might amount to.250 How could we make any 
claims about the transcendental subject, or have any self-knowledge? 
 One strategy is to adopt what Lee Braver, in his magisterial study of anti-realism 
in Continental philosophy, has termed “the Empirical Directive.” In his explication of 
the Kantian paradigm and its development, transformation, and dissolution in the work 
of Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, he points out that the only way we can know the 
transcendental subject is through its manifestation in the empirical world: 
We will see that throughout the history of continental 
philosophy, the Empirical Directive gradually pulls 
subjectivity itself more and more into the field of experience
—history, nature, causality, and community all come to claim 
constitutive power over the constituting subject. Although 
this immersion into this world would have horrified Kant, it 
is one of the unintended effects of the Empirical Directive 
that he initiated.251
And so we end up at with the quasi-transcendental figure of Man, that strange subject-
object of knowledge, the being who studies himself. As Foucault describes it, the forms 
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of life, the processes of our labour, the significance of our language, all these aspects of 
our worldly existence that aren’t quite empirical, that don’t quite count as “objects” that we 
encounter, these have been taken to be what I will call manifestations or expressions of our 
human subjectivity, the shadowy force binding these phenomena together and 
constituting them as ours. 
 But, in the same text, Foucault takes issue with this way of addressing the 
Kantian problem, with what he calls “the analytic of finitude.” The Kantian turn in 
philosophy makes human finitude a positive feature of human being, making the limits that 
we face into conditions for any experience at all. And there is something to this; as finite 
human beings, we are confronted in our daily lives with both the experience of a kind of 
freedom to do what we will, while at the same time finding ourselves subject to all sorts 
of obstacles, particularly, binding normative structures, from the cognitive and epistemic 
to the ethical and political. This is the idea same idea expressed by - to use an example 
that Foucault would have known very well - Hegel’s contention that we originally 
confront the normative structures of our lives as alien, as having the source of their 
authority in something beyond us, “in itself ” before we recognize that this authority is 
only “for us.” Hegel’s post-Kantian project of reconciliation, in both the Phenomenology 
and more explicitly in the Philosophy of Right, of appropriating as our own - as 
expressions of our own freedom,  perhaps, but even more importantly as the expression of 
reason in the world - the structures that confront as alien is precisely the sort of project 
that Foucault rejects. Indeed, in the text that marks the passage between his most 
explicitly archaeologically-focused works and his genealogies, Foucault states clearly his 
anti-Hegelianism, inherited from Hyppolite.252
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 What Foucault inherits from Hyppolite is the rejection of the closed system of 
Hegelian thought.253  In particular, Foucault rejects the orthodox Hegelian model of 
reality - and the philosophical comprehension thereof - as a closed system. The idea is 
that, on the Hegelian model, some aspect of the normative structures that we encounter 
resists its appropriation or construal as an expression of our reason; it cannot be 
recuperated. This is the motor behind Hegelian dialectics; one’s entire mode of being - 
both practical and cognitive - must be altered, encountering new normative structures 
and appropriating and so on, until the system is closed in a state of Absolute 
Knowledge. This closure is crucial; without it, we have no reason to accept Hegel’s claim 
that the “in itself ” can truly be recuperated as merely “for us,” as an expression of our 
reason or freedom. 
 This promise of closure or full recuperation, required by the transcendental turn 
to Man is the target of Foucault’s account of the analytic of finitude. Though in The 
Order of Things, his targets seem to be, variously, Husserl and Heidegger, Hegel and Marx, 
and Freud (and likely) Lacan, the structure that he is attacking is the same; whether it be 
the thought of the constituting phenomenological subject who must always await its 
complete description in the unthought that has eluded description, the Hegelian subject 
awaiting absolute knowledge, or the proletariat whose full realization must await its 
“origin” in the classless society, in each case the reality we are able to encounter is 
supposed to both express our nature, but also in some way fall short of fully expressing 
it. Foucault takes this to be evidence that the empirical directive is a failed strategy, and 
that it is time to awake from the anthropological 
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 The wager of Foucault’s claim is that this project fails, though he knows that the 
attempt to estrange us from the structures in which we find ourselves can always be 
countered. That is the nature of the analytic of finitude; as long as transcendental 
subjectivity always purports to be only indirectly accessible, one can always claim that the 
structures we encounter are its expressions. As he puts it, his path of thought might be 
one “at the end which [Hegel] stands, motionless, waiting for us.”254 
 And this is the dialectic in which he finds “humanism” and “discipline,” the 
juridical stance and the human sciences, locked. Back and forth, it might go, from a claim 
that some practice or act violates the rights or the humanity of some party to the 
elaboration of that humanity to the realization that, again, the establishment of that 
vision of humanity in our disciplinary practices and, once again, to the claim that this 
vision does not match up with our normative and moral judgments.
 So, for example, one can see Foucault targeting in the first volume of his History 
of Sexuality, not primarily at “sexuality” as a normalizing discourse, but at those 
movements or discourses aiming at permitting the free expression of sexuality. The idea 
that inscribing “human sexuality” in the normative order - whether in an “emancipatory” 
or a “repressive” manner - would amount to realizing or instituting freedom, as opposed 
to participating in this dialectic that constantly elicits discourse about “human being” for 
the sake of  somehow recognizing or realizing that being in our normative institutions:
Moreover, we need to consider the possibility that one day, 
perhaps, in a different economy of bodies and pleasures, 
people will no longer quite understand how the ruses of 
sexuality, and the power that sustains its organization, were 
able to subject us to that austere monarchy of sex, so that we 
became dedicated to the endless task of forcing its secret, of 
exacting the truest of confessions from a shadow. The irony 
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of this deployment is in having us believe that our 
"liberation" is in the balance.255
I take as further evidence that Foucault’s thought on this issue goes back as far into his 
alleged “archaeological” period as The Order of Things the fact that he had explicitly 
anticipated this dialectic, and the role that sexuality would come to play in it in. After the 
classical era of “representation,” and with the transition to the “modern” period, with its 
intense focus on “Man,” “violence, life and death, desire and sexuality will extend, below 
the level of representation,  an immense expanse of shade which we are now attempting 
to recover, as far as we can, in our discourse, in our freedom, in our thought. But our 
thought is so brief, our freedom so enslaved,  our discourse so repetitive, that we must face 
the fact that that expanse of  shade below is really a bottomless sea.”256
 This is important, for several reasons. First of all, it is the first signal of 
Foucault’s rejection - ultimately - of any sort of foundationalism with respect to ethical 
theory, which is the first step towards his rejection of the need for ethical theory at all. 
The humanist foundation would be, to Foucault’s mind, the most plausible; Sartrean 
existentialism, phenomenology, and humanist Marxism were to some extent the order of 
the day. Even Levinas’ radically Other-centered ethical philosophy is, in the relevant 
respects, humanist. The failure of humanist foundations for ethical life indicates their 
superfluousness in general; after all, we manage to live ethically - or, given our 
weaknesses, we know what it would be  to live ethically, at least in broad strokes - and it’s 
not clear what work these purported foundations are doing. Indeed, the transcendental 
figure of “the human” seems to be merely a repository for the normative judgments and 
convictions we already have, that are part and parcel of our ways of life and spaces of 
reason.
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 This is precisely the sort of view we should expect from Foucault. After all, in 
our discussion in §1.4, in which we brought Foucault into conversation with Prichard’s 
criticisms of moral philosophy, we saw that what is important, what matters, is our 
conviction in our moral judgments, the normative force we feel from these principles 
and particular cases. Indeed, in Anglo-American philosophy this idea has grown in 
influence under the guise of reflective equilibrium, which does away even with the notion 
that moral principles need to be foundational, let alone some sort of state of affairs 
grounding them. 
 This criticism of humanism, and foundationalism in moral theory more 
generally, is doubly important when considering the criticisms of Foucault from the 
Critical Theoretic Left that many take to express the sorts of theoretical problems taken 
to have moved Foucault to make an “ethical turn.” For example, Nancy Fraser conflates 
several aspects of Foucault’s view, taking him, in Discipline & Punish, to be criticizing 
some sort of disciplinary humanism, a crude utilitarianism that takes the source of 
goodness to be the maximization of human productivity or happiness.257 Fraser aims to 
show that Foucault’s “critique” misses its mark, the most important legacy of 
Enlightenment, namely, liberalism. In an earlier article, she claims that Foucault’s work, 
which she interprets as criticizing disciplinary power as such, which she also takes 
Foucault to credit with the emergence of liberal, “Enlightened” institutions; her problem 
with this is that Foucault seems to be “presupposing” liberal norms in order to criticize 
discipline for its impingement upon our “freedom.” Fraser, like so many of Foucault’s 
critics, is committed to a version of “the juridical stance,” the stance of the prosecutor 
and the universal intellectual. 
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 This reading of Foucault neglects, entirely, the tripartite relationship between 
disciplinary practices, the human sciences, and the juridical stance involved in attempting 
to delineate foundational rights that would ground a normative social order. This target 
allows Foucault to draw connections between interventionist, utilitarian policies and 
liberal foundations, and - effectively - target them both. But he is emphatically not 
presupposing liberal norms of justice, legitimacy, freedom, etc., in targeting them. And 
this is because he is not saying that discipline is bad, or - and this is different - that it is 
wrong. Discipline isn’t in and of itself a problem. The failure on the part of many of 
Foucault’s critics to realize that he is not engaged in this juridical sort of critique - in 
identifying and labeling those practices that violate a pre-established right in terms of a 
normative framework - is in part the reason why he is accused of  nihilism. 
 Foucault’s nihilism, such as it is, consists in his consistent refusal to take how things 
are to settle, on their own, the way things should be, to refuse the authority of normative 
frameworks that seek their ground in some set of facts about the world. As Foucault 
uses the term, then, the truth - in the sense of the accurate representation of the way 
things are - does not govern us naturally, in and of itself. There are ways in which we 
become subject to the truth; the importation of models of human being from religion, 
philosophy, economics, and the “human sciences” into our juridical practices and our 
political thinking, and the technologies that underlie and support these models, these all 
have histories, and he aims to show them to us. Foucault doesn’t “critique” discipline, 
but rather he engages in the historical ontology of our selves; the question is not what 
makes discipline wrong, but how does discipline make us who we are. The question remains: is this 
who we want to be? 
 Foucault repeatedly claims that the standard approaches to political - and, indeed, 
ethical - thought are insufficient:
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At bottom, despite the differences in epochs and objectives, 
the representation of power has remained under the spell of 
monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not 
cut off  the head of  the king. Hence the importance that the 
theory of power gives to the problem of right and violence, 
law and illegality, freedom and will...258
We have already seen that Foucault rejects the juridical stance - the tool of the monarchy, 
though often raised against the sovereign - and its imbrication with the human sciences 
in the emergence of “the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the ‘social worker’-judge,” 
and so on. Cutting off the king’s head is about more than recognizing, merely, that 
disciplinary power, for example, is more diffused throughout our lives and more 
efficacious in them than the proscriptions laid down by the State or the sovereign. For 
example, Fraser and Habermas might completely agree with the latter; they still fail “to 
cut off the king’s head,” insofar as their concern is finding “normative foundations” for 
an order of  rights that would serve as basis for a shared and communal life. 
 Even a liberal, secular order, grounded in the dignity or humanity of the human 
subject, does not aim at a new way of organizing social and political. It simply replaces the 
will of the sovereign with human being as the organizing principle. Now, many in the 
traditions of liberal and critical theory would emphatically deny that any sort of 
conception of human nature is at the heart of the sorts of order that they endorse. This 
is precisely the aim of Rawls’ conception of “public reason,” for example: no substantive 
conceptions of human nature can play a justificatory role in the constitution of the just 
liberal society. But Foucault is not only putting substantive conceptions of human being 
into question. 
 Even putting the will of the people, for example, in the sense of popular sovereignty, at 
the basis of one’s political theory requires assumptions about the nature of human 
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freedom and reason, about what individuals would do, under certain conditions. The 
sticking point here, for Foucault, is that the head of the sovereign remains, even if the person 
of the sovereign is no longer the king. This will be an issue so long as the project is that 
of deciding upon a just or legitimate constitution, of reigning in and enabling the powers 
of  the sovereign. The liberal framework of  individual rights is but one way of  doing this. 
 Foucault’s position here - while it might have been difficult to discern at the time 
- is similar to ones that are now much better known and represented. For example, an 
inherent tension between liberalism and democracy has been proposed by thinkers like 
Chantal Mouffe and others for whom liberal and critical theory has neglected the agonistic 
dimensions of political life, and by those, like Bruno Latour and Jacques Ranciére, who 
take such theory to represent a profound hostility to a genuinely democratic form of 
politics. These discussions often take the form of a charge against some liberal or 
critical-theoretic account of the proper conditions for political discourse, some sort of 
constitution that everyone might agree on, might be brought to accept. The hope is that 
these conditions - whether Rawls’ veil of ignorance or Habermas’ ideal speech situation, 
for example -  will allow for the derivation of just or legitimate norms for our living-in-
common. The issue is that these forget the ineliminable dimension of struggle in political 
life; to engage in this sort of theorizing is to subject oneself, in a sense, to a sovereign 
order that will be upheld, without one’s input or meaningful ability to transform in 
accordance with one’s desires or interests. 
 The point is that, at the very least, the foundational or constitutional norms in 
these situations need to be beyond the reach of political debates, beyond contention, 
insofar as they are supposed to frame the forms of life and discourse that amount to our 
shared form of life, drawing boundary lines around our spaces of (acceptable) reason. 
But, as we saw in §2, Foucault recognizes that to inhabit the space of reasons is to be 
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denied the possibility the god’s-eye view, to deny that any sovereign could guarantee that 
the limits of the space of reason hold. It is, in a word, to cut off the king’s head. As 
Brandom puts it: 
Sorting out who should be counted as correct, whose claims 
and applications of concepts should be treated as 
authoritative, is a messy retail business of assessing the 
comparative authority of competing evidential and inferential 
claims. [. . .] There is only the actual practice of sorting out 
who has the better reason in particular cases. The social 
metaphysics of claim-making settles what it means for a claim 
to be true by settling what one is doing in taking it to be true. 
It does not settle which claims are  true—that is, are correctly 
taken to be true. That issue is adjudicated differently from 
different points of view, and although these are not all of 
equal worth there is no bird’s-eye view above the fray of 
competing claims from which those that deserve to prevail 
can be identified nor from which even necessary and sufficient 
conditions for such deserts can be formulated. The status of any such 
principles as probative is always itself at issue in the same way as the 
status of  any particular factual claim.259
 
Though most of our discourse, and critical and liberal theory perhaps more than others, 
proceed as if this were not the case, we have already seen Foucault’s intense interest in 
such agonistic, essentially contested modes of conflict resolution, of framing and 
rejecting, vindicating and disqualifying, claims of right and wrong. Consider again the 
medieval, Germanic mode of conflict resolution; the distribution of authority, of the 
right to speak truly, are all up for challenge, and what counts as a challenge - for example, 
combat as opposed to inquiry - is itself  up for challenge. 
 The recognition of this essential agonism in our collective lives, I take it, is at the 
heart of Foucault’s rejection of the juridical-humanist complex, and it is something that 
continues well after his alleged “ethical turn.” In lecture courses from both 1971 and 
1981, for example, Foucault discusses at length an episode from Homer, in which the 
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contestants dispute the outcome of chariot race.260  Despite the presence of an 
“objective” witness, they defer to rank as the guarantor of right, and are not simply 
mistaken; the objective witness simply does not bear the right sort of  authority. 
 Or consider Foucault’s discussions of ancient philosophy, of parrhesia, ancient 
practices of truth-telling, and the care of the self. It must not be forgotten that, for all 
Foucault’s interest in the Stoic care of the self in Hellenistic antiquity, he is not 
endorsing it. Indeed, the figure of the professional philosopher, or the philosopher as a 
guide in the art of living, as represented by, say, Epictetus, is fashioned as a particular 
sort of master, one who asserts an authority, based on knowledge, over the way in which life 
ought to be lived:
... in the practice of the self in the Hellenistic and Roman 
period I want to analyze, at the beginning of the Empire, the 
relationship to the other is just as necessary as in the classical 
epoch... but obviously in a different form. [I]t is especially 
based... on the fact that the subject is not so much ignorant as 
badly formed, or rather deformed, vicious, in the grip of bad habits. 
Above all it is based on the fact that right from the start, at 
the moment of his birth, even in the lap of his mother, as 
Seneca says, the individual has never had the relationship to 
nature of rational will that defines the morally sound action 
and the morally valid subject... I think this theme is rather 
important in the history of this practice of the self and, more 
generally, in the history of subjectivity in the Western world. 
Henceforth, the master is...no longer the person who, 
knowing what the other does not know, passes it on to him. 
No more is he the person who, knowing that the other does 
not know, knows how to demonstrate to him that in reality he 
knows what he does not know. Mastership will not work in 
this way. Henceforth the master is an effective agency... for 
producing effects within the individual's reform and in his formation as a 
subject...We can say that, in one way or another, all the declarations of 
philosophers, spiritual directors, etcetera, in the first and second centuries, 
testify to this...[W]hen it becomes a question of transforming bad habits, 
of transforming... the individual's way of being, when we have to correct 
ourselves, then a fortiori we will need a master... Passing from a 
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status of "to be corrected" to the status "corrected" a fortiori 
presupposes a master. Ignorance cannot be the element that 
brings about knowledge; this was the point on which the need 
for a master was based in classical thought. The subject can 
no longer be the person who carries out his own 
transformation, and the need for a master is now inserted 
here.261
In the figure of the Stoic, then, we can see - with the benefit of both hindsight and 
Foucault’s work - the germs of what, with countless subtle transformations and shifts in 
technique, knowledge, and aims, will become the figure of the spiritual advisor, the 
confessor, the physician, the psychoanalyst. In each case, there is a privileged possessor 
of a truth that must use that truth in order to reform the subject, to train him or her, and 
bring her properly into the “true” form of life that the philosopher is trying to either 
unearth or invent. 
 While it  is true that Foucault contrasts this Stoic sort of normative mastery over 
the truth with more “classical” forms, primarily Socratic and Platonic. But they are 
continuous in very many important respects. After all, in investigating the shape of 
ethical life through the lens of sexuality, Foucault notes that it is Plato’s intervention in 
the debates surrounding the use of pleasures in ancient Athens that links desire with truth, 
in “a process by which the master of truth teaches the boy the meaning of wisdom... 
Platonic erotics... introduces the question of  truth... as a fundamental question.”262 Further:
Socratic erotics, in the form that Plato gives it, does deal with 
questions that were customary in discussion on love. But it 
does not seek to define proper conduct... it tries to determine 
the self-movement, the kind of effort and work upon oneself, that will 
enable the lover to elicit and establish his relation to his true being.263
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The Platonic philosopher differs from the Stoics in that, rather than simply working to 
reform or correct the subject, to bring the subject and the subject’s conduct in empirical 
reality into agreement with some transcendent or foundational order, Platonic or 
Socratic attempts to bring the subject to recognize that what she has wanted, all along, is to be 
in such agreement. This subject “would not be able to conduct [herself] without a twofold 
relation to truth: a relation to her own desire questioned in its being, and a relation to the 
object of desire recognized as true being.”264 The idea, I take it, is that in order for the conduct 
of the subject to be stable, and to be truly harmonious with the way of the world, the 
genuine desire of the subject must be satisfied, that is, somehow grasping that truth 
must be the desire of the subject. The task of this Socratic/Platonic truth-telling is to 
bring the subject to shape him- or herself into a subject of truth, in the sense of one who 
is subject to the way things are, to an order in the world. 
 This lays the groundwork for the Stoic, for the priest, the confessor, and so on. 
Each of them, of course, take for granted that there is some sort of order to be fit into, 
or nature or desire on the part of the subject to be expressed or realized. Less common 
is the conviction that the desire of the subject, the aim of the subject, has to be for, or 
directed towards, the realization of that order; the aims of the ordering of desire by these 
various iterations of the director of conscience can vary. But each will speak the truth 
about the subject, will articulate what it is about the subject that needs to be worked on, 
left alone, and so on. And this possibility - that of speaking the truth - is the prerogative 
of  philosophical truth-telling, or parrhesia.
 Foucault notes the emergence of philosophical parrhesia out of criticism of the 
alleged failure of political parrhesia and, more specifically, democratic  parrhesia. In a sense, 
then, Foucault is positioning himself as a partisan of a certain sort of democracy - the 
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possibility of ruling oneself, while also living in common with others - against liberalism 
and its kind. Platonic, philosophical truth-telling - the sort of truth-telling that is 
engaged in by the liberal and critical theorist - has roots in the rejection of demos, the 
rejection of the view that the people are capable of ruling themselves. But it is more than 
simply the aristocratic rejection of  the immorality of  the masses:
For Plato, the primary danger of parrhesia is not that it leads 
to bad decisions in government, or provides the means for 
some ignorant or corrupt leader to gain power, to become a 
tyrant. The primary danger of liberty and free speech in a 
democracy is what results when everyone has his own manner 
of life, his own style of life... then there can be no common 
logos, no possible unity, for the city.265 
That is to say, unity and order are threatened by democratic or political parrhesia; if 
citizens are able to use their speech - and to claim to speak the truth, to convince others, 
to bring them to accept their ways of  living - then there will be no unity. 
 But why not? One might think that the free use of rhetoric might result in 
tyranny or oligarchy, that those who could be most flattering or pandering or deceptive 
or otherwise convincing might thereby accrue to themselves an inordinate amount of 
power, securing rule for themselves. But that is not the situation or the worry; the worry 
that individuals might be able to shape their own lives, to exist in their own distinctive 
ways, is part and parcel of a worry over the agonistic structure of Athenian democracy and 
democratic truth-telling:
So we can say that parrēsia characterizes a particular position 
of some individuals in the city which is not defined just by 
citizenship or status. I would say that it  is much rather 
characterized by a dynamic, by a dunamis, by a certain 
superiority which is also an ambition and effort to be in a 
position such that one can direct others. This superiority is 
not at all identical to that of a tyrant, who exercises power 
without rivals, as it were, even if he has enemies. The 
superiority connected to parrēsia is a superiority shared with 
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others, but shared in the form of competition, rivalry, 
conflict, and duel. It is an agonistic structure. Even if it 
implies a status, I think parrēsia is connected much less to 
status than to a dynamic and a combat, a conflict. So, a 
dynamic and agonistic structure of  parrēsia.266
And this dynamic, agnonistic structure is linked crucially to various forms of self-
expression. Foucault will go on to discuss how this agonistic structure of truth-telling 
formed the basis of a sort of ethos on the part of those who wanted to be “first rank,” to 
play a part in directing the affairs of the city, in bringing others not to agree in their 
everyday conduct, necessarily, but to lend their efforts in public affairs. In particular, it is 
a mode of self-assertion, or self-affirmation on the part of those who wish to lead. Of 
course, this is a complex mode of self-affirmation, and the conditions for such truth-
telling are neither simple nor simply epistemic, but the agonistic, partisan basis of the 
space of  political reason in Athens is, to Foucault’s mind, clear:
It is one of the internal dimensions of democracy. That is to 
say, democracy is necessary for there to be parrēsia. For there 
to be democracy there must be parrēsia; for there to be 
parrēsia there must be democracy.267
Without going further into the details, we see again Foucault’s focus on an agonistic 
system of claims-making and influence being superseded by the emergence of a 
discourse claiming to speak the objective truth and transforming the subjects of that 
truth. 
 The supplanting of agonistic, democratic parrhesia is, according to Foucault, 
Plato’s aim:
... the parrēsia that should characterize the action of some 
citizens in relation to other citizens, is no longer to be given 
by citizenship and is no longer the exercise of moral or social 
ascendancy of some over others. Parrēsia [...], truth-telling in 
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the political realm can only be founded on philosophy. It is 
not just that this parrēsia, this truth-telling must refer to an 
external philosophical discourse, but truth-telling in the field 
of politics can well and truly only be philosophical truth-
telling. Philosophical truth-telling and political truth-telling 
must be the same, inasmuch as none of the ways of 
conducting politics witnessed by Plato can assure the true 
functioning of this parrēsia. This dangerous and perilous 
game I have been talking about is no longer possible. I think 
the absolute right of philosophy over political discourse is 
clearly central in this conception of  Plato.268
Foucault is contrasting the democratic, political form of truth-telling with depoliticizing, 
philosophical forms of truth-telling, forms and practices of truth-telling that are 
supposed to bring subjects into line with a privileged truth. Platonic parrhesia, Stoic 
philosophy, these are all in many respects ancestors of, or at the very least, they begin 
furnishing the conditions for, the adoption of the juridical stance, in both philosophy 
and politics.
 Bruno Latour has also recently looked towards Plato to discover the roots of 
approaches towards political and ethical theory that oppose “might” to “right.”It is a 
common refrain among political theorists of a critical theoretic bent that, in the absence 
of a proper critical theory, the masses, the people, the demos will be lead astray through 
“ideology” or “false consciousness.” In essence, the theory of ideology, and its critique, 
is a version of Cartesian skepticism played out in the ethical and political realm, with the 
role of the evil demon being played by some set of tyrannical forces preventing the 
people from recognizing their true interests, or the moral truth, or what have you. In a 
sense, Plato’s Socratic skirmishes with Callicles, or Thrasymachus present a preview of 
this view, opposing the ideology and machinations of the mighty, or the strong, with rule 
by the truth, with the grasp of an inhuman nature that might provide us with the rules and 
laws by which to order our living together in common. Latour is insightful, however, in 
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pointing out that both Callicles and Socrates evince a distrust - a hatred, even - of the 
people, or of their self-rule; for each of them, the merely “conventional” laws and 
norms, subject to revision, to debate, and to the agonistic struggling of individuals to 
position themselves as leaders and “masters of truth,” can and must give way to a higher 
law, a natural order.269 
 While Foucault would have been unfamiliar with Latour’s work (though the 
reverse is likely untrue), he still would have been familiar with literature in classical 
studies paying close attention to the rise of privileged claims to “truth,” and to shifting 
conceptions of what truth amounted to. In particular, he would have been aware of how 
truth was seen as the object of a struggle, and not simply an agreement with “the facts.”270 
Similarly, he would have been familiar with fellow travelers of the post-Marxist left 
attempting to leave behind the world of immobile structures of productive forces and 
placing their hope in truly radical democracy.271 In the light of all this, I take Foucault to 
be tracing the genealogy, in part, of our inability to deal with the unending agonism of 
genuine democracy and the urge to halt this game in the face of some foundational 
order, accessible to all in principle but by the philosopher, the advisor, the counselor, by 
the “educator-judge,” the “social worker” judge, and, perhaps, the liberal and critical 
theorist.  
 This same distrust plays out, continually, in critical political theory today, in the 
form of the same sort of dialectic that Foucault described in his lecture series on 
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 271 Most representative in this regard would likely be the work of Castoriadis and the contributors 
to Socialisme ou Barbarie. 
psychiatric power and in his earlier works under the title of “the analytic of finitude.” 
Consider the following dialectic that has played out among theorists active in the 
tradition of the Frankfurt School and, in particular, among those  Axel Honneth has 
recently turned explicitly to philosophical anthropology in order to provide normative 
foundations for his approach to critical theory; the idea is that our social arrangements 
ought to to be arranged towards something like “human self-realization.” The details of 
Honneth’s view are unimportant for our purposes here; more interesting are the 
responses of his fellow critical theorists. For example, in a review of Honneth’s work, 
Nikolas Kompridis takes issue with the manner in which Honneth justifies this approach, 
namely, by grounding it in the “pre-theoretical” interests, desires, experiences, and claims 
of individuals. Kompridis is skeptical of the very idea of a “pretheoretical” fact. He is 
skeptical that any of these claims, in the absence of some theoretical criteria for 
identifying them, carry any normative weight or - to use the language of the tradition 
“validity.”272  Kompridis, rather than attempting to delineate a social order based on 
claims and norms deriving from philosophical anthropology, rather attempts to provide 
normative foundations for critical theory by grounding norms in the human capacity of 
“disclosure,” occurring through our everyday practices, to reveal the world in new and 
transformative ways.273 Indeed, we find here the same phenomenon Foucault has been 
tracing - the call for a normative foundation, the consequent elaboration of a 
philosophical image of human being, followed by dissatisfaction with that image, 
followed in turn by the positing of some new foundational feature, in this case, our 
“disclosive” being in the world. 
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 273 Cf. Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between  Past and Future (Cambridge MA.The MIT Press: 
2006).
 Note that the dialectic doesn’t cease; Kompridis’ work is in turn subjected to 
criticism from within the same tradition. Amy Allen, for example, has raised the exact 
same concerns about disclosure; we are able to disclose the world in novel and fruitful 
ways, but our ability to do so rests on being part of traditions and participants in practice 
that might be unjust:
...the worry is that everyday practices are permeated with 
relations of  power in ways that we as actors often do not fully 
understand. Some of these power relations are subordinating 
and dominating and others are empowering and enabling 
(and, perhaps paradoxically, some may even be both 
subordinating and empowering at the same time). The 
difficult question for critical theory, and, hence, for 
Kompridis’ notion of reflective disclosure, is how to ground 
and justify our normative distinctions between these different 
types of  power relations.274
 There are three important things, I think, to be learned from this. First, that the 
analytic of finitude is still a dominant frame for thinking in ethical and political theory; 
the head of the king has yet to be cut off. Second, note that in each of these cases, our 
everyday judgments are placed under suspicion. The distrust of the people to govern 
themselves, to know what’s best for them, to play a role in guiding the lives of those 
dearest to them, is manifest; in the absence of some criteria that would allow us to tell 
which of our convictions match up with “the way (moral) things are,” they cannot be 
trusted. It’s difficult to see, at least prima facie, how to render this sort of theory 
democratic. Third, we should note that the recurring search for foundations, the quest to 
wrangle our moral outlooks and get them in order, does very little work. After all, we call 
into question our institutions, the forms of life we lead, because they violate some set of 
our other moral intuitions, convictions, and principles. It turns out we do, in fact, give 
them weight, and any sort of foundation we could give them would have force at best 
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only ex post facto. And given that we have yet - apparently - to arrive at the theory that 
would finally legitimate them, revealing them as the moral these moral intuitions, 
convictions, and principles, as the eternal and unchanging moral landscape that we 
inhabit, it’s not clear why we need such a theory. One explanation, of course, would be 
that such theories aim at sovereignty or, at least, to advise the king. By this I mean that 
these theories aim at producing the bodies of knowledge - objective knowledge, whether 
metaphysical or scientific - that will allow for stable and effective rule. Indeed, Foucault 
notes that Plato served as an advisor to Dion, the tyrant in Syracuse, attempting to 
develop the ethos of  philosophical parrhesia in him. 
 Let us return to the question that Foucault wrote but left unspoken, of the 
genealogy of the charge of nihilism against him, of the game to be played in which the 
charge of nihilism features as a constant threat. Despite his protests that “there [was] no 
question” of performing such a genealogy, we nevertheless find an implicit one. This 
particular game of truth, the game played in the juridical stance, is the game in which 
one either aims to be the sovereign, and to install order, or still serves the sovereign. In 
§1.3, I noted that a normative framework embodies the sorts of answers that a parent 
might provide a child; that was likely being too simplistic. It resembles most the back and 
forth reasoning between a ruler and her counselors, and that is not the game that 
Foucault wants to play. 
 One might worry, at this point, that Foucault’s work has lost its teeth. After all, if 
he is not in the business of declaring discipline bad, of identifying and weeding out 
disciplinary power or biopower or what have you, then what purpose do his genealogies 
serve? How might they be critical, as is so often demanded of  contemporary philosophy?
 As was discussed in the first chapter, Foucault characterizes his work as 
“historical ontology,” or a “critical ontology of our selves.” He is committed to showing 
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us how - historically, genealogically - we have become who we are, whether we be agonistic 
subjects or subjects of correction or what have you. And who we are is intimately linked to 
the norms that we accept, the work that we must do on ourselves to adhere to those 
norms, the aims we take them to serve, and the ways in which we let ourselves be 
governed. What he doesn’t do is suggest what we should do once we know who we are. 
We may be happy with being subjects of correction; we may rest content in our 
convictions that the leniency and mercy embodied in this way of being, and of relating 
to our fellows, is of  the utmost moral value. 
 As Foucault puts it: 
... in the theoretical domain, the imperative discourse that 
consists in saying “love this, hate that, this is good, that is 
bad, be for this, beware of that,” seems to me, at present at 
any rate, to be no more than an aesthetic discourse that can only be 
based on choices of an aesthetic order. And the imperative discourse 
that consists in saying “strike against this and do so in this 
way,” seems to me to be very flimsy when delivered from a 
teaching institution... In any case, it seems to me that the 
dimension of what is to be done can only appear within a 
field of real forces... that cannot be created by a speaking 
subject alone and on the basis of his words, because it is a 
field of forces that cannot in any way be controlled or 
asserted within this kind of imperative discourse... But this is, 
after all, the circle of struggle and truth, that is to say, precisely, of 
philosophical practice.275
This is a dense passage, but there are two points to be made. 
 First, we should note, like Richard Wolin might, read Foucault as suggesting that 
moral criteria are essentially aesthetic criteria, that moral properties can be reduced to 
aesthetic properties. We are not morally bound, after all, by beauty. Nor should we think 
that this means that Foucault thinks our moral judgments or imperatives are non-
cognitive, merely expressive of preferences, paving the way for a total moral relativism. 
Rather, we should Foucault describing moral judgments as similar in character aesthetic  - or 
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reflective - judgments, in the Kantian sense. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment,  Kant 
charaterizes aesthetic, reflective judgments as importantly subjective, a response to a 
particular feature of one’s environment, and an attempt to find a way of giving 
conceptual expression to that response, as opposed to other sorts of judgment that 
involve grasping a (universal) concept under which these particulars might fall. This 
attempt to give conceptual expression to our encounters has important effects. These 
judgments carry with them a kind of force, a demand for the assent or agreement of 
others.276  In short, they are normative, claims that demand assessment in terms of 
correctness or incorrectness. But given the irreducible subjectivity and receptivity 
involved in such judgments, despite the demand for assent and the normativity 
embodied in this demand, there is no neutral or objective matter of fact that one could 
appeal to, in order to command that assent. One can appeal to the features of an object or 
an experience in support of one’s reflective judgments, but if others do not respond to 
these features, if they disagree, still one has no ground for judging them as deviant, or 
defective, or even simply irrational. One can try to adduce more reasons for the 
disagreeable but reasonable interlocutor, but it is entirely possible that there be no such 
reasons that can sway this interloctuor as he is. Indeed, just as when we argue about works 
of art we might wish that we could just see the work, from a different angle, with different 
eyes, that we could reshape the sensibilities of our opponents, or bring them to adopt 
new values that would illuminate the worth of the piece, so it is with ethical and political 
discourse, or - to be a better Foucauldian about it - discursive practice.277 But we should 
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note that Foucault isn’t, and rarely does, put forward any positive ethical content. What 
he is trying to do here concerns not what we should do but, rather, who we are. 
 I take it, secondly, that this sort of discursive practice is another agonistic mode 
of engagement with others. Rather than simply appealing to factual or natural 
foundational order, or even moral principles, to which one’s interlocutor is purportedly 
subject, and rather than simply manipulating their behaviour so as bring it in line with 
some such order, it engages with the other as a competitor or rival. As we saw in §1.4, the 
game of moral discourse involves attempts to renew or transform the convictions of our 
interlocutors. As Foucault practices it, this discursive practice, making full use of 
rhetoric, aims not only at the beliefs of the subject but at its being: perhaps, even to 
effect a conversion or a transformation. We might be persuaded, or persuade another, to give 
up some norm or form of ethical work or telos that makes us who we are now; once it 
has been revealed to us, we might not be able to tolerate what we are, or who we have - 
over decades, centuries, or millennia - become.
 We might not always be able to distinguish this work from the work of power, 
insofar as it aims at initiating us into a new space of reason, into a new form of life. There is 
always a risk that we might end up engaging with others in the purely objective stance, or 
that we might simply end up positing a foundational order to which we try to bring our 
others to subject themselves. But there is no avoiding that risk. This is - as Foucault puts 
it - the “circle of struggle and truth,” the field in which we attempt to initiate others into 
an agonistic space of reasons, and - in his time - to transgress the limits of the juridical 
stance and the subject of  correction. To Foucault’s mind, these are no longer tolerable:
And if I was interested in Antiquity it was because, for a 
whole series of reasons, the idea of morality as obedience to 
a code of rules is now disappearing, has already disappeared. 
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And to this absence of morality corresponds, must 
correspond, the search for an aesthetics of  existence.278
The point here is not that we should simply seek to shape our lives in accordance with 
criteria of beauty, grace, etc., but that we have no choice but to adopt the technologies of 
the self - technologies for influencing, impacting, indeed governing, ourselves and others 
- once we realize that foundational orders, whether “natural” or “sovereign,” cannot be 
sustained. As the discussion of aesthetic judgment above is meant to suggest, the project 
of the “aesthetics of existence” is a possible way of initiating subjects into into an 
agonistic form of life, one in which - in the absence of foundations - our moral relation 
to ourselves must be more of a styling or crafting than an attempt to conform such an 
order. 
 This is the aim of a critical ontology of who we are; after all, there is nothing about 
what we are that determines who we are; the truths about ourselves that we take to matter, 
to be meaningful and normative with respect to who we are. And once we realize that, we 
are left with the necessity of figuring out just what exactly will be. In 1978, Foucault 
describes philosophical practice as a circle of struggle and truth; in 1984 he will describe 
his philosophical practice as a “critical ethos” or stance that embraces transgressing the 
historical limits, norms, and structures that determine who we are:
The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in 
the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that 
takes the form of a possible crossing-over... This entails an 
obvious consequence: that criticism is no longer going to be 
practiced in the search for formal structures with universal 
value but, rather, as a historical investigation into the events 
that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize 
ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. 
In that sense, this criticism is not transcendental, and its goal 
is not that of  making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical 
in its design and archaeological in its method. Archaeological 
- and not transcendental - in the sense that it will not seek to 
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identify the universal structures of all knowledge [connaissance] 
or of all possible moral action, but will seek to treat the 
instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and 
do as so many historical events. And this critique will be 
genealogical in the sense that it  will not deduce from the 
form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to 
know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has 
made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, 
doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.279
I take it that my account of Foucault’s project gives real substance to these words, and 
makes much clearer the notion of critique that Foucault rejects, and the “limit-attitude,” 
or “ethos” that he hopes to cultivate in its stead, in the form of  “historical ontology.”
 Foucault articulates his project of historical ontology in the context of a 
discussion of Kant’s thought on Enlightenment, and situates his own thought in a 
broadly Kantian tradition. Many have written about the connection between Kant and 
Foucault’s work.280  I don’t intend to challenge these other interpretations; in fact, I 
assume that some of them are consistent with most of what I have put forward. Rather, 
I take it that an account of Foucault’s project is all the stronger the more it can 
incorporate and make intelligible numerous aspects of that project. I want to argue that 
we can make the best sense of Foucault’s “Enlightenment” ethos, his “ethics” of critique, 
as precisely an engaged, practical effort to bring both himself and other subjects - his 
readers in particular - into the sort of agonistic, dynamic, politicized stance that we have 
seen him repeatedly discuss.281  Perhaps even more idiosyncratically, we can bring out 
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is Foucault’s aim; cf. Rayner, Foucault’s Heidegger: Philosophy and Transformative Experience. Rayner, however, 
approaches Foucault through a reading of Heidegger (and of Foucault’s reading of Heidegger) that I don’t 
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these themes through a rethinking of Foucault’s doubly controversial engagements, 
through 1978-79, with Iranian Revolution and neoliberal government. This will be the 
task of  the next, and concluding, chapter. 
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4PUTTING THE ACCOUNT TO THE TEST: FOUCAULT ON 
BIOPOLITICS, NEOLIBERALISM, AND THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION
The text that comprises “What is Enlightenment?” - Foucault’s most explicitly 
Kantian text, and one of his final publications - went through several iterations, with 
many passages serving almost word for word as the introductory lectures in his 1983 
course on the Government of Self and Others.282 But the main ideas - presented in strikingly 
similar ways in many respects - had been worked out at least 6 years earlier. 
In 1978, in an interview published as “What is Critique?” Foucault first makes 
public his allegiance to the Enlightenment, at least as what he calls an “historico-
philosophical” discourse, that he finds emerging in Kant’s occasional writings.283 This 
move raised the eyebrows and hackles of many of Foucault’s critics; Habermas thought 
the move showed staggering inconsistency on the part of a figure who, he thought, had 
thoroughly rejected the “old fashioned European rationality” of the Enlightenment. In 
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the end, Habermas - like so many - thought that Foucault had made some sort of “turn,” 
ultimately repudiating his nihilism for a set of  Enlightenment normative standards.284 
  Simultaneously, in a move that still receives relatively little attention, Foucault 
identified and – in various newspaper and journal articles – gave his unflinching and 
exclusive support to Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic wing of the Iranian Revolution. 
This move drew much criticism; his work was taken by many to show a callous disregard 
for the cruelty of Shari’a law and the poor station of women under Islamic rule, through 
a shallow sort of Orientalism.285  After Khomeini’s government instituted theocratic 
executive power and an exclusively clerical jurisprudence, Foucault fell silent on Iran. But 
the question remains: how could Foucault align himself with the tradition of Kant, of 
Marx, Weber, Adorno, and Habermas (critics of European rationality, but also prophets 
– whether optimistic or pessimistic – of a West ruled by a purified, enlightened, 
humanized reason) while at the same time supporting a radical, politicized Islam? What 
did he take from the Iranian situation, how can we make sense of it in the context of his 
professed relation to Kant and “critique”?
 1978 also marks Foucault’s most explicit engagement with the concepts of “bio-
politics.” He first deploys the concept in his lectures of 1975-76, entitled “Society Must Be 
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Defended,” and concludes the first volume of The History of Sexuality with a discussion of 
the lethal consequences of bio-political governance in the Holocaust, Soviet purges, and 
the constant threat of nuclear annihilation. He claims that bio-political imperatives, like 
those of the welfare State and its intermediaries in the medical and helping professions 
to “make live or let die” - as opposed to the sovereign privilege to “let live or make die” - 
are now in fact the horizon of Western politics. In part because of the striking nature of 
these claims, no doubt, bio-politics has been a major focus of much Foucauldian 
research over the last 20 years or so. Nevertheless, the concept has remained quite 
pliable, in part because Foucault - despite nominally designating a course to the topic - 
very rarely discusses it explicitly. We know that it is meant to designate a new set of 
practices and imperatives that have, he takes it, in some sense either superseded, or 
emerged alongside and transformed, disciplinary practices in many important respects 
through the late 19th and early 20th century.286 
 In “Society Must Be Defended” Foucault’s discussion of bio-politics appears as a 
coda to a semester-long history of the concept of the “race war.” One of Foucault’s 
avowed goals in this lecture course is to investigate the origins, limits, and fecundity of 
analyzing power-relations in terms of war, in terms of military tactics. Indeed, more than 
anything else, this sort of discursive practice is the focus of the course. We’ve already 
encountered, in §3.2, this attempt to “invert Clausewitz’ dictum” and see “politics as war 
by other means.”287  It is a prototypical form of the agonistic, dynamic shaping of 
subjectivity that we have seen Foucault excavating in ancient Athens, in medieval 
Germanic justice, and beneath the surface of  both penal discipline and activism. 
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 One can make the best sense of the discussion of race and racism, and the basic 
structure of Foucault’s insights into bio-politics with this dimension of the “war-model” 
in mind. After all, in determining the sources and limits of the discourse of the “race-
war,” Foucault is explicit in praising it. In the context of the emergence of the discourse 
of “race” war, “race” is not taken in even a quasi-biological sense; it originally refers to 
something perhaps closer to “class,” and is indeed the discourse from which Marx and 
Engels claim to have found the concept of “class war.”288 But Foucault’s main interest in 
the emergence of the discourse of race-war as it emerged in early modern England and, 
later, France, is that it is an oppositional discourse, an “historico-political” discourse that 
opposes what he calls philosophical or juridical discourses.289 The important point of 
contrast lies in the constitutive partiality of historico-political discourse. This is different 
in kind from the philosophico-juridical insofar as the latter is concerned with elucidating 
truths, norms, and rights that are objective in the particular sense of allegedly being 
binding for any “rational” subject, any subject of rights, from which practical 
commitments can be drawn and competing claims impartially adjudicated.290
 Historico-political discourse, in this sense, rests on an authority that comes not 
from some sovereign right of subjectivity but from from one’s investment in a struggle, 
situated in an agonistic context or field of force-relations. And, I would like to suggest, 
there is an irreducibly first-personal dimension to this; the rights claimed by, say, the 
Diggers or the Levellers are grounded in who they are. They are not “objective” in the 
sense that they could necessarily be agreed to by anyone who does not share the same 
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first-personal commitments. And they are truths about who one is precisely because they 
are integrated into projects and, consequently, struggles; such a discourse could not be 
used to “guide” action from a disinterested vantage point. The normativity of these 
claims  born in struggle is of  the aesthetic order.291 
 As we have seen, philosophico-juridical discourse is taken by Foucault to stand 
opposed to this; there are important truths about who (and, more often) what we are that 
are available only from an essentially neutral or third-personal standpoint, truths that 
nevertheless have some sort of normative claim on us. And their normative authority 
depends precisely on the fact that they are neutral in this way; first-personal commitment 
can only be distorting, and the ideal of philosophico-juridical discourse is to provide 
truths that, because objective, might be binding for all. For example, the discourse of 
natural rights in early modern philosophy articulates truths about us that are available to 
all, and which are authoritative for us because of this impartial availability, and thus serve 
to provide normative guidance independent of our projects, commitments, and 
struggles, regulating the behaviour of  individuals, groups, populations, and nations. 
 Foucault, then, praises the discourse of race war insofar as it offers a model of 
political discourse and practice that “cuts off  the king’s head”:
...this historico-political discourse is not, and cannot be, that 
of the Prince's politics" or, obviously, that of absolute power. 
It is in fact a discourse that inevitably regards the Prince as... 
at best, an enemy. This is, basically, a discourse that cuts off 
the king's head...292
  What Foucault finds, in “Society Must Be Defended,” is that this oppositional 
discourse becomes both co-opted by State power, and the truths it produces rendered 
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objective by incorporation into the scientific discourses of medicine and (misguided 
racial) biology.293  The oppositional aspect of the discourse is absorbed into the State 
discourse, and so the opposition between rival combatants is transformed into an internal 
division, a division within the unity of society and the combative, agonistic dimension 
neutralized into a project of purification. The discourse of race war is only able to be co-
opted and neutralized in this way through its “objectification” in biological discourses; 
the truths of “race” are available to all, and their normative authority is no longer linked 
to first-personal struggle but to a third-personal discourse of health. Health therefore 
takes on political significance, the State takes on the responsibility of administrating it, 
and political problems and medical problems begin to overlap. All of this results in the 
eclipse of the sovereign State’s right to “let live or make die” by the imperative to “make 
life live.” This discourse of the State’s responsibility for the health of the nation plays 
itself  out in the history of  State racism. 
 I want to stress here is that, whatever differences there are between bio-politics 
and disciplinary power - and Foucault clearly thinks that the two modes of power co-
exist, buttress, and cohere with each other - he is tracing the same sort of genealogical 
story, the neutralization and depoliticization of engaged, agonistic forms of life in and 
through the objectifying integration of scientific discourses into the production of 
political order, resulting in new and different sorts of subjects. He is explicitly tracing the 
way that philosophy... 
 ... codifies struggle, war, and confrontations into a logic... it 
turns them into the twofold process of the totalization and 
revelation of a rationality... The dialectic, finally, ensures the 
historical constitution of a universal subject, a reconciled 
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 293 It should be noted here that – though of  course the pseudo-science of  racial biology did not 
produce truths about race – Foucault’s critique is not an epistemic critique; science may tell us many really 
true things about ourselves. Foucault is just trying to identify spaces for other discourses that tell truths 
about our selves, differently.
truth, and a right in which all particularities have their 
ordained place. The Hegelian dialectic and all those that came 
after it must, I think and as I will try to demonstrate to you, 
be understood as philosophy and right's colonization and 
authoritarian colonization of a historico-political discourse 
that was both a statement of fact, a proclamation, and a 
practice of social warfare... The dialectic is the philosophical 
order's, and perhaps the political order's, way of colonizing 
this bitter and partisan discourse of basic warfare. There you 
have the general frame within which I would like to try this 
year to retrace the history of  this discourse.294 
I have already outlined how this process, involving the human sciences and penal 
practice, played out in the case of disciplinary power. And it is interesting, in that with 
the establishment of a “natural” or objective  that the sort of “racism” that is usually 
associated with Foucault’s work on bio-politics is also present in his discussion of 
disciplinary practices. Indeed, it seems that the inhabitants of the “carceral society” were 
among those who though “society must be defended,” though, in this case, from a 
“criminal” race or species.295  Foucault foreshadows this aspect of his work on bio-
politics, and its relation to earlier frameworks of “juridical” thought, in an even earlier 
lecture course:
Whether we take Hobbes, Locke, or later French theorists, we 
can say that there was a juridico-political type of discourse 
one role of which-though not the only role, of course-was to 
constitute what I will call a formal and theoretical 
discriminant that enables one to distinguish between good 
and bad political regimes... After the third wave of 
republican, democratic, nationalist, and sometimes socialist 
revolutions that shook Europe between 1848 and 1871, it was 
psychiatry, and psychology [and the human sciences] in 
general, that people tried to put to work as a discriminant.We 
will possess the principle of discrimination if it  can be 
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 295 Foucault notes the view, not uncommon at the time, that “ it is not crime that alienates an 
individual from society, but that crime is itself due rather to the fact that one is in society as an  alien, that one 
belongs to that 'bastardized race', as Target called it, to that 'class degraded by misery whose vices stand like an 
invincible obstacle to the generous intentions that wish to combat it' ... [and] that in the courts society as a 
whole does not judge one of its members, but that a social category with an interest in order judges 
another that is dedicated to disorder” (Discipline & Punish, p. 276, emphasis mine)
proved that these contemporary movements are led by a 
biologically, anatomically, psychologically, and psychiatrically 
deviant class of men. Biological, anatomical, psychological, 
and psychiatric science makes it possible to recognize 
immediately the political movement that can be endorsed and 
the movement that must be discredited.296
Foucault thinks that bio-political strategies of State power were made possible in part by 
the assimilation of an oppositional discourse into objective, scientific discourse and the 
transformation of  the discourse-as-struggle into discourse-on-(internal)-struggle. 
 We can outline how this sort of process takes place with respect to “biopolitics” 
as well. Foucault’s original plan for the History of Sexuality project was to provide a 
genealogy of modern bio-politics, culminating in a volume entitled Population and Races. 
 The concept of population is crucial here, as Foucault distinguishes bio-politics 
from disciplinary power in part due to the fact that bio-politics takes the population as 
its object, where disciplinary power targets the body. The population is thus constituted 
both as a unified object whose care is entrusted to the government and, consequently, as a 
“site of veridiction,” an object about which one can gain objective knowledge, 
knowledge that can then become normative, serving to lay the groundwork for a political 
order in which there will be the normal, and the deviant. 
 In order for the auto-immune mechanisms of bio-politics to play out – as they 
have tragically done over the last 100 years – State power must have taken the “care” of 
its subjects as its objective, as the sort of beings for whom such care is crucial, namely, as 
“populations.” When faced, for example, with the problem of securing urban territories 
against plague, against meteorological disaster, etc., that is, not against violations of right 
but against the danger of probabilistic and uncertain events, the State needs to govern a 
population, a body of living beings whose behaviour is intelligible in terms of statistical 
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Salomoni. Trans. Graham Burchell. New York NY. Verso: 2003), pp. 152-154
probability, these truths being mined from the nascent discourses of statistics, political 
economy, biology, and so on.297 
 That such a strategy of government might find a foothold, however, required 
that the ruled – citizens, subjects, individuals – be accustomed to being “governed 
economically,” that is, that they submit to being directed to their “natural” ends, in 
accordance with objective truths about their dispositions. This “conduct of conduct” 
Foucault calls governmentality. Foucault sees the conditions of “governmentality,” and 
thus the possibility of bio-politics, stretching further back into the development of 
“pastoral power”298. In early ecclesiastic communities, the individual is induced to confess 
one’s desires, one’s inner life, as an important truth about one’s dispositions. But the 
normative authority of this truth – its ability to provide direction for action, living – 
derives from its interpretation by the mediating figure of the priest. The priest has an 
authoritative knowledge. And here we see the fate of sorts of philosophers and spiritual 
advisors whose emergence so absorbed Foucault in the last years of his life, those whose 
access to the truth allowed them a privileged position from which to govern themselves 
and others.  
 The genealogy of government and governmentality in their broadest senses - 
which Foucault pursues from Athens through the Chicago School - explains how it is 
that individuals might come to think that there is a truth inside them, such that if it were 
only explained to them, might explain how it is that they ought to live. Given the 
continuity between pastoral and biopolitical government, it is unsurprising that people 
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 298  The discussion of pastoral power can be found throughout Security, Territory, Population. 
Indeed, in 1979, well after the events of the Iranian Revolution were concluded and he was lecturing at the 
Collège de France on neoliberalism, Foucault gave the address that would be entitled Omnes et  Singulatim: 
Towards a Critique of Political Reason at Stanford University that focused precisely on the centrality of 
pastoral power for our contemporary political self-conceptions. 
accustomed to the former did not bristle at the latter; all that has shifted is the type of 
truth being sought in people - biological, medical, sexual – and, correlatively, the 
authority that interprets them and renders them normative, from the priest to the 
scientist, the expert, the counsel and administrator. Bio-politics is able to emerge in 
history with barely a ripple through subtle transformations of the ways that subjects are 
governed by the truth. The story that Foucault tells us about this process is more 
complicated and detailed, but it  is in 1978 that Foucault’s thinking about bio-politics and 
governmentality, their convergence and relation, are expressed most explicitly. 
 It is with reference to bio-politics and bio-political governmentality that one 
must understand Foucault’s ill-fated dalliance with radical Islam. Throughout his writings 
on the subject, one finds Foucault discussing the promise of Islamic government. This is a 
particularly prevalent theme in his most well-known piece on Iran, “What are the 
Iranians Dreaming About?”299  It is striking to read Foucault’s critical remarks about 
Western ideals of revolution, and of liberation, and to see him throw his support behind 
a form of government. But this move is comprehensible when we remember the central 
role that governmentality had taken on in his work at the time, both in Security, Territory, 
Population, and The Birth of Biopolitics. In fact, “governmentality” seemed to eclipse 
“biopolitics” in Foucault’s thought; for example, between 1980 and 1984, 3 out of 5 of 
his lecture courses at the Collège de France included the term “government” in their 
titles. Foucault, perhaps naively, takes the idea of “Islamic government” to be a form of 
self-government, one that importantly resists the authority on which bio-political 
government rests. He, as usual, has very little to say about the positive content of this 
Islamic, self-government. As his engagement with Islam and the Iranian Revolution takes 
place in a journalistic context, he states this contrast in terms of “traditional forms of 
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life” vs. a sort of “modernization.”300 But the real distinction here is, in fact, between a 
particular form of bio-politics, namely, neoliberal governmentality, and the agonistic sort 
of  self-affirmation that Foucault has traced time and time again. 
 As mentioned, the object of bio-politics is the population. The “population” is the 
object of both regulative practices and of the sort of scientific knowledge that will 
provide the normative order into which political life will be pressed. While the discourses 
of biology, epidemiology, and other measures of public health and welfare are certainly 
central to this knowledge, Foucault is explicit that political economy is - par excellence - the 
science that gets at the “truth” of the population, and that liberal government is its 
correlate. The market becomes a “site of veridiction,” the arena in which the truths of 
market behaviour become normative for governmental conduct.301 And liberal government is 
that which takes this truth as its  principle, that is to say, as ultimately normative. In early 
forms of liberalism, this takes the form of “laissez-faire” government, government that 
attempt to let the market run its course, in contrast to other intensively interventionary 
forms of government.302  Slowly, bio-politics is becoming a kind of econo-politics. 
Nevertheless, as Foucault states, liberalism is a naturalism.303 That is to say, the “natural 
order” made manifest in the economic activity of the population will become 
foundational. But it is with neoliberal government that we finally see how political 
economy intersects with State power through the bio-political imperative to “make life 
live.” 
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Foucault and the Iranian Revolution.
 301 The Birth of  Biopolitics, p. 32-34. 
 302 This includes discipline, of course, but see also Security, Territory, Population for a discussion of 
Raison d’État. 
 303 The Birth of  Biopolitics, p. 61. 
 In a sense, neoliberal bio-politics is the purest example of the replacement of 
agonistic politics. Consider Foucault’s discussion of the first neo-liberals, the German 
“ordo-liberals.” The problem confronting the ordo-liberals was the establishment of a 
legitimate political order in the wake of the devastation of WWII. The attempted 
solution to that problem was to remove politics, the struggle over substantive values and 
the form of one’s life, and to claim that the economic order would provide the absolute 
and exclusive basis for political life.304  But neoliberalism cannot simply be the 
abolishment of government: “So, it is a matter of a market economy without laissez-
faire, that is to say, an active policy without state control. Neoliberalism should not 
therefore be identified with laissez-faire, but rather with permanent vigilance, activity, 
and intervention.”305  Neoliberalism requires constant governmental activity because, 
paradoxically, the perfectly natural mechanism of the market is nevertheless constantly 
under threat. If the object of bio-politics is the population, and the truth about the 
population is discovered by political economy, and it is neoliberal governmentality that 
realizes or inscribes this order in reality with all the weight of the State behind it, then 
neoliberal governmentality really does “make the population live,” institutionalizing the 
purportedly most basic, objective features of  human life.306
 In his lectures of 18 January 1978, as demonstrations in Iran against the Shah 
intensified, Foucault was describing the subject of revolt in the context of the biopolitical 
government of  the population:
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 305 The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 132. On this point see also Mirowski and Plewhe (ed.), The Road to 
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 306  It would be instructive to compare Foucault here with Arendt’s account in The Human 
Condition of  the displacement of  politics from the center of  human life by “life” and “labour.”
Well, this is the people. The people comprises those who 
conduct themselves in relation to the management of the 
population, at the level of the population, as if they were not 
part of the population as a collective subject-object, as if they 
put themselves outside of it, and consequently the people is 
those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the 
system.307
Foucault’s view of the transformative potential of Islamic self-government was clearly 
clouded by a good deal of Orientalism (though perhaps no more than the hopes of 
many westerners for the Arab Spring).308 But what was he looking for? I think that, in 
the face of the economic modernization of Iran under the Shah, the increasing 
government of the population through political economy, Foucault was searching for the 
people, the collective subject of  revolt, against neoliberal governmentality.
  Throughout his writings on the Iranian revolution, we find him stressing what 
he takes to be the non-hierarchical organization of Islamic religious community. As 
Foucault saw it, the imams, as leaders or – perhaps better – as organizers of (religious) 
life do not make a claim to political authority on the basis of scientific  authority, possibly 
not even on the basis of any epistemic authority at all. Now, this was hopelessly mistaken 
with regard to Khomeini, whose Islamic  Government had, in 1970, explicitly claimed 
authority to rule on the basis of the privileged knowledge of trained mullahs. But what 
Foucault imagined was a decentralized mode of organization, in which imams afforded 
provisional leadership for just those followers they engaged in discussion. The religious 
leaders are “like so many photographic plates on which the anger and the aspirations of 
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 308  Many Westerners pushed for genuinely democratic self-governance on the part of the 
Egyptian people, who themselves supported the Muslim Brotherhood to a large degree, and some even for 
military support for nominally democratic rebels. The outcome of  this remains unclear.
the community are marked. If they wanted to go against the current, they would lose this 
power, which essentially resides in the interplay of  speaking and listening.”309
 The discourse of radical Islam in the Iranian Revolution was therefore, for 
Foucault, akin to that of the Levellers, and the Diggers, of the originators of the 
discourse of race war. It serves as a counterhistory, and its political manifestation as a sort 
of counterconduct. Most importantly for Foucault, it serves as a discourse in which 
governing truths are not pronounced with the impersonal authority of science, and not 
through a process of objectification, of neutralization, of rendering available to all. They 
are truths not produced through inquiry (and certainly not through self-inquiry) but 
through gestures of rejection, of revolt, and through the shaping and formation of a new 
political subjectivity; through struggle, and conflict, a new who is being formed. This is 
part of what Foucault considers the strange destiny of Persia, and of Islam; in this 
culture that, he thinks, invented the State and, in centuries past, developed its 
administrative form, he finds a new sort of political will: a “possibility we [Westerners] 
have forgotten since the Renaissance and the great crisis of Christianity, a political 
spirituality.”310 
 This term garnered some attention from Foucault’s critics at the time but, despite 
his silence regarding Iran after Khomeini tightened his grip on power, Foucault did not 
give up on “spirituality.” In fact, in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, delivered a few short 
years later at the Collège de France, Foucault “spirituality” would replace “race-war” as 
the object of Foucault’s praise. Spirituality is, for Foucault, the name of those sets of 
practices in which the subject must subject itself to trial, in order to reach a truth about 
itself that it might affirm; whatever normative authority the truth might have for 
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conduct derives from these practices. While Foucault focuses, in these lectures, on the 
way these these practices take shape at the level of individual subject-formation, it is the 
same phenomenon that he saw writ large in the early stages of the Islamic revolt in Iran. 
After tracing it from the British civil war to to the streets of Tehran, he follows this 
phenomenon to the practices of the Athenian elite. He dates the end of its political 
efficacy to roughly the same period, a “Cartesian moment” marking the end of the 
Renaissance: the need to transform oneself –through an épreuve, an ordeal, trial, or 
struggle – in order to produce or access normatively authoritative truths is superseded by 
a project of accessing objective truth, a truth available to all, and hence (potentially) 
authoritative for all.311  The latter, for Foucault, is one of the (many) distant seeds of 
bio-politics. 
 It is in light of all the preceding that we can best understand Foucault’s alignment 
with the Kantian project of critique, an engagement that stretches from 1978 until his 
death. The aspect of Kant that Foucault wrestles with for 6 years is the nature of 
“Enlightenment” as an exit from immaturity, that is, from government by others. For Kant, 
this means taking on the responsibility for knowing for oneself, over against the 
normative authority of the clergy, of doctors, or of rulers. It involves refusing their 
government by critiquing their epistemic authority. This project – as Foucault calls it, the 
“art of not being governed” – is inherited by him slightly differently; as we have seen, 
Foucault’s art of not being governed is not a direct epistemic challenge to the truths 
produced by reason, by science, by medicine, or even by religion. It is a challenge to the 
normative authority of those truths even if they’re true. Figuring out who we are, engaging 
in a “critical ontology of our selves,” is not a matter of producing an objective account 
of ourselves, but producing new truths about ourselves that are only intelligible from our 
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situations, our struggles, and only guide us insofar as they remain partial, remain ours. If 
Foucault came to insist that we “experiment” on our selves and our limits, it  is because 
this word “experiment” still holds traces of its original meaning of “trial,” “test,” 
“ordeal.” This is why critique is an attitude, that is, a stance, a position, a way of being 
partisan. He inherits from Enlightenment an agonism, in both his approach to the history 
of the West and in his ceaseless attempts to think it differently. For Foucault, global 
revolution holds no appeal; it is only in revolt, local and partial, that we genuinely engage 
in what he ultimately came to refer to as our “patient labour, giving form to our 
impatience for liberty.”  
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